Pietro Kobau

It wouldn’t be too wrong, to assert that the modern debate about the faculty of taste has almost entirely been translated into the contemporary dispute about the aesthetic experience. And, right or wrong, the work of art remains here the primary point of reference. However, in both continental and analytical traditions, the discussion about the “what” of the aesthetic experience – normally intended as the experience of an artwork, and the experience made by a spectator with particular attitudes and expectations – has not reached even the maturity of a minimal number of shared theories. Moreover, this whole question has not even been outlined as a commonly accepted and structured problem.

In a previous publication, I explored the work of Mimmo Paladino, attempting to show that, on one hand, his artistic creations transcend the traditional and merely representational function of painting by not subordinating it to a purely symbolic or narrative purpose. Conversely, I argued that Paladino does not naively employ one of the seemingly obvious instruments of painting – attracting visual attention to its own medium. The present paper revisits that earlier intervention with greater analytical depth, critically examining and elaborating on the fundamental theoretical problems underlying those initial assertions and endeavoring to extend their conceptual scope beyond the specific case of a single artist.

“Art”—what is it? What sort of entities are artworks? “Art”—when is it? Normally, when we visit an art exhibition, when we listen to a concert or when we look at a performing art in a setting, we use to read the titles, the tags or something textual, a threshold not crafted by the author, about the exposed or executed artworks in order to grasp their subject, style, history, and author. But: how does a title, a non-fiction depiction or a pointing, and different ways of para-textual activation, entitle and unable us to such an operation and to live an aesthetic relation? This issue of “Aisthesis” explores the conditions under which it could be useful to distinguish between aesthetic objects and artworks–visual, musical, literary, performing arts– and to admit that the existence of the latter depends on a marginal and basic component of them: tags. The issue contains articles by Jerrold Levinson, Bernard Sève, Filippo Focosi, Alberto Voltolini, Giulia Alberti, Pietro Kobau, Jean-Pierre Cometti, Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel, Filippo Fimiani, Bertrand Rougé, Leardo Botti, Michel Déguy, Jean-Marie Klinkenberg, Micla Petrelli, Andrea Olivieri, Alessandro Ottaviani.

After more than three centuries, Molyneux's question continues to challenge our understanding of cognition and perceptual systems. Locke, the original recipient of the question, approached it as a theoretical exercise relevant to long-standing philosophical issues, such as nativism, the possibility of common sensibles, and the empiricism-rationalism debate. However, philosophers were quick to adopt the experimentalist's stance as soon as they became aware of recoveries from congenital blindness through ophtalmic surgery. Such recoveries were widely reported to support empiricist positions, suggesting that the question had found its empirical answer. Contrary to this common view, we argue that studies of patients recovering from early blindness through surgery cannot provide an answer. In fact, because of the very nature of such ophtalmological interventions it is impossible to test the question in the empirical conditions outlined by Molyneux. Thus we propose that Molyneux's question be treated as an early thought experiment of a specific kind. Although thought experiments of this kind cannot be turned into actual experimental conditions, they provide a conceptual restructuring of theories. Such restructuring in turn leads to new predictions that can then be tested by normal experiments. In accord with this interpretation, we show that Molyneux's question can be analyzed into a hierarchy of specific questions about vision in its phenomenal and sensory-motor components. Some of these questions do lead to actual experimental conditions that could be studied empirically

We normally suppose that any artwork “is about” something. The aim of this paper is to show that, even if we can often successfully treat artworks like (historical, sociological, biographical, economical, psychological…) documents, such a circumstance isn’t essential in order to make of an object (a building, a photo…) an artwork (nor it is, parenthetically, the fact that the object in question can be judged as a “beautiful” object, in any sense of this word). The only important circumstance is that an object is adequately documented to be an artwork.