Peter R. Sutton

Wright holds that the following two theses are jointly incoherent: Rules determine correct language use. These rules are discoverable via internal reflection on language use. I argue that incoherence is derivable from alone and examine two types of probabilistic accounts that model a modification of, one in terms of inexact knowledge, the other in terms of viewing semantic rules as reasons for linguistic actions. Both accommodate tolerance by breaking the link between justified assertion and truth, but incoherence threatens their conception of justified assertion. I argue that the rules-as-reasons approach can relocate sharp boundaries to a place where they are not only more tolerable, but to be expected.

This paper addresses both semantic issues of countability in linguistics, and philosophical issues arising from the problem of the many. I argue (i) that the problem of the many is orthogonal to vagueness and we should look to the semantics of count nouns and numerals for its solution; (ii) that the problem of the many is a challenge for contemporary mereological analyses of count nouns in semantics; but (iii) that the count criterion in these theories can be weakened to avoid the problem. Specifically, _weak quantization_ is proposed as the criterion: a sum, _x_, counts as _n_ _P_s if and only if _x_ has _n_ disjoint parts, each of which is in the extension of _P_, but where the sum of no two of them is also in the extension of _P_. I show how importing this idea into the semantics of numerals provides a semantic means of dissolving the paradox.