Piero Carreras

The paper tries to elucidate some of the implications of using phenomenology in anthropological research. The starting point is Blumenberg’s critique of the Husserlian Anthropologieverbot, against which he proposes a phenomenological anthropology as a “description of man” that can never be completed. This idea resonates with the use of phenomenology in contemporary ethnographic and anthropological works: the problem stems from the “disempowering” effect that this anthropological use has on the phenomenological analytical power. Phenomenology has, from an anthropological point of view, the great advantage of offering a “trans-ontological” perspective able to let the Other speak. Many influential anthropologists cite Merleau-Ponty as a key figure in their approach, as in the case of Csordas’ “embodiment paradigm”, Jackson’s “existential anthropology” or Throop’s idea of an “ethnographic epoché”. This is equally true for two of the key figures of the “Ontological turn”, Descola and Ingold, albeit in radically different ways. On the contrary, it is difficult to find philosophers influenced by “non-philosophical” anthropology. The paper discusses both advantages and limits of phenomenological approaches in anthropology, adopting philosophical and anthropological perspectives, attempting to understand the deeply asymmetrical relation of the two disciplines.

Three of the most recent developments of the “theological turn” in French phenomenology deal explicitly with the question of the form of phenomena. Dealing with the works of Emmanuel Gabellieri, Emmanuel Falque and Jean-Luc Marion, this essay engages into a dialogue with and through French phenomenologists while discussing their philosophical stances – while also incorporating some ideas from authors of the Italian tradition (Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Virgilio Melchiorre and Enzo Melandri). The first part discusses the question of “barriers” and “limits” of phenomenology, followed by a closer examination of how this change in the conception of phenomena (“phenomenomorphosis”) is enacted by the three authors. Considering how the three of them exhibit the signs of what Gabellieri calls a “Christological turn,” the final part before the conclusions addresses the theoretical problem of a theological legitimation of phenomenology.