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Peyman Pourghannad

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Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
17th/18th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (2)
  •  1151
    The Psychotic Transition: Some Remarks on the Nature of Hallucination-Inducing Imaginative Experiences
    There are numerous studies suggesting a substantial link between psychotic hallucinatory states and some forms of disordered imaginings. We have to figure out (1) what characteristic makes imagining, not other mental states, prone to induce hallucination, and (2) what underlies the (phenomenological/conceptual) transition from imagining X to the hallucinatory experience of X? In this paper, I will try to provide answers to these questions, in order to shed light on the nature of the so-called “m…Read more
    There are numerous studies suggesting a substantial link between psychotic hallucinatory states and some forms of disordered imaginings. We have to figure out (1) what characteristic makes imagining, not other mental states, prone to induce hallucination, and (2) what underlies the (phenomenological/conceptual) transition from imagining X to the hallucinatory experience of X? In this paper, I will try to provide answers to these questions, in order to shed light on the nature of the so-called “misidentified” or “disordered” imaginative experience. To achieve this, I emphasize the phenomenological aspects of hallucination and imagination.
    Philosophy, MiscellaneousPsychologyMental IllnessPsychiatry and PsychotherapyPhilosophy of Psycholog…Read more
    Philosophy, MiscellaneousPsychologyMental IllnessPsychiatry and PsychotherapyPhilosophy of Psychology, Misc
  •  1433
    The Counterexample Method and Armchair Philosophy
    with Davood Hosseini
    According to a bedrock assumption in the current methodology of armchair philosophy, we may refute a theory aiming at analyzing a concept by providing a counterexample in which it intuitively seems that a hypothetical or real situation does not fit with what the theory implies. In this paper, we shall argue that this assumption is at most either untenable or otherwise useless in bringing about what is commonly expected from it.
    Philosophical Methods, MiscEpistemology of Philosophy, MiscEpistemology of IntuitionConceptual Analy…Read more
    Philosophical Methods, MiscEpistemology of Philosophy, MiscEpistemology of IntuitionConceptual Analysis
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