Philippe Biermann

This dissertation explores the theoretical and empirical foundations of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs), a critical philosophical type of argument used to challenge realist positions across various domains, notably morality. The dissertation systematically analyzes how EDAs function, what they require as minimal empirical input, what their scope and limits are, and how they can be successfully applied to domains beyond morality. By investigating the empirical credibility of evolutionary psychology and the epistemological consequences of belief formation through natural selection, the dissertation provides a rigorous framework for assessing the scope and limits of EDAs. The work investigates key problems such as the "empirical input problem"—which questions the degree of evolutionary evidence required for a successful debunking argument—and the "target problem", which is concerned with how EDAs can be generalised to expand and clearly define the target area for debunking. The dissertation applies its framework to specific case studies, including moral realism, color realism, and aesthetic realism, demonstrating where EDAs are most compelling and where their applicability is limited. Ultimately, the dissertation argues that while EDAs can effectively challenge certain realist positions, they must be applied with methodological precision to avoid overgeneralization. The findings have broader implications for metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, offering new insights into the evolutionary constraints on human cognition and the justification of our beliefs​.