Pierce Alexander Marks

Many contemporary philosophers have presumed that the doctrine of evil as privation simply means that there can be no evils that count as positive realities. However, this interpretation is naive, and does not cohere well with the Christian theological tradition, especially the work of Augustine, who is widely regarded as the touchstone proponent of the doctrine. The goal of this paper is to clarify the more nuanced, teleological meaning of the doctrine of “evil as privation,” as well as to establish a useful conceptual division between genuine evils of privation (“depraved privations”) and harmless privations (“mere privations”). Additionally, I discuss four challenges to evil as privation: that it entails the inherent evil of all creatures, that the normative property “evil” is itself a positive reality, that it makes no sense to speak of non-existence as a deprivation, and that any attempt to refine the doctrine renders it trivial and vacuous. Finally, I close out the paper by showing that there is still a fifth, unresolved problem facing the more nuanced, teleological version of the doctrine: that it requires us to make significant recalibrations to very tender-hearted and loving moral intuitions.

Despite many warnings, the larger public has just now become aware that moderns are suffering from a crisis of meaning, in which everything we do and are can come to seem meaningless, futile, and absurd. We may doubt not only the meaningfulness of our lives, but whether meaning, value, and goodness exist at all. That is where this book comes in. Within, forgotten elements of the Christian moral paradigm are described in their most basic details, and offered as a solution to the meaning crisis. Far from being rare, meaning and value in life are, if Christianity is true, unavoidable. For all of creation—all of reality—is good, beautiful, loveable, meaningful and even divine. Our perception that life is meaningless is, then, merely a self-centered blindness, an inability to see what is right in front of us.

The purpose of this essay will be to set out an analysis of a certain philosophical, metaethical angst, which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to the extent it can be), and offer up hopeful suggestions regarding consolation of this angst. In short, I take absurd angst to be a painful worry that there are no normative, non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it seems to me, can only come about under a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will devote a large amount of time here to understanding it. This moral conceptual scheme leads the angsty to accept several nontrivial beliefs about the relationships between moral concepts and their application in true/accurate moral ascriptions. The angsty are led to these beliefs by, I think, a strongly ingrained set of moral concepts which form the basis of their moral system(s). Ultimately, I argue that absurd angst arises in some because the angsty possess moral concepts which lead them to believe either that normative reasons require external reasons (reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents), or that normative reasons require external sources of normativity (grounds or explanations for the normative force and authority of reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents) (these possibilities are not exclusive). This worries the angsty. First, because external sources of normativity are theoretically problematic, and this is felt to, in some way, make moral claims problematic. Second, because a host of painful consequences are thought to follow from a lack of these external sources and a denial of normative reasons to act.