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14On Being Conscious as a Basic LibertyAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 15 (1): 24-26. 2024.Crutchfield and Redinger (2024) maintain that “being conscious is a basic liberty,” and infer from this that without informed consent, deep sedation, by intruding upon one’s consciousness, is an in...
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54Of Primary Features in Aesthetics: A Critical Assessment of Generalism and a Limited Defence of ParticularismBritish Journal of Aesthetics 59 (1): 35-49. 2019.Contemporary analytic aesthetics has seen a heated debate about whether there are general critical principles that determine the merits/demerits of an artwork. The so-called generalists say ‘yes’, whereas the so-called particularists say ‘no’. On the particularists’ view, a feature that is a merit in one artwork might well turn out to be a defect in another, so critical principles purporting to define merits and defects are pretty much in vain. Against this, the generalists argue that while some…Read more
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45Reason Holism, Individuation, and EmbeddednessEthical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5): 1091-1103. 2018.The goal of this paper is to promote what I call ‘the embedded thesis’ as a general constraint on how moral reasons behave. Dancy’s reason holism will be used as a foil to illustrate the thesis. According to Dancy’s reason holism, moral reasons behave in a holistic way; that is, a feature that is a moral reason in one context might not be so in another or might even be an opposite reason. The way a feature manages to switch its reason status is by the help of a so-called enabler/disabler. The en…Read more
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20What Doesn’t Kill Primary Reason Atomism Will Only Make It Stronger: A Limited DefenseEthical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3): 431-446. 2023.Against the reason holists (e.g. Dancy 2014), it has been contended by many reason atomists that while many features might well change their reason statuses or valences in different contexts in the way suggested by reason holists, they are merely secondary rather than primary reasons. In these atomists’ scheme of things, there are features that function as primary reasons whose reason statuses remain invariant across contexts. Moreover, these features provide the ultimate source of explanations …Read more
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586Shapelessness and predication supervenience: a limited defense of shapeless moral particularismPhilosophical Studies 166 (S1): 51-67. 2013.Moral particularism, on some interpretations, is committed to a shapeless thesis: the moral is shapeless with respect to the natural. (Call this version of moral particularism ‘shapeless moral particularism’). In more detail, the shapeless thesis is that the actions a moral concept or predicate can be correctly applied to have no natural commonality (or shape) amongst them. Jackson et al. (Ethical particularism and patterns, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) argue, however, that the shapele…Read more
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87Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Erkenntnis 81 (3): 545-560. 2016.Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, and Philip Pettit contend in their 2000 paper that an argument from supervenience deals a fatal blow to shapeless moral particularism, the view that the moral is shapeless with respect to the natural. A decade has passed since the Canberrans advanced their highly influential supervenience argument. Yet, there has not been any compelling counter-argument against it, as far as I can see. My aim in this paper is to fill in this void and defend SMP against the Canberran…Read more
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10Misclassifying the Minimally Conscious State PatientsAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1): 27-28. 2018.
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47Elimination of Pain Versus Elimination of Suffering: Why CDS Is Ethically Preferable to PASAmerican Journal of Bioethics 11 (6). 2011.The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 45-46, June 2011
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540Defending Particularism from Supervenience/Resultance AttackActa Analytica 26 (4): 387-402. 2011.I take the debate between the particularists and the principlists to be centered on the issue of whether there are true moral principles. One argument the principlists often appeal to in support of their claim that there are true moral principles is the argument from supervenience. Roughly, the argument is made up of the following three statements: (P1) If the thesis of moral supervenience holds, then there are true moral principles. (P2) The thesis of moral supervenience holds. (C) There are tr…Read more
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49Reproductive Autonomy and Normalization of Cesarean SectionAmerican Journal of Bioethics 12 (7). 2012.The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 7, Page 61-62, July 2012
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24Essence as a Set of Co-occurring FeaturesAmerican Journal of Bioethics---Neuroscience 2 (2): 41-42. 2011.
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38The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study (review)Philosophical Forum 42 (3): 327. 2011.
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733Enhancing Eyewitness Memory in a Rape CaseAmerican Journal of Bioethics---Neuroscience 1 (3): 41-42. 2010.
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36Two Sorts of Health Maximization: Average View and Total ViewAmerican Journal of Bioethics 11 (12): 41-42. 2011.The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 12, Page 41-42, December 2011
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301Book Note on Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3): 521-524. 2008.