Peter Millican

Published in 1966, Joseph Weizenbaum’s ELIZA is the first conversational agent or chatbot, most famous for its DOCTOR persona. In 2021, a group of scholars recovered the original source code for ELIZA from the MIT archives. For about four years, an expanded team of eight scholars from diverse disciplines explored this code through weekly meetings in one of the longest ongoing projects of critical code studies. This paper presents both the methodology of conversational close reading as well as the substantive findings that resulted from the sustained collaborative inquiry. Their investigation examined not only how ELIZA functions technically but also what it reveals about the cultural moment of its development and its enduring influence. The team interrogated the code by reading it line-by-line, porting it to other languages, and attempting to run it on emulators, while also consulting archival materials and conducting interviews with Weizenbaum’s contemporaries. This collaborative approach revealed significant discrepancies between Weizenbaum’s published descriptions of ELIZA and its actual implementation, including previously undocumented features and editing of canonical conversations. The project demonstrates how critical code studies can operate as a conversational method, where a team of scholars with diverse disciplinary backgrounds can use a technical analysis to open up a broader cultural and philosophical discussion. By treating source code as a cultural text rich with historical significance, this work bridges software history with code analysis and offers insights into the development of human–computer conversation that have become more increasingly relevant in today’s era of large language models. This paper selectively documents the team’s process, discoveries, and reflections, offering their collaborative model as a template for understanding both historical and contemporary computational artifacts for future projects in critical code studies.

This paper aims to assess the cogency of Hume’s famous argument against testimony for miracles. Hume starts by arguing in favour of a “general Maxim” which involves balancing the strength of the testimony “considered apart and in itself” against the inductive unlikelihood of the reported event. But although this reasoning shows real insight – anticipating what is now known as the “base rate fallacy” – it turns out that such a separation cannot work, and an adequate maxim must inevitably take into account the specific nature of the reported event when evaluating the epistemic strength of the testimony. There is also a deeper problem with Hume’s argument, which arises from his treating a miracle as an extreme example of an inductively unlikely event. For the believer can agree that miracles are inductively unlikely – or even physically impossible – whenever the world is proceeding normally. Where she will differ from Hume is in claiming that divine activity can interfere with the natural order, and can sometimes be identified through its purposive nature. Naturalist philosophers – like Hume – are likely to reject this, but their best argument for doing so comes not from theoretical probabilistic maxims, but from the hopelessly unconvincing track record of miracle reports.

Peter Millican addresses the issue of how to best interpret Hume’s iconic passages on causation and causal powers and aims to cut through the various interpretations by fixing twelve ‘key points’ and arguing that a reductivist reading makes best sense of them. With these twelve points regarding Hume’s theory fixed, Millican turns toward adjudicating between reductivist, subjectivist, and projectivist interpretations. First, Millican attacks subjectivist interpretations on the grounds that they emphasize melodramatic passages in tension with Hume’s more considered claims, especially the first definition of necessity. Millican backs up the critical comments about subjectivism with a plausibly Humean account of what his ‘impression of power or necessary connexion’ might be. Then he turns to projectivist interpretations. Here, he argues that projectivist readings can be accommodated by the reductivist reading he is defending. After that, he turns to the ‘New Hume’, who allegedly accepted ‘thick’ causal powers, which push beyond the two definitions of cause. However, Millican emphasizes that Hume did accept causal powers in some thinner sense, powers that reduce to causal structures in the world that allow the discovery of laws and enable predictive success.

This very impressive collection, in the Routledge Philosophical Minds series, contains thirty-eight essays (averaging around thirteen pages apiece) on a series of topics carefully selected to cover the broad range of Hume's philosophy, but also his context, the reception of his work, and his legacy. Many familiar long-term Hume scholars have contributed, and seem to be generally very well chosen, but there are also a good number of contributions from excellent younger scholars. In a somewhat similar pattern, many of the papers are on well-worn central topics of Hume's philosophy, of a sort that will be familiar from other general collections on Hume that have appeared over the last couple of decades. But alongside... Read More.

The common tendency to characterize Hume’s philosophy as simply “skeptical,” “naturalist,” “empiricist,” or “irreligious” is a mistake. Rather, his philosophy is best seen as responding to a number of specific issues that captured his attention in the 1730s, mostly involving causation and thus explaining his particular enthusiasm for applying the Copy Principle to that idea. Other enthusiasms that shaped Book 1 of the Treatise later faded, but the “Chief Argument” around causation—and causal/inductive inference—remains the consistent core of Hume’s theoretical philosophy through theand the many editions of the first Enquiry. In the Enquiry, moreover, Hume manages to tame the corrosive skepticism of the Treatise, enabling him to pursue his ambitions towards a naturalistic “science of man” while maintaining a discriminating skepticism towards aprioristic metaphysics and religion.

Traditionally, Hume has widely been viewed as the standard-bearer for regularity accounts of causation. But between 1983 and 1990, two rival interpretations appeared—namely the skeptical realism of Wright, Craig, and Strawson, and the quasi-realist projectivism of Blackburn—and since then the interpretative debate has been dominated by the contest between these three approaches, with projectivism recently appearing the likely winner. This paper argues that the controversy largely arose from a fundamental mistake, namely, the assumption that Hume is committed to the subjectivity of our conception of causal necessity. That assumption generated tensions within the regularity account, which the skeptical realist and quasi-realist alternatives, in very different ways, purported to resolve. But a broader and more balanced view of the textual evidence, taking due account of the relatively neglected sections where Hume applies the results of his analysis, tells strongly in favour of an objectivist regularity view, both in respect of causation and causal necessity. Despite some complications, the upshot is a far more straightforward reading of Hume than those that have hitherto dominated this long-running debate.

Hume’s argument concerning induction is the foundation stone of his philosophical system, and one of the most celebrated and influential arguments in the entire literature of western philosophy. It is therefore rather surprising that the enormous attention which has been devoted to it over the years has not resulted in any general consensus as to how it should be interpreted, or, in consequence, how Hume himself should be seen. At one extreme is the traditional view, which takes the argument to be thoroughly sceptical, leading to the sweeping conclusion that all “probable reasoning” or “reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” is utterly worthless, so that Hume is portrayed as a negative Pyrrhonian intent on undermining the credentials of all our would-be knowledge of the world. But at the other extreme a number of very prominent commentators, particularly in recent years, have put forward a strikingly contrasting view, that Hume’s intentions here are entirely non-sceptical, and that so far from advancing a negative thesis himself, he is merely intent on showing the implausible consequences of the “rationalist” position taken by some of his philosophical opponents

This is the second of two volumes of essays on the ideas of Alan Turing, whose pioneering work in artificial intelligence and computer science made him one of the seminal thinkers of the century. A distinguished international cast of contributors offer original investigations of key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, celebrating Turing's intellectual legacy in these fields. 'fascinating...we can all learn by reading these essays because they encourage us to explore issues beyond our normal sphere of expertise' Choice.