University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2002
Eindhoven, North Brabant, Netherlands
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Applied Ethics
  •  121
    This paper explores the role of moral uncertainty in explaining the morally disruptive character of new technologies. We argue that existing accounts of technomoral change do not fully explain its disruptiveness. This explanatory gap can be bridged by examining the epistemic dimensions of technomoral change, focusing on moral uncertainty and inquiry. To develop this account, we examine three historical cases: the introduction of the early pregnancy test, the contraception pill, and brain death. …Read more
  •  76
    Trust in engineering
    In Diane Michelfelder & Neelke Doorn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Engineering, Routledge. pp. 494-505. forthcoming.
    Engineers are traditionally regarded as trustworthy professionals who meet exacting standards. In this chapter I begin by explicating our trust relationship towards engineers, arguing that it is a linear but indirect relationship in which engineers “stand behind” the artifacts and technological systems that we rely on directly. The chapter goes on to explain how this relationship has become more complex as engineers have taken on two additional aims: the aim of social engineering to create and s…Read more
  •  46
    Disruptive Innovation and Moral Uncertainty
    NanoEthics 14 (3): 259-269. 2020.
    This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker, moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the harm account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own and others’ moral obligations. On the qualified h…Read more
  •  83
    Disruptive Innovation and Moral Uncertainty
    NanoEthics: Studies in New and Emerging Technologies. forthcoming.
    This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker (2013), moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the Harm Account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own and others’ moral obligations. On the Qual…Read more
  •  102
    In this chapter, we consider ethical and philosophical aspects of trust in the practice of medicine. We focus on trust within the patient-physician relationship, trust and professionalism, and trust in Western (allopathic) institutions of medicine and medical research. Philosophical approaches to trust contain important insights into medicine as an ethical and social practice. In what follows we explain several philosophical approaches and discuss their strengths and weaknesses in this context. …Read more
  •  180
    Assurance Views of Testimony
    In D. Henderson & N. J. L. L. Pedersen P. J. Graham M. Fricker (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. pp. 96-102. 2019.
    Assurance theories of testimony attempt to explain what is distinctive about testimony as a form of epistemic warrant or justification. The most characteristic assurance theories hold that a distinctive subclass of assertion (acts of “telling”) involves a real commitment given by the speaker to the listener, somewhat like a promise to the effect that what is asserted is true. This chapter sympathetically explains what is attractive about such theories: instead of treating testimony as essentiall…Read more
  •  62
    Sound Trust and the Ethics of Telecare
    with Sander A. Voerman
    Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (1): 33-49. 2017.
    The adoption of web-based telecare services has raised multifarious ethical concerns, but a traditional principle-based approach provides limited insight into how these concerns might be addressed and what, if anything, makes them problematic. We take an alternative approach, diagnosing some of the main concerns as arising from a core phenomenon of shifting trust relations that come about when the physician plays a less central role in the delivery of care, and new actors and entities are introd…Read more
  • Moral Dependence: Reliance on Moral Testimony
    Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 2002.
    Moral dependence is taking another person's assertion or "testimony" that C as a reason to believe C , such that whatever justificatory force is associated with the person's testimony endures or remains as one's reason for believing C. People are justified in relying on one another's testimony in non-moral matters. The dissertation takes up the question whether the same is true for moral beliefs. ;My method is to divide the topic into three somewhat separate questions. First, there is the episte…Read more
  •  99
    Trust and testimony
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3): 301-316. 2012.
    Some recent accounts of testimonial warrant base it on trust, and claim that doing so helps explain asymmetries between the intended recipient of testimony and other non-intended hearers, e.g. differences in their entitlement to challenge the speaker or to rebuke the speaker for lying. In this explanation ‘dependence-responsiveness’ is invoked as an essential feature of trust: the trustor believes the trustee to be motivationally responsive to the fact that the trustor is relying on the trustee.…Read more
  •  87
    Artificial Speech and Its Authors
    Minds and Machines 23 (4): 489-502. 2013.
    Some of the systems used in natural language generation (NLG), a branch of applied computational linguistics, have the capacity to create or assemble somewhat original messages adapted to new contexts. In this paper, taking Bernard Williams’ account of assertion by machines as a starting point, I argue that NLG systems meet the criteria for being speech actants to a substantial degree. They are capable of authoring original messages, and can even simulate illocutionary force and speaker meaning.…Read more
  •  58
    Vulnerable populations in research: The case of the seriously ill
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (3): 245-264. 2006.
    This paper advances a new criterion of a vulnerable population in research. According to this criterion, there are consent-based and fairness-based reasons for calling a group vulnerable. The criterion is then applied to the case of people with serious illnesses. It is argued that people with serious illnesses meet this criterion for reasons related to consent. Seriously ill people have a susceptibility to “enticing offers” that hold out the prospect of removing or alleviating illness, and this …Read more
  •  189
    Moral testimony and its authority
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3): 253-266. 2001.
    A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this requirement when…Read more
  •  433
    Trust in technological systems
    In M. J. de Vries, S. O. Hansson & A. W. M. Meijers (eds.), Norms in technology: Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, Vol. 9, Springer. 2013.
    Technology is a practically indispensible means for satisfying one’s basic interests in all central areas of human life including nutrition, habitation, health care, entertainment, transportation, and social interaction. It is impossible for any one person, even a well-trained scientist or engineer, to know enough about how technology works in these different areas to make a calculated choice about whether to rely on the vast majority of the technologies she/he in fact relies upon. Yet, there ar…Read more
  •  39
    Trust, Staking, and Expectations
    Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (3): 345-362. 2009.
    Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue that these two views of trust are different, that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grou…Read more
  •  79
    Can We Make Sense of the Notion of Trustworthy Technology?
    with Maarten Franssen and Peter Kroes
    Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (3-4): 429-444. 2010.
    In this paper we raise the question whether technological artifacts can properly speaking be trusted or said to be trustworthy. First, we set out some prevalent accounts of trust and trustworthiness and explain how they compare with the engineer’s notion of reliability. We distinguish between pure rational-choice accounts of trust, which do not differ in principle from mere judgments of reliability, and what we call “motivation-attributing” accounts of trust, which attribute specific motivation…Read more
  •  158
    Being Pragmatic about Trust
    In Paul Faulkner & Thomas Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust, Oxford University Press. pp. 195-213. 2017.
    Trust should be able to explain cooperation, and its failure should help explain the emergence of cooperation-enabling institutions. This proposed methodological constraint on theorizing about trust, when satisfied, can then be used to differentiate theories of trust with some being able to explain cooperation more generally and effectively than others. Unrestricted views of trust, which take trust to be no more than the disposition to rely on others, fare well compared to restrictive views, w…Read more
  •  76
    Trust and Obligation-Ascription
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3): 309-319. 2007.
    This paper defends the view that trust is a moral attitude, by putting forward the Obligation-Ascription Thesis: If E trusts F to do X, this implies that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X. I explicate the idea of obligation-ascription in terms of requirement and the appropriateness of blame. Then, drawing a distinction between attitude and ground, I argue that this account of the attitude of trust is compatible with the possibility of amoral trust, that is, trust held among amoral persons on…Read more
  •  22
    Vrijheid door scepticisme
    Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1): 19-36. 2016.
    In this paper, I consider a form of skepticism that has a permissive conclusion, according to which we are rationally permitted to suspend judgment in an area, or to have beliefs in that area. I argue that such a form of skepticism is resistant to some traditional strategies of refutation. It also carries a benefit, namely that it increases voluntary control over doxastic states by introducing options, and therefore greater freedom, into the realm of belief. I argue that intellectual preferences…Read more
  •  40
    Trust, staking, and expectations
    Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (3). 2009.
    Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person’s performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectati…Read more
  •  18
    Ethical issues in human embryonic stem cell research
    In Kristen Renwick Monroe, Ronald B. Miller & Jerome Tobis (eds.), Fundamentals of the Stem Cell Debate: The Scientific, Religious, Ethical & Political Issues, University of California Press. 2008.
    As a moral philosopher, the perspective I will take in this chapter is one of argumentation and informed judgment about two main questions: whether individuals should ever choose to conduct human embryonic stem cell research, and whether the law should permit this type of research. I will also touch upon a secondary question, that of whether the government ought to pay for this type of research. I will discuss some of the main arguments at stake, and explain how the ethical conflict over these q…Read more
  •  106
    Ethics in e-trust and e-trustworthiness: the case of direct computer-patient interfaces
    Ethics and Information Technology 13 (2): 355-363. 2011.
    In this paper, I examine the ethics of e - trust and e - trustworthiness in the context of health care, looking at direct computer-patient interfaces (DCPIs), information systems that provide medical information, diagnosis, advice, consenting and/or treatment directly to patients without clinicians as intermediaries. Designers, manufacturers and deployers of such systems have an ethical obligation to provide evidence of their trustworthiness to users. My argument for this claim is based on evide…Read more
  •  710
    Risk and trust
    with Krist Vaesen
    In Sabine Roeser, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Martin Peterson & Per Sandin (eds.), Handbook of Risk Theory, Springer. 2012.
  •  940
    On Testimony and Transmission
    Episteme 11 (2): 145-155. 2014.
    Jennifer Lackey’s case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticiz…Read more
  •  106
    Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2): 312-334. 2010.
    A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the age…Read more
  •  133
    Testimonial entitlement, norms of assertion and privacy
    Episteme 10 (2): 207-217. 2013.
    According to assurance views of testimonial justification, in virtue of the act of testifying a speaker provides an assurance of the truth of what she asserts to the addressee. This assurance provides a special justificatory force and a distinctive normative status to the addressee. It is thought to explain certain asymmetries between addressees and other unintended hearers (bystanders and eavesdroppers), such as the phenomenon that the addressee has a right to blame the speaker for conveying a …Read more