Philipp Schmidt-Boddy

This paper examines how interactions within online environments affect the experience of shared reality by eroding trust. Trust has often been described as the ‘glue’ of society, essential not only for personal relationships, groups, and institutions but also for the very fabric of shared reality. One of its forms, epistemic trust, is of particular importance as it concerns the acquisition, acceptance, and establishment of shared knowledge, as well as the dynamics that sustain it. As online environments reshape our social interactions, they also modify significant conditions for epistemic trust—its requirements, incentives, and challenges. The aim of the paper is to illustrate these modifications, showcasing how online environments affect the various dimensions of epistemic trust that significantly shape how we experience shared reality. The paper unfolds in four steps. First, we present and discuss central cognitive and affective dimensions of epistemic trust and illustrate how it forms an inextricable aspect of social life and our sense of a shared reality (“Section 1: Epistemic trust and the experience of shared reality”). Second, we briefly present and discuss the phenomenon of conspiracy theories (“Section 2: The case of conspiracy theories”), and argue that their central features amount to a significant modification of our practices of epistemic trust (“Section 3: Epistemic trust and the experience of shared reality in the context of conspiracy theories”). Against this backdrop, we finally suggest that structural and phenomenological features of online environments can create epistemic scenarios that increase susceptibility to conspiratory mentalities and corresponding epistemic trust dynamics. We conclude that online environments may challenge our sense of a shared reality by shifting our propensities for epistemic trust (“Section 4: How online environments favor the development of conspiracy thinking”).

This paper sheds light on the role of inner speech and self-talk in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) by providing a literature review of existing empirical studies on related phenomena. Building on these insights, it explores how processes of linguistic self-relation may affect an individual’s sense of self. More specifically, it examines how processes of inner speech contribute to the genesis and sustainment of key psychological phenomena associated with BPD, which likely manifest as experiences of self-estrangement and hinder the development of a stable sense of self. First, I review the empirical literature on BPD, providing an overview of insights into intrapersonal dialogicality, auditory verbal hallucinations, inner speech and self-talk in BPD. Second, I then connect these empirical results with a philosophical notion of self-familiarity by exploring how linguistic processes in one’s experience of self, world, and others can significantly challenge or even undermine the development and sustainment of self-familiarity. By understanding how overt or covert dialogues within oneself may support or disrupt self-familiarity, I suggest, it becomes evident that linguistic self-relation is a critical area for therapeutic change and recovery in BPD.

In the past decade, the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) have seen unprecedented developments that raise human-machine interactions (HMI) to the next level. Smart machines, i.e., machines endowed with artificially intelligent systems, have lost their character as mere instruments. This, at least, seems to be the case if one considers how humans experience their interactions with them. Smart machines are construed to serve complex functions involving increasing degrees of freedom, and they generate solutions not fully anticipated by humans. Consequently, their performances show a touch of action and even autonomy. HMI is therefore often described as a sort of "cooperation" rather than as a mere application of a tool. Some authors even go as far as subsuming cooperation with smart machines under the label of partnership, akin to cooperation between human agents sharing a common goal. In this paper, we explore how far the notion of shared agency and partnership can take us in our understanding of human interaction with smart machines. Discussing different topoi related to partnerships in general, we suggest that different kinds of "partnership" depending on the form of interaction between agents need to be kept apart. Building upon these discussions, we propose a tentative taxonomy of different kinds of HMI distinguishing coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and social partnership.

In his 1956 book Das Gemüt, Stephan Strasser presents an original phenomenological investigation into human happiness and pleasure. We will examine Strasser’s theory of happiness in more detail and reveal how he incorporates important phenomenological insights from Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the passions of the soul. Both Strasser and Aquinas view happiness as the fulfilment of intentional striving and differentiate between various feelings associated with the pursuit and attainment of a goal, such as joy and pleasure. However, while Aquinas believes that only an imperfect form of happiness can be attained in this life, Strasser aims to determine the essence of the highest form of happiness possible for human beings as the felt anticipation of perfect happiness in the future. Strasser, therefore, interprets Aquinas’ theory through the lens of an existential-phenomenological approach.

This article sheds light on a today mostly forgotten though highly influential thinker: Theodor Lipps. It explores the notion of ‘tendency’ in his work, a hitherto insufficiently examined yet central concept of the Munich philosopher. More specifically, the paper examines how Lipps utilizes the term to describe important structures of experience. By illuminating the various ways in which Lipps refers to tendencies, it aims to reconstruct important pillars of his theory of experience. This theory emphasizes that experience has a teleological character, striving towards the complete determination and realization of the objects as they are represented (vorgestellt) in our experience. As will be shown, the description of different tendencies serves Lipps to conceptualize the laws that govern the related dynamics of our psychic life and to distinguish and examine the diverse range of conscious phenomena within it. To unveil the core ideas that guide Lipps’s development of his proposal, the article will first identify and reconstruct the primary source for his philosophical analysis of the mind’s motions: the metaphysics of Johann Friedrich Herbart. Subsequently, Lipps’s critical examination of Herbart’s proposal will be presented. This discussion will serve as a backdrop to illustrate how Lipps integrates Herbartian themes, reformulates related concepts, and ultimately develops his unique understanding of tendency and its roles in experience. By delving into his comprehensive analysis of tendencies, it will be argued that Lipps offers a version of Herbartianism.

Open peer commentary on the article “Kaleidoscope of Pain: What and How Do You See Through It” by Maja Smrdu. Abstract: Welcoming Smrdu’s proposal to shed light on the experience of pain through the lens of phenomenology and enactivism, I offer two suggestions that may support the kind of 5E approach to pain she develops. First, I argue that a shift from the biopsychosocial model to a phenomenological 5E theory requires understanding “experience” as functioning as both explanans and explanandum. Second, I suggest that comparing varieties of pain - including mental pain - may help further elucidate the different dimensions that shape the experience of pain according to the 5E approach.

In the past decade, the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) have seen unprecedented developments that raise human-machine interactions (HMI) to the next level.Smart machines, i.e., machines endowed with artificially intelligent systems, have lost their character as mere instruments. This, at least, seems to be the case if one considers how humans experience their interactions with them. Smart machines are construed to serve complex functions involving increasing degrees of freedom, and they generate solutions not fully anticipated by humans. Consequently, their performances show a touch of action and even autonomy. HMI is therefore often described as a sort of “cooperation” rather than as a mere application of a tool. Some authors even go as far as subsuming cooperation with smart machines under the label ofpartnership, akin to cooperation between human agents sharing a common goal. In this paper, we explore how far the notion of shared agency and partnership can take us in our understanding of human interaction with smart machines. Discussing different topoi related to partnerships in general, we suggest that different kinds of “partnership” depending on the form of interaction between agents need to be kept apart. Building upon these discussions, we propose a tentative taxonomy of different kinds of HMI distinguishing coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and social partnership.

Presumably, everyone has, at some point in their lives, felt lonely. Loneliness is, in that particular sense, omnipresent. What it feels like to be lonely can, however, vary significantly. Loneliness is far from being a homogeneous phenomenon. Different kinds of loneliness need to be distinguished, considering its causes, contexts, a person’s capacities to cope with it, and many other factors. This paper introduces the notion of a specific kind of loneliness: experiential loneliness. Experiential loneliness, it will be argued, consists in particular ways of experiencing the world, oneself, and others. Although feelings of being lonely in one way or another can emanate from one’s experience of the world being structured in a particular manner, such kinds of loneliness need not—at least, not always and the whole time—lead to emotional feelings that are concerned with one’s loneliness or the lack of meaningful social relationship. Loneliness can give rise to quite different emotional feelings that sometimes even cover up their provenience from underlying experiential loneliness. The notion of experiential loneliness, it is suggested, helps to tie back certain styles of thinking, desires, feelings, and behaviors to contexts of loneliness. Moreover, it will be argued that the notion can also elucidate the development of feelings of being lonely in contexts in which others are not only around but also available. To develop and enrich the notion of experiential loneliness as well as to exemplify its usefulness, a closer look will be taken at the case of borderline personality disorder, a condition in which sufferers are often plagued by loneliness.

This chapter compares Lotze’s, Lipps’, and Voigtländer’s notion of feelings of self-worth in order to carve out the specific and genuine aspects of Voigtländer’s understanding of self-feeling, as developed in her dissertation. Three lines of thinking important to her approach to the constitution of self-feeling are identified. While primarily sitting on an axis that stretches from the post-romantic Lotze via the descriptive psychologist Lipps to what is later understood as phenomenological philosophy, traces of two other major traditions can be discovered in her proposal: (a) romantic psychology of the unconscious as found, for instance, in C. G. Carus, and (b), Nietzsche’s genealogical psychology of value. Both these traditions would later inspire biologistic versions of German Lebensphilosophie. By relying on them, it is argued, Voigtländer’s notion of self-feeling shows affinities with those vitalist approaches that fueled racist and eugenic ideologies in National Socialism. Given this, her theory of self-feeling in her dissertation from 1910 turns out to be fairly compatible with her later engagement in the fields of eugenics and membership in the NSDAP. Although her account of self-feeling is unique and interesting, therefore, it is finally suggested that Voigtländer’s proposal should be read with due caution.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 233-243, October 2022. This special section of Emotion Review is devoted to the discussion of a recent philosophical emotion theory, the theory of emotions as affective position-takings. The aims of the special section are to provide readers with a spotlight view of recent research in the philosophy of emotion, to advance emotion theory, and support the interdisciplinary dialogue. To increase the accessibility of the special section texts to a nonphilosophical readership, we first discuss the relationship between the philosophy and the psychology of emotions and give a brief review the main types of theories of emotional experience.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 264-269, October 2022. Müller's position-taking view of emotions takes issue with the widely endorsed philosophical notion that emotional feelings are a form of consciousness in which we become acquainted with the evaluative properties of objects and events. Müller rejects this perceptual theory of emotions and casts doubt on the idea that it is through emotional feeling that we develop an awareness of value. In so doing, his proposal amounts to a denial of any epistemic function of emotional feeling. Challenging such a radical move, in my commentary, I discuss several affective phenomena in which feelings do seem to serve an epistemic function. These cases pose problems for Müller's version of the position-taking view of emotion, at least in its current form.

Borderline personality disorder is a complex psychopathological phenomenon. It is usually thought to consist in a vast instability of different aspects that are central to our experience of the world, and to manifest as “a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity” [American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 663]. Typically, of the instability triad—instability in self, affect and emotion, and interpersonal relationships—only the first two are described, examined, and conceptualized from an experiential point of view. In this context, disorders of self have often motivated analyses of self-experience and the sense of self, affective disorders have been frequently considered in the light of emotional experience and its phenomenological structure. Patterns in the phenomenology of social experience have found comparatively little traction when it comes to the conceptualization of the interpersonal disturbances in borderline. In this paper, I argue that interpersonal instability in borderline consists in much more than fragile and shifting relationships but, most importantly, also involves certain styles in experiencing others. These styles, I suggest, may play an explanatory role for the borderline-typical patterns of interpersonal turmoil and so deserve more attention. To better describe and understand these styles, I explore the phenomenological structure of borderline affective instability and discuss the implications it might have for how a person experiences and relates to other people. Considering core aspects of borderline affective instability, such as alexithymia, emotional contagion, emotion dysregulation, and chronic emptiness, I propose borderline can be interpreted as a disturbance of interaffective exchange, which gives rise to certain ways of experiencing others that imply a social impairment.

Manipulation or manipulative behavior, which is widespread in many life contexts and interpersonal relationships, is mostly associated with a negative connotation. Often considered roughly a form of control over others that cannot be equated with coercion or argumentation, manipulation is an umbrella term for strategies that serve to make another person (or oneself) experience x or do y or induce certain situations and interpersonal constellations. Frequently, the use of manipulative strategies is deemed to result from egoistic or even hostile motives. Such an appraisal has a major impact on the stigma patients with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) are confronted with, given that many of their behaviors are often interpreted as manipulative. In the past decade or so, however, researchers and clinicians have pointed out that what is generally identified as manipulation in persons with BPD needs to be seen through the lens of their lifeworld in order to facilitate an empathetic and more positive attitude towards these individuals. In this paper, I discuss the different functions manipulation may have for persons with BPD and argue that instead of seeing it as a clear expression of malevolence or belligerence, a heightened disposition to manipulations should be considered as both the fruit and seed of a painful and isolating social impairment.

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is characterized by severe disturbances in a subject’s sense of identity. Persons with BPD suffer from recurrent feelings of emptiness, a lack of self-feeling, and painful incoherence, especially regarding their own desires, how they see and feel about others, their life goals, or the roles to which they commit themselves. Over the past decade or so, clinical psychologists, psychotherapists, and psychiatrists have turned to philosophical conceptions of selfhood to better understand the borderline-specific ruptures in the sense of identity, which are frequently associated with severe affective instability and turbulence in interpersonal relationships. Fuchs (2007) has suggested that these disturbances in self-experience can best be described and explained by using notions—widely discussed in philosophy and psychology—ofnarrativityandnarrative identity. On such a narrative view, key features of BPD present significant modifications of proto-narrative structures and inhibit the development of a narrative identity, resulting in a disturbed sense of identity. Although the role of narrativity in BPD has been acknowledged by many researchers, some have voiced dissatisfaction with what they take to be limitations of a narrativistic understanding of the disorders of identity characterizing BPD, and have proposed alternative, allegedly non-narrativistic, accounts. In this paper, we critically examine an example of the latter, viz. Gold and Kyratsous’ (2017) account ofthe person as an intrapersonal team reasoner. We defend a narrativistic understanding of BPD identity disorder against their objections. To this end, we propose a broader, and more finely-differentiated, concept of narrativity. On this account, four aspects of narrativity are distinguished, the disordering of which can affect those with BPD. As it turns out, our account implies that even Gold and Kyratsous—in order to ground their approach—must either make use of these aspects or propose an as-yet unarticulated alternative. This casts doubt upon whether their approach is non-narrativistic after all.