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95Can Morality Be CodifiedAustralian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 11 (1-2): 145-154. 2010.In this paper, I will examine the debate between the principlists and the particularists with special focus on the question of whether there is any true and coherent set of moral principles that codifies the moral landscape metaphysically speaking. My stance on this issue is an extreme sort of particularism which gives a ‘no’ answer to the above question. Yet it is significantly different from the positions of other extremists like John McDowell, Jonathan Dancy and Margaret Little. In section 2,…Read more
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36On the Reconceptualization of HealthAmerican Journal of Bioethics 14 (7): 16-17. 2014.No abstract
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33Can the AFR Approach Stand Up to the Test of Reasonable Pluralism?American Journal of Bioethics 18 (3): 61-62. 2018.
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32What Doesn’t Kill Primary Reason Atomism Will Only Make It Stronger: A Limited DefenseEthical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3): 431-446. 2023.Against the reason holists (e.g. Dancy 2014), it has been contended by many reason atomists that while many features might well change their reason statuses or valences in different contexts in the way suggested by reason holists, they are merely secondary rather than primary reasons. In these atomists’ scheme of things, there are features that function as primary reasons whose reason statuses remain invariant across contexts. Moreover, these features provide the ultimate source of explanations …Read more
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Biomedical Moral Enhancement in the Face of Moral ParticularismIn Michael Hauskeller & Lewis Coyne (eds.), Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press. 2018.
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44Moral perception, for the purposes of this article, is taken to be the perception of moral properties, unless contexts dictate otherwise. While both particularists and generalists agree that we can perceive the moral properties of an action or a feature, they disagree, however, over whether rules play any essential role in moral perception. The particularists argue for a ‘no’ answer, whereas the generalists say ‘yes’. In this paper, I provide a limited defense of particularism by rebutting sever…Read more
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16Marginally Represented Patients, Best Interests, and Ends-in-ThemselvesAmerican Journal of Bioethics 20 (2): 57-59. 2020.Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 57-59.
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823Shapelessness and predication supervenience: a limited defense of shapeless moral particularismPhilosophical Studies 166 (S1): 51-67. 2013.Moral particularism, on some interpretations, is committed to a shapeless thesis: the moral is shapeless with respect to the natural. (Call this version of moral particularism ‘shapeless moral particularism’). In more detail, the shapeless thesis is that the actions a moral concept or predicate can be correctly applied to have no natural commonality (or shape) amongst them. Jackson et al. (Ethical particularism and patterns, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) argue, however, that the shapele…Read more
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16Traditional, Not the Usual: On Misrepresenting Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome Network Lower Tidal Volume TrialAmerican Journal of Bioethics 20 (1): 54-56. 2020.
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44Biomedical Moral Enhancement in the Face of Moral Particularism – AddendumRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 271-271. 2019.
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97Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Erkenntnis 81 (3): 545-560. 2016.Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, and Philip Pettit contend in their 2000 paper that an argument from supervenience deals a fatal blow to shapeless moral particularism, the view that the moral is shapeless with respect to the natural. A decade has passed since the Canberrans advanced their highly influential supervenience argument. Yet, there has not been any compelling counter-argument against it, as far as I can see. My aim in this paper is to fill in this void and defend SMP against the Canberran…Read more
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24Correction to: Reason Holism, Individuation, and EmbeddednessEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5): 1105-1105. 2018.The original version of this article unfortunately contained an error. The acknowledgement of the funding sources was inadvertently omitted by the author. The funding statement is shown below.
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66Of Primary Features in Aesthetics: A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defence of ParticularismBritish Journal of Aesthetics 59 (1): 35-49. 2019.Contemporary analytic aesthetics has seen a heated debate about whether there are general critical principles that determine the merits/demerits of an artwork. The so-called generalists say ‘yes’, whereas the so-called particularists say ‘no’. On the particularists’ view, a feature that is a merit in one artwork might well turn out to be a defect in another, so critical principles purporting to define merits and defects are pretty much in vain. Against this, the generalists argue that while some…Read more
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56Reason Holism, Individuation, and EmbeddednessEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5): 1091-1103. 2018.The goal of this paper is to promote what I call ‘the embedded thesis’ as a general constraint on how moral reasons behave. Dancy’s reason holism will be used as a foil to illustrate the thesis. According to Dancy’s reason holism, moral reasons behave in a holistic way; that is, a feature that is a moral reason in one context might not be so in another or might even be an opposite reason. The way a feature manages to switch its reason status is by the help of a so-called enabler/disabler. The en…Read more
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87Biomedical Moral Enhancement in the Face of Moral ParticularismRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 189-208. 2018.Biomedical moral enhancement, or BME for short, aims to improve people’s moral behaviors through augmenting, via biomedical means, their virtuous dispositions such as sympathy, honesty, courage, or generosity. Recently, it has been challenged, on particularist grounds, however, that the manifestations of the virtuous dispositions can be morally wrong. For instance, being generous in terrorist financing is one such case. If so, biomedical moral enhancement, by enhancing people’s virtues, might tu…Read more
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22Essence as a Set of Co-Occurring FeaturesAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 2 (2): 41-42. 2011.