Piotr Nowak

DONATION AFTER CIRCULATORY DETERMINATION OF DEATH. ABOUT THE PRECEDENCE OF NEUROLOGICAL CRITERION OF DEATH OVER CIRCULATORY CRITERION – PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES Summary This two-part article concerns with bioethical issues associated with organ donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). Part 2 is devoted to philosophical problems. I analyze three concepts of death, that identify the end of life with a) somatic disintegration of the organism, b) irreversible cessation of vital work of self-preservation and c) irreversible loss of patient’s moral status. By referring to these positions I argue that circulatory criterion of death is reliable only if cessation of circulation lasts long enough for brain death to occur. Taking this into account, it might be supposed that the 5 minutes period of observation of cessation of circulation is not enough for patient’s death to take place.

DONATION AFTER CIRCULATORY DETERMINATION OF DEATH. ABOUT THE PRECEDENCE OF NEUROLOGICAL CRITERION OF DEATH OVER CIRCULATORY CRITERION – REGULATORY ISSUES This two-part article concerns with bioethical issues associated with organ donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). Part 1 is devoted to legal and regulatory matters. Here I prove that in Poland organ retrieval from donors of all categories, specified in the modified Maastricht classification, is permissible. Particularly I argue that in our country there already is a legal basis for development of program of organ retrieval from donors in whom circulatory arrest have occurred after foregoing of life sustaining treatment. I also examine whether from the point of view of the law such donors might be considered dead when organ retrieval takes place.

After more than fifty years of debate on the definition of death, there remains no consensus among bioethicists. This article identifies the conflicting interests represented by various groups within the bioethics community as the primary cause of this stalemate. It argues that the impasse can be overcome if bioethicists recognize these conflicting interests as the fundamental reason for their disagreements, rather than viewing the dispute as primarily concerning the scientifically adequate concept of death. This article proposes a strategy on how to reach a consensus. The core idea in this regard is that the definition of death, in a socially important sense, needs to protect the interests of individual members of society.

This paper introduces the special issue of Diametros devoted to discussing “Expertise, Disagreement, and Trust in Vaccine Science and Policy. The Importance of Transparency in a World of Experts” by Alberto Giubilini, Rachel Gur-Arie, and Euzebiusz Jamrozik. In their article, Giubilini et al. argue that expert transparency—particularly regarding disagreements among experts—is ethically crucial for securing public trust in vaccine policy. Several contributors to this issue expand upon that claim. For example, Maciej Macuga proposes that transparency is necessary to make coercive vaccination policies morally legitimate, and Lucie White interprets the core disagreement surrounding vaccine recommendations as a divergence in underlying values. Other authors challenge aspects of Giubilini et al.’s position: Udo Schüklenk and Ben Almassi caution that greater transparency may not bolster trust or improve vaccine uptake, while Ezio Di Nucci presents an analytical argument showing that a purely epistemic notion of expertise leads to paradoxical conclusions—namely, that experts should care neither about trustworthiness, nor trust. Jamie Watson emphasizes that it is the reliable process of producing scientific knowledge that grounds expert trustworthiness. Finally, Elena Popa and Richard Matthews argue that redistributions of power, both in society at large and within expert communities, are necessary to foster genuine trust.

The author analyses “The Merchant of Venice” by William Shakespeare, to highlight the transformation of the Christian body and the Jewish soul during the early stages of capitalism. He reveals that the Venice described by Shakespeare is a world without measure, in which money is the only value. People are objects of financial speculation and all of humanity is treated as a commodity, an exchange value. When Bassanio praises the advantages of Portia, he first mentions her ducats, and only after that does he allude to her beauty and virtues of mind. The capitalism that is being formed in the eyes of the viewers mocks significant cultural, ethnic and religious differences. It buries them in heaps of money and then blurs them, forcing a new concept of man, whose existence differs little from plants and animals growing freely. In such a world, a game is the only strategy that allows for survival. In Venice, everyone pretends, wears a mask and lives in hypocrisy. This behaviour is typical of the “carnival” atmosphere. Masks separate people from themselves, covering up their tracks and blurring identities. By wearing them, they can hide behind “someone else”.