Piers Rawling

What makes an action morally obligatory, the one that we are morally required to do? Different moral theories give different answers to this question. The simplest answer would be that just one consideration is relevant to the rightness of an action. Act‐consequentialism (which we will refer to as “consequentialism,” unless otherwise indicated) is a popular and influential theory that claims just this. On this view, the only morally relevant consideration is the effect an action will have on the amount of value in the world – you are morally required to bring about the greatest balance of good over bad.

Donald Davidson is famous for, among other things, his theory of radical interpretation – an account of how it is that we can attribute meanings to people's words, and contents to their mental states, based on an apparent paucity of evidence. This account is infused with ideas from, and applications of, the general theory of measurement, as well as one specific instance of that theory – decision theory. In addition, however, Davidson also applies measurement theory – in the form of his “measurement theoretic analogy” – from outside the theory of radical interpretation, to yield a novel account of one of its notable features: the indeterminacy of interpretation. I argue that the success of this application is limited, however, in dispelling a worry to which indeterminacy gives rise – namely that if Davidson's account of indeterminacy is correct, we have no mental states.

I examine Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments to the effect that classical logic is the one and only correct logic. This conclusion is drawn from their views on radical translation and interpretation, respectively. I focus on the latter, but I first address, independently, Quine’s argument to the effect that the ‘deviant’ logician, who departs from classical logic, is merely changing the subject. Regarding logical pluralism, the question is whether there is more than one correct logic. I argue that bivalence may be subject matter dependent, but that distribution and the law of excluded middle can probably not be dropped whilst maintaining the standard meanings of the connectives. In discussing the ramifications of the indeterminacy of interpretation, I ask whether it forces Davidsonian interpreters to adopt Dummett’s epistemic conception of truth vis-à-vis their interpretations. And, if so, does this cohere with their attributing a nonepistemic notion of truth to their interpretees? This would be a form of logical pluralism. In addition, I discuss Davidson’s arguments against conceptual schemes. Schemes incommensurable with our own could be construed as wholesale deviant logics, or so I argue. And, if so, their possibility would yield, in turn, the possibility of a radical logical pluralism. I also address Davidson’s application of Tarski’s definition of truth.

McNaughton and Rawling's anti-reductionist intentions are to be welcomed, but are not well served by their continuing adherence to a neo-Humean notion of the 'descriptive'. Their too-willing acceptance of this notion is reflected in a denial of appropriate dialectical weight to considerations about the way 'pattern' disappears from the domain of value when we try to characterize the constituent features of the latter in non-evaluative terms. The need for a satisfactory account of the immanence of value in nature is real enough, but such an account can be given without recourse to the problematic idea of a class of subvenient 'descriptive' properties. Likewise, McNaughton and Rawling's recognition of 'normative facts' is to be endorsed, but such facts are a more widespread and everyday phenomenon than they would have us think

Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We (like perhaps Derek Parfit) hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions of normativity, and we see reason to reject descriptivism generally. We also discuss the views of David Brink, Jonathan Dancy and Bernard Williams in this area

Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required by the accounts. We then address the promise to explain why the conditions that render one blameworthy are as they are. According to proponents, these conditions render one blameworthy because they render fitting the selected emotion. But why do just these conditions do the latter? We find no good answer to this question from proponents of the accounts. While we do not contend that blameworthiness is response-independent, we are unconvinced that it is response-dependent.

Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, S, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We advance a slightly qualified version of the following thesis: (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for S to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing. Leaving implicit the qualification concerning extent, we claim as well: (Desert) S's having this reason suffices for S’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing. We also advance a third thesis connecting desert of feeling guilty with the fittingness of this response. In light of our three theses, we address several claims that have been made regarding responsibility and desert. We take issue with the divorce of desert from responsibility. We find acceptable a claim regarding blameworthiness and reason to induce guilt, and we defend the idea that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is blameworthy be subject to a fitting feeling of guilt. We argue against a view on which desert of blame has a teleological dimension.

The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Philosophy presents the first comprehensive, state of the art overview of the complex relationship between the field of translation studies and the study of philosophy. The book is divided into four sections covering discussions of canonical philosophers, central themes in translation studies from a philosophical perspective, case studies of how philosophy has been translated and illustrations of new developments. With twenty-nine chapters written by international specialists in translation studies and philosophy, it represents a major survey of two fields that have only recently begun to enter into dialogue. The Routledge Handbook of Translation and Philosophy is a pioneering resource for students and scholars in translation studies and philosophy alike.

Any adequate account of the distinction between consequentialist and deontological moral systems must take account of the central place given to constraints in the latter. Constraints place limits on what each of us may do in the pursuit of any goal, including the maximisation of the good. There is some debate, however, both over how constraints are to be characterised, and over the rationale for their inclusion in a moral system. Some authors view constraints as agent-relative: a constraint supplies an agent with an agent-relative reason to refrain from acting in the prohibited manner. A reason is agent-relative if it contains an ineliminable back-reference to the agent. On this characterisation, it is natural to suppose that constraints arise because of an agent’s concern with her own agency. There is perhaps, however, an alternative to this agent-focussed rationale: constraints, although characterised in terms of agent-relative reasons, might be best explained and defended via considerations of the potential victim of wrongdoing—yielding a victim- or patient-focussed rationale. Or, perhaps, constraints are not only best defended by a victim-focussed rationale; they are also best characterised by reference to the potential victim. In what follows, we advocate an agent-relative characterisation of, and an agent-focussed rationale for, constraints. We begin by developing a rigorous account of agent-focussed agent-relativity, before turning to consider patient-based approaches.

The context-free weak ordering principle is viewed by many as a cornerstone of rational choice theory. McClennen, for example, claims that this principle is one of a pair on which '[t]he theory of rational choice and preference, as it has been developed in the past few decades by economists and decision theorists, rests', and Sen characterizes a version of context freedom as ‘a very basic requirement of rational choice’. But this principle is certainly not uncontroversial: there are examples of principle is certainly not apper irrational

According to Newton, the goals of natural philosophy comprise quantitative generalizations and causal knowledge, the latter being paramount. Quantitative generalizations are sometimes explanatory, in psychology as elsewhere . However, in psychology, they are not explanatory when the human subject is considered qua bearer of psychological states , but only when she is considered qua physical system. In the former case quantitative generalizations are, rather, to be causally explained. In this sense, psychology may be closer to the Newtonian methodological mark than contemporary physics

In recent years the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons has been taken by many to play a key role in distinguishing deontology from consequentialism. It is central to all universalist consequentialist theories that value is determined impersonally; the real value of any state of affairs does not depend on the point of view of the agent. No reference, therefore, to the agent or to his or her position in the world need enter into a consequentialist understanding of what makes an action right or wrong or morally permissible. Consequentialism thus provides an agent-neutral account of both the right and the good