Peter West

The expression ‘rationalism’ is a historiographical category that refers to a set of views more or less shared by a number of philosophers active in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This period saw the heyday of metaphysical system-building, but the expression ‘rationalism’, as the term is understood in this entry, connotes primarily epistemological commitments. Since the early twentieth century, ‘rationalism’ has typically been presented in contrast with ‘empiricism’. By contrast to so-called ‘empiricism’, which traces (all) knowledge to sensory experience, ‘rationalists’ tend to rely upon the powers of reason to explain and justify what we know. This entry provides an account of the traditional narrative of early modern ‘rationalism’ while also extending that narrative to cover figures from typically under-represented backgrounds who hold commitments that can also plausibly be characterized as ‘rationalist’. The entry thus covers René Descartes (1596–1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), alongside Anton Wilhelm Amo (1703–1759), Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673), and Anne Conway (1631–1679). The entry also concludes by briefly suggesting future directions for scholarship on early modern rationalism involving the application of rationalist principles in topics such as social and political philosophy, as illustrated through the writings of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1645–1695) and François Poulain de la Barre (1647–1723).

This chapter explores Stebbing’s connection to idealism. It argues that, in a characteristically careful (and charitable) fashion, Stebbing is not outright dismissive of idealism, nor does she suggest it is obviously false. Indeed, her own worldview, which she calls ‘realism’, is not necessarily incompatible with an idealist analysis of reality. For that reason, this chapter argues that Stebbing adds a level of complexity to our understanding of the relation between early analytic philosophy and idealism. Section 1 outlines Stebbing’s own metaphysical stance, which she calls ‘realism’, and explains why that position does not necessarily preclude idealism. Section 2 outlines Stebbing’s criticisms of attempts to move from developments in modern physics to idealism. Finally, Sect. 3 assesses how Stebbing’s position relates to more general attitudes towards idealism in early analytic philosophy and argues that, compared to contemporaries like Moore or Russell, Stebbing’s approach offers a more tolerant vision of analytic philosophy’s relation to idealism, even if she was critical of certain attempts to argue for it.

This chapter argues that two of Susan Stebbing’s most notable works of public philosophy—Philosophy and the Physicists (1937) and Thinking to Some Purpose (1939)—can be understood as one unified project. That is, despite their differences, both texts are attempts to enhance democratic citizens’ ability to think clearly. West also contrasts Stebbing’s approach to public philosophy with that of Bertrand Russell’s, highlighting her practical and actionable approach, which aims to provide readers with tools for critical thinking. Compared to Russell’s more idealized and didactic “transfer of knowledge” approach, Stebbing’s “skills and training” approach to public philosophy focuses on how we can think better and “to some purpose.”

In 1966, Dorothy Emmet published Rules, Roles and Relations, in which she argues that moral philosophy could stand to learn a lot by drawing on sociological research. In this paper. I will argue that Rules, Roles and Relations is deserving of much wider scholarly attention, especially in light of an explosion of scholarship focusing on contemporaries of Emmet such as Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Iris Murdoch (the ‘Wartime Quartet’). Emmet, unlike the Quartet, has received a very minimal amount of scholarly attention. Yet, like the Quartet, Emmet rejects the Fact-Value Distinction, endorses what can be characterised as an ‘Aristotelian’ approach to ethics, and defends a form of moral cognitivism. What’s more, her approach to these issues is novel (in drawing on sociological research) and thus enrichens our understanding of how certain philosophers in twentieth century Britain sought to push back against dominant analytic approaches to moral theorising.

The aim of this paper is to provide an exposition of Susan Stebbing’s moral philosophy. Stebbing is increasingly recognized as a key figure in early analytic philosophy. However, there is no existing scholarship on her moral philosophy. We examine how Stebbing’s moral philosophy connects to that of two important figures who Stebbing herself identifies as influences on her work: Moore and Aristotle. We argue that while there are clear signs of influence from Moore, Stebbing is also critical of his abstract approach to moral theorizing. In a manner more reminiscent of Aristotle, Stebbing argues that moral philosophy must concern itself with “the ways in which men live.” We argue that Stebbing can plausibly be characterized as both a first level and second level ‘Aristotelian’ ethicist. This is significant since neo-Aristotelian ethics is usually understood as having emerged in the second half of the twentieth century in the work of thinkers like Foot, Hursthouse, and MacIntyre. We also raise an objection to Stebbing from her student, Margaret Macdonald, and reconstruct a response to that objection on Stebbing's behalf.

Towards the beginning of her essay ‘Philosophical Plumbing’ (in Utopias, Dolphins and Computers (1996)), Mary Midgley writes that “We think as whole people, not as disembodied minds, not as computers”. In this chapter, my aim is to emphasise the significance of this remark – and the philosophical methodology that comes with it – to Midgley’s conception of philosophical inquiry in general, to her views on how we ought (and ought not) to approach moral philosophy specifically. In doing so, I show the significance of Midgley’s place within the wider context of twentieth century British philosophy and connect her to the work of Susan Stebbing and Dorothy Emmet.

Stephen H. Daniel’s monograph offers a novel interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy of mind while situating Berkeley’s thought within the context of early eighteenth-century epistemology and metaphysics. The text is commendable for its attempt to shed light on Berkeley’s engagement with thinkers and traditions that tend to fall outside the canon of early modern philosophy and its attempt to place Berkeley’s lesser-known works, such as De Motu and Siris, on a par with his best-known texts. Daniel’s approach to historical interpretation is strongly contextualist and fits well with recent attempts to read...

In this paper we provide the first in-depth analysis of Anton Wilhelm Amo’s 1734 Tractatus de Arte Sobrie et Accurate Philosophandi by examining the fundamental role that intention plays in this work. Specifically, we argue that the ‘Intentional Principle’, which states that everything that exists (except for God) is the effect of an intentional action, is key to understanding his account of the operations of human and divine spirits and his account of what exists (and why). In doing so, we demonstrate that Amo was a systematic thinker with intention underpinning his philosophical system. Furthermore, we show that intentions are key to understanding Amo’s views on what the ends of philosophy are and how philosophical inquiry ought to be pursued.

The aim of this paper is to outline Dorothy Emmet's (1904–2000) account of perception in The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (published in 1945). Emmet's account of perception is part of a wider attempt to rehabilitate metaphysics in the face of logical positivism and verificationism (of the kind espoused most famously by A. J. Ayer). It is thus part of an attempt to stem the tide of anti-metaphysical thought that had become widespread in British philosophy by the middle of the twentieth century. Emmet does not fit neatly into the traditional story of twentieth-century British philosophy. She draws on figures like A. N. Whitehead and Henri Bergson much more extensively than figures like Russell or Moore – and thus straddles the so-called ‘analytic-continental divide.’ My aim in this paper is to put Emmet on the map of twentieth-century British thought by outlining her philosophy of perception, highlighting her proposals for a way forward for metaphysics in a time of crisis, and identifying the ways she preempts movements in contemporary philosophy of perception.

We argue that, while Cavendish did express orthodox piety, she is likely to have been read by her contemporaries as heterodox and deistic at best, atheistic at worst. Furthermore, they would have been right: it is seemingly impossible to reconcile her metaphysical and epistemological views with particular providence, miracles, the incarnation and revelation. We proceed by outlining her general metaphysical position (section 1) before looking in some detail at her discussion of immaterial beings (section 2). We then consider the implications of these views for certain orthodox Christian doctrines (section 3).

Recent discussions in the history of analytic philosophy have targeted questions about the concept of ‘Analytic Philosophy’ itself. Scholars, such as Glock (2008) and Preston (2004), have argued that ‘Analytic Philosophy’ cannot plausibly be characterised in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions and that other, more pragmatic, approaches must be taken instead. In this paper, we argue that similar questions that have recently emerged about the status of ‘Western Philosophy’ can be informed by these debates in the history of analytic philosophy. Some recent scholars, most notably Platzky Miller (2023) and Cantor (2022), have argued that the concept of ‘Western philosophy’ should be abandoned altogether, due to its incoherence and the role it plays in upholding and perpetuating various exclusionary mechanisms and politically dubious aims. The aim of this paper is to apply the lessons learnt from similar discussions about ‘Analytic Philosophy’ and to build on Platzky Miller’s and Cantor’s innovative proposals. We argue that the term should not be abandoned altogether and that continuing to use it is required for combating exclusions in the history of philosophy.

A number of recent papers or monographs have examined Susan Stebbing's criticisms of Arthur Eddington's scientific-philosophical writing. These papers focus on Stebbing's critique of Eddington's attempt to infer philosophical conclusions from developments in modern physics, his view that there is a discrepancy between the world of science and the world of common sense (best encapsulated by his famous ‘two tables’ metaphor), and his use of ‘inexact language’ to try and convey modern scientific insights to his readers. On November 10th 1938, Eddington presented a paper at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge entitled “Prof. Stebbing's ‘Philosophy and the Physicists'”. Eddington did not go on to publish this paper and it is not discussed in relevant scholarship. However, the details of Eddington’s talk are outlined in the minutes of that meeting. I argue that these minutes provide new insights into both the Stebbing-Eddington debate and developments in Eddington's late philosophical views. A full transcription of the minutes is included as an Appendix to this paper.

In my contribution to this Concise Collection on Margaret Cavendish, I focus on teaching Cavendish’s work in the context of philosophy (and, more specifically, Early Modern Philosophy). I have three aims. First, to explain why teaching women from philosophy’s history is crucially important to the discipline. Second, to outline my own reflections on teaching Cavendish’s philosophy. Third, to defend a specific claim about the benefits of teaching Cavendish to philosophy students; namely, that introducing biographical detail alongside philosophical ideas enriches the learning experience.

Margaret Macdonald was at the institutional heart of analytic philosophy in Britain in the mid-twentieth century. However, her views on the nature of philosophical theories diverge quite considerably from those of many of her contemporaries. In this article, I focus on Macdonald’s provocative 1953 paper, “Linguistic Philosophy and Perception,” in which she argues that the value of philosophical theories is more akin to that of poetry or art than science or mathematics. I do so for two reasons. First, it reveals just how far Macdonald’s metaphilosophical views diverged from those of many of her contemporaries. Second, the discussion in her article preempts recent literature on the nature of philosophical inquiry and the efficacy of philosophical arguments. Indeed, Macdonald’s paper is just as likely to provoke discussion today as it was in the 1950s.

Berkeley’s realism about sensible things is the starting point of Peter West’s chapter, in which he addresses a possible inconsistency in Berkeley’s epistemology: he rejects indirect realism about sensible things but defends indirect realism when it comes to the existence of other minds. Berkeley’s view is that we do not know other minds directly, like we know our ideas, but indirectly: via certain ideas which signify them. This account of knowledge of other minds looks structurally similar to the account of knowledge of external things (the indirect realist account) that Berkeley rejects on the grounds that it leads to skepticism. Should Berkeley’s own views lead him to reject indirect realism about other minds too? West provides reasons for thinking that Berkeley can consistently defend this account despite his criticisms of representationalism elsewhere.

This volume focuses on Berkeley's doctrine of signs. The 'doctrine of signs' refers to the use that Berkeley makes of a phenomenon that is central to a great deal of everyday discourse: one whereby certain perceivable entities are made to stand in for (as 'signs' of) something else. Things signified might be other perceivable entities or they might also be unperceivable notions - such as the meanings of words. From his earliest published work, A New Theory of Vision in 1710, to those works written towards the end of life, including Alciphron in 1732, Berkeley is at pains to emphasise the crucial role that sign-usage, particularly (but not only) in language, plays in human life. Berkeley also connects sign-usage to our (human) relationship with God: an issue that was right of the heart of his philosophical project. The contributions in this volume explore the myriad ways that Berkeley built on such insights to better understand a range of philosophical issues - issues of epistemology, language, perception, mental representation, mathematics, science, and theology. The aim of this volume is to establish that the doctrine of signs can be seen as one of the unifying themes of Berkeley's philosophy. What's more, this theme is one which spans his whole philosophical corpus; not just his best-known works like the Principles and the Three Dialogues, but also his works on science, mathematics, and theology.

We examine Margaret Cavendish’s ecological views and argue that, in the Appendix to her final published work, Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), Cavendish is defending a normative account of the way that humans ought to interact with their environment. On this basis, we argue that Cavendish is committed to a form of what, for the purposes of this paper, we call ‘deep ecology,’ where that is understood as the view that humans ought to treat the rest of nature as something of intrinsic value. The reading of Cavendish we defend in this paper also commits her to a naturalistic account of ‘moral facts’ about how humans ought to interact with their environment. That is, on our reading of Cavendish, ‘moral facts’ (i.e., facts about how we ought and ought not to behave, and what it is right or wrong for us to do) are grounded in facts about nature—and, in Cavendish’s case, its (ir)regularity. Such facts are hypothetical, rather than categorical: they are facts about how we ought to act if we wish to attain happiness or flourishing. We thus contend that Cavendish anticipates, at least loosely speaking, movements in both deep ecology and in naturalistic meta-ethics that came to prominence well after the time in which she was writing.

‘British Empiricism’ is a name traditionally used to pick out a group of eighteenth-century thinkers who prioritised knowledge via the senses over reason or the intellect and who denied the existence of innate ideas. The name includes most notably John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. The counterpart to British Empiricism is traditionally considered to be Continental Rationalism that was advocated by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all of whom lived in Continental Europe beyond the British Isles and all embraced innate ideas. This article characterizes empiricists more broadly as those thinkers who accept Locke’s Axiom that there is no idea in the mind that cannot be traced back to some particular experience. It includes British-Irish Philosophy from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century. As well as exploring the traditional connections among empiricism and metaphysics and epistemology, it examines how British empiricists dealt with issues in moral philosophy and the existence and nature of God. The article identifies some challenges to the standard understanding of British Empiricism by including early modern thinkers from typically marginalised groups, especially women. Finally, in showing that there is nothing uniquely British about being an empiricist, it examines a particular case study of the eighteenth-century philosopher Anton Wilhelm Amo, the first African to receive a doctorate in Europe.