•  90
    The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism
    Philosophy 53 (206). 1978.
    If someone abstains from meat-eating for reasons of taste or personal economics, no moral or philosophical question arises. But when a vegetarian attempts to persuade others that they, too, should adopt his diet, then what he says requires philosophical attention. While a vegetarian might argue in any number of ways, this essay will be concerned only with the argument for a vegetarian diet resting on a moral objection to the rearing and killing of animals for the human table. The vegetarian, in …Read more
  •  38
    Homicide Revisited
    Philosophy 55 (213). 1980.
  •  16
    Does St. Anselm Beg the Question?
    Philosophy 50 (193). 1975.
  •  7
    Truth And Pragmatism in Higher Education
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 5 (1): 67-74. 1990.
  •  11
    Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant
    Philosophical Books 37 (3): 202-204. 1996.
  •  14
    "Exists" and St. Anselm's Argument
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 3 (1): 59-70. 1977.
    This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of St. Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God.
  •  11
    Against Superkitten Ethics
    International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4): 429-436. 2011.
    I here criticize the use of science-fiction examples in ethics, chiefly, though not solely, by defenders of abortion. We have no reliable intuitions concerning such examples—certainly nothing strong enough to set against the strong intuition that infanticide is virtually always wrong.
  •  8
    Birth, Copulation, and Death
    New Scholasticism 59 (3): 276-295. 1985.
  •  57
    Letters to the Editor
    with William F. Vallicella, Keith Burgess-Jackson, John Pepple, and Michael Kelly
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2). 2003.
  •  6
    Against Interrogational Torture: Upholding a Troubled Taboo
    In David Boonin, Katrina L. Sifferd, Tyler K. Fagan, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Michael Huemer, Daniel Wodak, Derk Pereboom, Stephen J. Morse, Sarah Tyson, Mark Zelcer, Garrett VanPelt, Devin Casey, Philip E. Devine, David K. Chan, Maarten Boudry, Christopher Freiman, Hrishikesh Joshi, Shelley Wilcox, Jason Brennan, Eric Wiland, Ryan Muldoon, Mark Alfano, Philip Robichaud, Kevin Timpe, David Livingstone Smith, Francis J. Beckwith, Dan Hooley, Russell Blackford, John Corvino, Corey McCall, Dan Demetriou, Ajume Wingo, Michael Shermer, Ole Martin Moen, Aksel Braanen Sterri, Teresa Blankmeyer Burke, Jeppe von Platz, John Thrasher, Mary Hawkesworth, William MacAskill, Daniel Halliday, Janine O’Flynn, Yoaav Isaacs, Jason Iuliano, Claire Pickard, Arvin M. Gouw, Tina Rulli, Justin Caouette, Allen Habib, Brian D. Earp, Andrew Vierra, Subrena E. Smith, Danielle M. Wenner, Lisa Diependaele, Sigrid Sterckx, G. Owen Schaefer, Markus K. Labude, Harisan Unais Nasir, Udo Schuklenk, Benjamin Zolf & Woolwine (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, Springer Verlag. pp. 123-133. 2018.
    Until recently, torture was regarded as an unthinkable act. But in the dark years following September 11, 2001, many people have defended it openly as they have many other kinds of action previously considered taboo. And the underlying issues are complicated. Yet at least a virtually absolute prohibition on interrogational torture can be rationally defended.
  •  25
    One of the deepest problems in philosophical theology is that of divine causality and human freedom. The analogy between God and the author of a work of fiction can shed light on this and many other thorny problems in philosophical and dogmatic theology.
  •  30
    On Slippery Slopes
    Philosophy 93 (3): 375-393. 2018.
    I here discuss an argument frequently dismissed as a fallacy – the slippery slope or camel's nose. The argument has three forms – analogical, argumentative, and prudential. None of these provides a deductive guarantee, but all can provide considerations capable of influencing the intellect. Our evaluation of such arguments reflects our background social and evaluative assumptions.
  •  44
    The Ethics of Homicide
    with R. A. Duff
    Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120): 273. 1980.
  •  17
    What’s Wrong with Torture?
    International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3): 317-332. 2009.
    Many of us want to say that there is an absolute—or at least a virtually absolute—prohibition on torturing people. But we live in a world in which firm moral restraints of all sorts are hard to defend. Neither contemporary conventional morality, nor any of the available moral theories, provides adequate support for the deliverances of the “wisdom of repugnance” in this area. Nor do they support casuistry capable of distinguishing torture from forms of rough treatment. I here make some suggestion…Read more
  •  16
    Ideologues Or Scholars?
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (2): 69-78. 1991.
  •  374
    Abortion: Three Perspectives
    with Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, and Alison M. Jaggar
    Oup Usa. 2009.
    The newest addition to the Point/Counterpoint Series, Abortion: Three Perspectives features a debate between four noted philosophers - Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, Philip E. Devine, and Alison M. Jaggar - presenting different perspectives on one of the most socially and politically argued issues of the past 30 years. The three main arguments include the "liberal" pro-choice approach, the "communitarian" pro-life approach, and the "gender justice" approach. Divided into two parts, the text …Read more
  •  31
    On the Public Responsibilities of Philosophers
    Teaching Philosophy 10 (1): 3-12. 1987.
  •  32
    The principle of double effect
    American Journal of Jurisprudence 19 (1): 44. 1974.
  •  146
    Why Tolerate Religion?By Brian Leiter
    Analysis 73 (3): 595-597. 2013.
  •  25
    "Exists" and St. Anselm's Argument
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 3 (1): 59-70. 1977.
    This paper examines interpretations of the doctrine that "exists" is not a predicate (existence is not a property). None, it is concluded, is both true and a refutation of St. Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God.
  •  53
    Creation and Evolution
    Religious Studies 32 (3). 1996.
    I defend the coherence of Theistic Evolutionism, though I do not present any direct argument for either theism or (broadly Darwinian) evolution. I distinguish between evolution as a scientific theory, however well established, and evolutionism as a religion or ideology. I argue that the confusion between the two senses of evolutionism is bad for both biology and religion, and conclude by suggesting that, in Irving Kristol's words, 'our goal should be to have biology and evolution taught in a way…Read more
  •  14
    The Religious Significance of the Ontological Argument
    Religious Studies 11 (1). 1975.
    I discuss the religious implications of accepting the ontological argument as sound. in particular, i attempt to show in detail how the argument fails to validate religious belief
  •  15
    A fallacious argument against moral absolutes
    Argumentation 9 (4): 611-616. 1995.
    The denial of moral absolutes rests, I think, on a seductive but fallacious argument, which I shall attempt both to expound and to refute here. Human beings are highly complex creatures living in a highly complex world. Every human being is different from every other, every interaction or relationship between or among human beings is unique. Hence also every occasion for moral choice is also unique, and all those action kinds - be theyadultery, murder, rape, theft, ortorture on which moralists a…Read more
  •  5
  •  8
    Ideologues Or Scholars?
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (2): 69-78. 1991.