Peter West

The expression ‘rationalism’ is a historiographical category that refers to a set of views more or less shared by a number of philosophers active in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This period saw the heyday of metaphysical system-building, but the expression ‘rationalism’, as the term is understood in this entry, connotes primarily epistemological commitments. Since the early twentieth century, ‘rationalism’ has typically been presented in contrast with ‘empiricism’. By contrast to so-called ‘empiricism’, which traces (all) knowledge to sensory experience, ‘rationalists’ tend to rely upon the powers of reason to explain and justify what we know. This entry provides an account of the traditional narrative of early modern ‘rationalism’ while also extending that narrative to cover figures from typically under-represented backgrounds who hold commitments that can also plausibly be characterized as ‘rationalist’. The entry thus covers René Descartes (1596–1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), alongside Anton Wilhelm Amo (1703–1759), Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673), and Anne Conway (1631–1679). The entry also concludes by briefly suggesting future directions for scholarship on early modern rationalism involving the application of rationalist principles in topics such as social and political philosophy, as illustrated through the writings of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1645–1695) and François Poulain de la Barre (1647–1723).

The aim of this paper is to provide an exposition of Susan Stebbing’s moral philosophy. Stebbing is increasingly recognized as a key figure in early analytic philosophy. However, there is no existing scholarship on her moral philosophy. We examine how Stebbing’s moral philosophy connects to that of two important figures who Stebbing herself identifies as influences on her work: Moore and Aristotle. We argue that while there are clear signs of influence from Moore, Stebbing is also critical of his abstract approach to moral theorizing. In a manner more reminiscent of Aristotle, Stebbing argues that moral philosophy must concern itself with “the ways in which men live.” We argue that Stebbing can plausibly be characterized as both a first level and second level ‘Aristotelian’ ethicist. This is significant since neo-Aristotelian ethics is usually understood as having emerged in the second half of the twentieth century in the work of thinkers like Foot, Hursthouse, and MacIntyre. We also raise an objection to Stebbing from her student, Margaret Macdonald, and reconstruct a response to that objection on Stebbing's behalf.

A number of recent papers or monographs have examined Susan Stebbing's criticisms of Arthur Eddington's scientific-philosophical writing. These papers focus on Stebbing's critique of Eddington's attempt to infer philosophical conclusions from developments in modern physics, his view that there is a discrepancy between the world of science and the world of common sense (best encapsulated by his famous ‘two tables’ metaphor), and his use of ‘inexact language’ to try and convey modern scientific insights to his readers. On November 10th 1938, Eddington presented a paper at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge entitled “Prof. Stebbing's ‘Philosophy and the Physicists'”. Eddington did not go on to publish this paper and it is not discussed in relevant scholarship. However, the details of Eddington’s talk are outlined in the minutes of that meeting. I argue that these minutes provide new insights into both the Stebbing-Eddington debate and developments in Eddington's late philosophical views. A full transcription of the minutes is included as an Appendix to this paper.

Margaret Macdonald was at the institutional heart of analytic philosophy in Britain in the mid-twentieth century. However, her views on the nature of philosophical theories diverge quite considerably from those of many of her contemporaries. In this article, I focus on Macdonald’s provocative 1953 paper, “Linguistic Philosophy and Perception,” in which she argues that the value of philosophical theories is more akin to that of poetry or art than science or mathematics. I do so for two reasons. First, it reveals just how far Macdonald’s metaphilosophical views diverged from those of many of her contemporaries. Second, the discussion in her article preempts recent literature on the nature of philosophical inquiry and the efficacy of philosophical arguments. Indeed, Macdonald’s paper is just as likely to provoke discussion today as it was in the 1950s.

In this paper, I provide the first in-depth discussion of Susan Stebbing’s views concerning our experience of the passage of time – a key issue for many metaphysicians writing in the first half of the twentieth century. I focus on Stebbing’s claims about the passage of time in Philosophy and the Physicists and her disagreement with Arthur Eddington over how best to account for that experience. I show that Stebbing’s concern is that any attempt to provide a scientific account of the passage of time will face problems, since the events described by physics are necessarily measured against the passage of time. I then identify views elsewhere in her philosophical corpus that can help shed light on this claim. Ultimately, I argue, Stebbing’s views on time should be construed as part of her wider commitment to ‘realism’. To be a realist, for Stebbing, is to accept a set of propositions which are a pre-requisite for even beginning to analyse the world around us. For Stebbing, I argue, part of what it means to be a realist is to accept our experience of the passage of time as something fundamental that cannot itself be subject to analysis.