Philipp Batthyány

The fundamental concept of classical liberalism is the notion of negative freedom: freedom as the absence of coercion. But what is coercion? Why is coercion considered an evil from a libertarian perspective? The liberal economist and social philosopher Friedrich August von Hayek develops a definition of the concepts of freedom and coercion in his "Constitution of Liberty," which, however, remains incomplete and raises some fundamental questions about his moral philosophy and theory of cultural evolution. In this study, I undertake the task of providing an immanent definition of Hayek's concept of coercion and a justification for the reprehensibility of coercion as a fundamental evil in society. By including essential parts of Hayek's unpublished legacy, I delve into Hayek's entire body of work with a focus on his underlying conception of freedom and coercion.

The aim of this book is to provide a comparative study of the concepts of freedom in existential philosophy and liberalism. To this end, it presents a detailed examination of the works of two of the most prominent thinkers of the respective notions of freedom in the 20th century, Karl Jaspers and Friedrich August von Hayek. Their ideas of freedom are developed both independently and in relation to each other, from their foundational principles. In the political conclusion, the possibility of a conception of freedom that integrates both approaches is explored. Although Jaspers himself made an explicit reference to Hayek in one of his books, such a comparative study has not yet been undertaken in the literature. In many respects—both historically and systematically—this work breaks new ground, opening up new philosophical discourses and interpretations of both authors' works in research and teaching.

In the first book of the Republic, through the figure of Thrasymachus Plato presents the antithesis of Socrates’ idea of justice. Justice, declares the sophist, is nothing but the stronger person’s advantage. The climax of his colorful and violent entry on the scene is the argument that the happiest person of all is the tyrant. In this interpretive study I discuss Thrasymachus’s approach to political and personal power, together with Socrates’ refutation of it, based on a reconstruction of seven explications on the justice-theme by the sophist. From a philosophical perspective that takes account of a range of literary, psychological, and historical factors, I analyze the Republic’s opening dialog as a foundational text in Plato’s theory of virtue, state, and soul. The Republic has retained its status as one of the most influential works in the history of Western philosophy. In the Republic, Thrasymachus serves, in an essential way, as an opening catalyst for Plato’s following exposition. Remarkably, this study represents the first full-length examination of both Platonic and historical Thrasymachus.