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This paper addresses commentaries on “Rethinking Subjectivity: The Social Roots of Consciousness”. In response to Marraffa-Meini, the author defends his view by arguing that empirical evidence supports the emergence of social cognition faculties, such as motor mirroring and emotional contagion, before higher-level cognitive processes like deception. The author acknowledges the critique of the “mindreading priority account” but maintains that a single mindreading system better explains self-consciousness. Responding to Eugeny Loginov, the author clarifies that while consciousness serves an adaptive role, it does not imply adaptationism. The author agrees that consciousness may have multiple evolutionary origins but emphasizes the focus on self-consciousness as a social cognitive tool. In addressing Artem Besedin’s critique, the author concedes that the tension between phenomenology and functionalism is valid but argues that the problem of phenomenology is empirical rather than principled. Responding to Max Cappuccio, the author acknowledges the potential compatibility of the theory with enactivism, particularly in avoiding the reduction of mental life to motor dimensions. Finally, in response to Keith Frankish, the author agrees that the “subjective side of subjectivity” may be illusory in some sense and that science, while limited in explaining individual experiences, can be complemented by other disciplines to develop a more nuanced understanding of consciousness.

The mind has a subjective side. This is evidenced by a number of cognitive processes, including self-consciousness, first-person perspective, qualia, and individual differences in perception and emotion. In the early decades of cognitive science, these types of mental events were studied very cautiously. It was feared that they would compromise the experimental character of the new science of the mind. In fact, phenomenology – understood both in terms of reviving the themes dear to the philosophy inspired by Edmund Husserl and in terms of looking at the qualitative and enactive aspects of consciousness – was the most serious attack on the scientific claims of cognitive science. In general, what we are interested in is establishing relations with individuals, not with an abstract mind, which has the same structure in all human beings as well as other animals and machines. Physicalism has been challenged and with it – the principle of the causal closure of the physical world. To claim that one can explain what the mind is without understanding the role of subjective experience is like holding a wedding ceremony without the bride. Subjectivity is the very reason for our interest in the mind. However, the price of the causal closure of the physical world and the ultimate abandonment of cognitive science is too high to save the subjective and individual side of experience. Behind the enthusiasm for subjectivity also lies a kind of attitude that actually hinders research. It is the idea that self-consciousness and its phenomenology are the pinnacle of the human spirit, the most valuable thing we have and the thing we should be most proud of. This attitude is a misunderstanding. Indeed, it contradicts most of the empirical evidence that has been obtained in recent decades. It seems that, contrary to popular belief, self-consciousness serves the purposes of social cognition, not the opposite. We have not evolved the ability to coordinate our behavior with that of others and then develop an elaborate inner life. On the contrary, we have developed the inner logical space of self-consciousness because it allows social cognition to be much more efficient. In my paper, I would like to illustrate this way of thinking and, in particular, show that conceptual self-consciousness is a by-product of social cognition (“Mindreading priority account”). While non-conceptual self-consciousness seems to be more or less independent of social cognition, conceptual self-consciousness is subordinate to social cognition from a logical, evolutionary, and developmental psychological perspectives. The reason is that social cognition requires an internal workspace to perform its simulations, and this workspace is precisely what we introspectively experience as the sense of self-consciousness.

The chapter explores the challenges posed by the proliferation of robots in society, particularly humanoid robots, focusing on cognitive constraints, ergonomic concerns, cross-cultural issues and the emergence of an artificial morality in human–robot interactions. It also delves into the distinctions between physical and intentional trust, highlighting the role of deference, both biologically grounded and epistemic, in human–robot relationships. The concept of selective deference is introduced as a means of navigating interactions with robots, emphasizing the importance of balancing trust and deference based on the context and the technology involved. Overall, the analysis underscores the need for a nuanced understanding of trust and deference in the evolving landscape of human–robot interactions.

This book contains essential contributions to enrich and broaden the application field of pragmatics. It provides an example of how the fruitful reflections and refined conceptual distinctions born in the philosophical field can find a practical application in addressing social, cognitive, clinical, and psychological problems. Its chapters address, from different points of view, the relationship between pragmatic linguistics and philosophy, and outline the possible application of pragmatic theories to different domains. Developed during the third Pragmasophia international conference, whose name is derived from the Greek terms πρᾶγμα (action, fact) and σοφία (knowledge, science), the book aligns itself with its aim to study human actions and activities and how they take shape through language. But ‘Pragma’ and ‘Sophia’ also signal another purpose: highlighting the importance of creating links between empirical investigations on language use, and more traditional philosophical approaches. In this reading, ‘Pragma’ represents the experimental goal devoted to analysing and interpreting language facts. In contrast, the term ‘Sophia’ recalls the original vocation of past philosophers to pursue an ideal of ‘pure knowledge’, disconnected from any practical-economic interest. While maintaining the conference's original purpose of encouraging productive comparisons between different approaches, the book consists of two sections: first, on philosophical approaches, recalls more theoretical aspects (closer to the term ‘Sophia’); the second, ‘Inferential and Cognitive Pragmatics,’ addresses more practical issues affecting domains such as Greek literature, pragmatic disorders, dictionary entries, and speech analysis. The reader, whether in linguists, philosophy or psychology, obtains a complete overview of the most advanced current research lines, both theoretical and empirical, and thus contributes to broadening the scope of pragmatics.

This book contains a comprehensive view of pragmalinguistic studies and their recent ramifications, boasting some of the most advanced recent research in pragmatics. Organised into three sections—pragmalinguistics, social pragmatics, and cognitive-inferential pragmatics, respectively—the chapters enable an understanding of the possible applications of linguistic and philosophical theories in practical fields. Covering topics such as polysemy across languages and lexical externalism, the role of literal meaning in the construction of metaphorical meaning, the pragmatics of truth, the roles of reflexivity in meaning negotiation, argumentation and discourse, the pragmatics of taboo, linguistic and cognitive aspects of formation of implicates, and reflections on neuropragmatics and clinical pragmatics in Autism Spectrum Disorder and Schizophrenia—to name but a few exciting areas of exploration—this book is of interest to scholars and postgraduate students in the fields of semantics, pragmatics and philosophy of language, cognitive science, and other areas of linguistics.

This paper provides an epistemological and methodological analysis of the recent practice of using neural language models to simulate brain language processing. It is argued that, on the one hand, this practice can be understood as an instance of the traditional simulative method in artificial intelligence, following a mechanistic understanding of the mind; on the other hand, that it modifies the simulative method significantly. Firstly, neural language models are introduced; a study case showing how neural language models are being applied in cognitive neuroscience for simulative purposes is then presented; after recalling the main epistemological features of the simulative method in artificial intelligence, it is finally highlighted how the epistemic opacity of neural language models is tackled by using the brain itself to simulate the neural language model and to test hypotheses about it, in what is called here a co-simulation.

According to the common sense view, self-consciousness is the climax of human cognition. This provides the ordinary feeling of being special thanks to the faculty of self-consciousness. But, we can doubt how much nature takes care of our satisfactory feeling of being self-conscious. What if self-consciousness has any top role in human cognition? In particular, is self-consciousness really prior to mindreading?, or the contrary? Call the first thesis “self-consciousness priority account” and the other “mindreading priority account”. While MRPA is also the view that mindreading evolved prior to self-consciousness, SCPA is the claim that self-consciousness evolved prior to mindreading.

There is a diffuse sentiment that to anthropomorphize is a mild vice that people tend to do easily and pleasingly, but that an adult well educated person should avoid. In this paper it will be provided an elucidation of ``anthropomorphism'' in the field of common sense knowledge, the issue of animal rights, and about the use of humans as a model in the scientific explanation. It will be argued for a ``constructive anthropomorphism'', i.e., the idea that anthropomorphism is a natural attutude to attribute human psychological features to other individuals, no matter they are actually rational agents, or not. If we know the ``grammar'' of this attutude, we can avoid the risks in overestimating the environmental inputs towards anthropomor­phism and, at the same time, take the heuristic advantages of anthropomor­phism in the use of human mind as a model for both everyday circumstances and scientific enterprise.

In recent years, the family of algorithms collected under the term ``deep learning'' has revolutionized artificial intelligence, enabling machines to reach human-like performances in many complex cognitive tasks. Although deep learning models are grounded in the connectionist paradigm, their recent advances were basically developed with engineering goals in mind. Despite of their applied focus, deep learning models eventually seem fruitful for cognitive purposes. This can be thought as a kind of biological exaptation, where a physiological structure becomes applicable for a function different from that for which it was selected. In this paper, it will be argued that it is time for cognitive science to seriously come to terms with deep learning, and we try to spell out the reasons why this is the case. First, the path of the evolution of deep learning from the connectionist project is traced, demonstrating the remarkable continuity, and the differences as well. Then, it will be considered how deep learning models can be useful for many cognitive topics, especially those where it has achieved performance comparable to humans, from perception to language. It will be maintained that deep learning poses questions that cognitive sciences should try to answer. One of such questions is the reasons why deep convolutional models that are disembodied, inactive, unaware of context, and static, are by far the closest to the patterns of activation in the brain visual system.

: Autonomous driving systems promise important changes for future of transport, primarily through the reduction of road accidents. However, ethical concerns, in particular, two central issues, will be key to their successful development. First, situations of risk that involve inevitable harm to passengers and/or bystanders, in which some individuals must be sacrificed for the benefit of others. Secondly, and identification responsible parties and liabilities in the event of an accident. Our work addresses the first of these ethical problems. We are interested in investigating how humans respond to critical situations and what reactions they consider to be morally right or at least preferable to others. Our experimental approach relies on the trolley dilemma and knowledge gained from previous research on this. More specifically, our main purpose was to test the difference between what human drivers actually decide to do in an emergency situations whilst driving a realistic simulator and the moral choices they make when they pause to consider what they would do in the same situation and to better understand why these choices may differs. Keywords: Self-driving Cars; Trolley Problem; Moral Choices; Moral Responsibility; Virtual Reality Dilemmi morali nelle automobili a guida autonoma Riassunto: I sistemi di guida autonomi promettono importanti cambiamenti per il futuro dei trasporti, principalmente attraverso la riduzione degli incidenti stradali. Tuttavia, vi sono preoccupazioni etiche, in particolare due questioni centrali, fondamentali per il loro sviluppo. In primo luogo, le situazioni di rischio che comportano inevitabili danni ai passeggeri e/o ai pedoni, ovvero situazioni in cui alcune persone devono essere sacrificate a beneficio di altri. In secondo luogo, l’identificazione delle parti responsabili in caso di incidente. Il nostro lavoro affronta il primo di questi problemi etici. Siamo interessati a studiare come gli umani rispondono a situazioni critiche e quali reazioni considerano moralmente giuste o almeno preferibili. Il nostro approccio sperimentale si basa sul trolley problem e sulle conoscenze acquisite da precedenti ricerche su questo ambito. Più specificamente, il nostro scopo principale è quello di testare la differenza tra ciò che i conducenti umani decidono effettivamente di fare in una situazione di emergenza, mentre guidano un simulatore realistico, e le scelte morali che compiono se posti nella stessa situazione e hanno la possibilità di decidere senza limiti di tempo. Lo scopo è inoltre comprendere come e perché queste scelte possono differire. Parole chiave: Automobili a guida autonoma; Trolley problem; Scelte morali; Responsabilità morale, Realtà virtuale

: According to Tim Crane, his version of psychologism is not based on the familiar opposition between conceptual analysis and empirical science. His point is not simply to consider phenomenological and empirical data in the science of the mind. Challenging the idea that investigation of the mind has to be understood “as an autonomous investigation solely into the concepts embodied in our psychological discourse”, Crane tries to argue for a more realistic picture of the mental. His rejection of “autonomous investigation”, however, is based in the end on its impermeability to empirical evidence and on the consequent reduction of philosophy of mind to conceptual analysis of ordinary intentional vocabulary. This seems clear as far as conceptual analysis goes, but perhaps has some undesired consequences in terms of common sense vocabulary. In fact, with respect to folk psychological discourse about the mind, all that Crane is saying is that — besides conceptual analysis — we have to take into consideration empirical evidence in order to reconsider common sense discourse on the mind. This is not so different from the familiar contrast between conceptual analysis and empirical science. Keywords : Psychologism; -psycholosigm; Conceptual Analysis; Common Sense Knowledge; Folk-psychology La psicologizzazzione dello psicologico e il ritorno al senso comune Riassunto : Secondo Tim Crane, la sua idea di psicologismo non poggia sulla nota opposizione tra analisi concettuale e scienza empirica. Non si tratta semplicemente di tenere in considerazione i dati empirici e fenomenici all’interno della scienza della mente. Diversamente da quanti ritengono che l’indagine sulla mente debba essere intesa “come un’indagine autonoma che verte solo sui concetti incorporati nel nostro discorso psicologico”, Crane vorrebbe sostenere un’immagine più realistica del mentale. Il rifiuto del metodo della “indagine autonoma”, poggia in definitiva sull’impermeabilità all’evidenza empirica e sulla conseguente riduzione della filosofia della mente ad analisi concettuale del lessico intenzionale ordinario. Quanto pare chiaro circa l’analisi concettuale, ha forse tuttavia qualche conseguenza indesiderata sul lessico del senso comune. In effetti, se prendiamo in considerazione il discorso della psicologia del senso comune sulla mente, quanto Crane afferma è che – oltre l’analisi concettuale – dovremmo tener conto anche dell’evidenza empirica. Questo, tuttavia, non sembra tanto lontano dalla solita contrapposizione tra analisi concettuale e scienza empirica. Parole chiave : Psicologismo; -psicologismo; Analisi concettuale; Conoscenza di senso comune; Psicologia del senso comune.

The aim of this paper is to show that humanlanguage is context-dependent in a veryspecific way. In order to support this thesis,a detailed comparison is made between the waysin which verbal expressions depend on thecontext of occurrence and evaluation and animalcommunication systems. The comparisonhighlights a series of analogies anddifferences between human language and thecommunication systems of other animals. Myproposal is to use the term `indexicality' toindicate the characteristic way of using thecontext in human language and to use the moregeneral phrase `context-dependence' for thecorresponding phenomenon in animalcommunication systems.

The recent Italian translation of the writings on language of J.G. Fichte draws attention to a chapter in German classical philosophy which so far has not aroused great interest. The volume brings together four texts: 1) Von der Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprung der Sprache, 2) Über den Ursprung der Sprache, 3) Von der Sprachfähigkeit, 4) Über den Ursprung der Sprache überhaupt. The first of these four texts is the most important: it is the only work by Fichte thematically devoted to the problem of language. It is a 1795 essay published in the Philosophisches Journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten edited by F.I. Niethammer partly in the third and partly in the fourth fascicle of that year. The other writings are linked to Fichte’s work in that period as a lecturer at the University of Jena. They are notes by the author and transcriptions of his university courses. Fichte’s lectures were based on the Philosophische Aphorismen by Ernst Platner and it was precisely in commenting on the chapter on language in Platner’s text that Fichte worked out his own reflections on language. In Fichte’s corpus there is not much else on language: some pages in Reden an die deutsche Nation and a few other observations in the other works.