Peter V. Forrest

This chapter argues that we have inconsistent intuitions about the structure of space (or spacetime, or some stuff, the aether, that fills space or spacetime). A contradiction is obtained from eleven premises, each of which is either directly intuitive or supported by intuitions. The use of so many premises results from the desire to exhibit as clearly as possible the places where one might decide some intuition is to be undermined. Nonetheless the argument for inconsistency is straightforward: our intuitions support the existence of a _supersponge_, namely a region of less than the total volume but not disjoint from any connected part of space of positive diameter. But the complement of a supersponge is an intuitively impossible region. Yet, intuitively a region of less than maximal volume must have a complement. So some intuition must be abandoned.

Consider the things that exist—the entities—and let us suppose they are mereologically structured, that is, some are parts of others. The project of ontology within the bounds of bare mereology use this structure to say which of these entities belong to various ontological kinds, such as properties and particulars. My purpose in this paper is to defend the most radical section of the project, the mereological theory of the exemplification of universals. Along the way I help myself to several hypotheses: the existence of merely possible worlds; that particulars have thisnesses; and that mereology is far from classical. Moreover, the way I characterize instantiation might be judged too complicated to be plausible. At the end of the paper, I reply to these objections based on complexity.

This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phenomenally conscious? To make progress on these questions and explore the relationship between the two, I narrow my focus to a particular instance of each, viz. the (scope) question of whether thoughts possess their own phenomenal character and the (marks) question of whether all phenomenal character is presentational. First, I argue that a phenomenology of entertaining thought content, if it exists, is non-presentational. I then argue from the fact that every genuine phenomenal property can be thought about using a phenomenal concept, to the conclusion that all phenomenology is presentational. One implication is that a (standard form of) transparent, proprietary phenomenology of thought does not exist.

That God is of great beauty is religiously significant as a component of the widespread hope of a blessed experience in this or the next life. This motivates the project of formulating the strongest coherent thesis of divine beauty. This chapter has two parts. In Section 9.1 I argue for the incoherence of Perfect Divine Beauty. The natural reaction to this incoherence is to replace the idea of perfection, but in a way that coheres with the theists’ religious tradition. I explore a range of such replacements, motivating the thesis of Pre-eminent Divine Beauty, that the actual divine beauty is infinitely greater than that of the physical universe. In Section 9.2 I examine various arguments against God’s great beauty. They are the Argument from Divine Simplicity (and the related the Argument from Divine Spirituality), the Argument from Divine Necessity, and the Argument from Moral Righteousness.

I consider three candidates for ultimate understanding: (1) ultimate agency, the familiar idea of understanding the existence and nature of the universe as created by God for good reasons; (2) axiarchism, the initially counter-intuitive idea that goodness is the first cause of contingent reality; and (3) plenitude, the thesis that all possible types of situation are real. After some initial clarification, I note the problems with axiarchism, and offer solutions. These solutions require the unification of space and time as space-time, and the consequent introduction of what might be called hypertime, but which I take to be true time—Time with an upper case “T”. I note how axiarchism and plenitude may be combined into the Plenum Bonum thesis that all and only good universes are real. Next, I note some problems with agency as an ultimate way of understanding. Finally, I solve these by means of a theory of agency as completing axiarchism, the Good versus Good theory.

In this book I investigate the necessary structure of the aether the stuff that fills the whole universe. Some of my conclusions are. 1. There is an enormous variety of structures that the aether might, for all we know, have. 2. Probably the aether is point-free. 3. In that case, it should be distinguished from Space-time, which is either a fiction or a construct. 4. Even if the aether has points, we should reject the orthodoxy that all regions are grounded in points by summation. 5. If the aether is point-free but not continuous, its most likely structure has extended atoms that are not simples. 6. Space-time is symmetric if and only if the aether is continuous. 7. If the aether is continuous, we should reject the standard interpretation of General Relativity, in which geometry determines gravity. 8. Contemporary physics undermines an objection to discrete aether based on scale invariance, but does not offer much positive support."

Naturalism, as I understand it, includes cosmological naturalism, ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. After clarifying these three theses I argue that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. I do so by providing a pro tanto case against ontological naturalism and show that it can be resisted, but only by abandoning methodological naturalism. The pro tanto case is that ontological naturalism requires a version of what I call Redundancy Nominalism, but methodological naturalists should either reject it or at very least treat it, and hence ontological naturalism, as a speculation.

This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phenomenally conscious? To make progress on these questions and explore the relationship between the two, I narrow my focus to a particular instance of each, viz. the (scope) question of whether thoughts possess their own phenomenal character and the (marks) question of whether all phenomenal character is presentational. First, I argue that a phenomenology of entertaining thought content, if it exists, is non-presentational. I then argue from the fact that every genuine phenomenal property can be thought about using a phenomenal concept, to the conclusion that all phenomenology is presentational. One implication is that a (standard form of) transparent, proprietary phenomenology of thought does not exist.

The recent debate in philosophy of mind over whether thought has its own distinctive phenomenology, so-called cognitive phenomenology, has led to a sharp division between proponents and skeptics of CP. This paper critically examines an ambitious argument against the existence of CP, which is based on a particular view of the temporal structure of thought. The argument, roughly, is that experiences, those mental entities that have phenomenology, persist as processes, while thoughts, on the other hand, are non-processive states or events. So no thoughts are experiences. The present paper attacks the claim that thoughts never temporally unfold as processes.

In this paper, I present a piece of natural theology, whose pro tanto conclusion is the existence of god-the-artist, that is a lower case “g” god, a creator who creates for the sake of beauty, but who is not worthy of worship, a god who can be admired but should not be loved. I then consider some only partially successful responses to this dismal conclusion. Finally, I show to reconcile the idea of a god motivated by love of beauty with the religious tradition of an upper case “G” God, who is not merely to be worshiped but loves us and invites a loving response.