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207Abortion, Infanticide, and Choosing ParenthoodDialogue 1-26. forthcoming.Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood. Certaines réponses aux analogie…Read more
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340Why there is no dilemma for the birth strategy: a response to Bobier and OmelianchukJournal of Medical Ethics 49 (11): 779-780. 2023.Bobier and Omelianchuk argue that the Birth Strategy for addressing analogies between abortion and infanticide is saddled with a dilemma. It must be accepted that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are either, impermissible, or they are not. If accepted, then the Birth Strategy is undermined. If not, then the highly unintuitive claim that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are permissible must be accepted. I argue that the moral principle employed to defend the claim that non-therapeutic late-…Read more
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265Ectogenesis and the Right to LifeDiametros 19 (74): 51-56. 2022.In this discussion note on Michal Pruski and Richard C. Playford’s “Artificial Wombs, Thomson and Abortion – What Might Change?,” I consider whether the prospect of ectogenesis technology would make abortion impermissible. I argue that a Thomson-style defense may not become inapplicable due to the right to life being conceived as a negative right. Further, if Thomson-style defenses do become inapplicable, those who claim that ectogenesis would be an obligatory alternative to abortion cannot do s…Read more
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11018Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource, collected and edited by Noah Levin (edited book)N.G.E Far Press. 2019.Collected and edited by Noah Levin Table of Contents: UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TECHNOLOGY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND IMMIGRATION 1 The “Trolley Problem” and Self-Driving Cars: Your Car’s Moral Settings (Noah Levin) 2 What is Ethics and What Makes Something a Problem for Morality? (David Svolba) 3 Letter from the Birmingham City Jail (Martin Luther King, Jr) 4 A Defense of Affirmative Action (Noah Levin) 5 The Moral Issues of Immigration (B.M. Wooldridge) 6 The Ethics of our D…Read more
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361Orphans Cannot be After-Birth Aborted: A Response to BobierJournal of Medical Ethics 49 (2): 143-144. 2023.I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns.
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1087Moral Realism and Expert DisagreementTrames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 24 (3): 441-457. 2020.SPECIAL ISSUE ON DISAGREEMENTS: The fact of moral disagreement is often raised as a problem for moral realism. The idea is that disagreement amongst people or communities on moral issues is to be taken as evidence that there are no objective moral facts. While the fact of ‘folk’ moral disagreement has been of interest, the fact of expert moral disagreement, that is, widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers, is even more compelling. In this paper, I present three…Read more
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694Blame Without Punishment for AddictsPhilosophia 50 (1): 257-267. 2022.On the moral model of addiction, addicts are morally responsible and blameworthy for their addictive behaviours. The model is sometimes resisted on the grounds that blaming addicts is incompatible with treating addiction in a compassionate and non-punitive way. I argue the moral model is consistent with addressing addiction compassionately and non-punitively and better accounts for both the role of addicts’ agency in the recovery process. If an addict is responsible for their addictive behaviour…Read more
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649Killing and Impairing FetusesThe New Bioethics 28 (2): 127-138. 2022.Could it be that if a fetus is not a person abortion is still immoral? One affirmative answer comes in the form of ‘The Impairment Argument’, which utilizes ‘The Impairment Principle’ to argue that abortion is immoral even if fetuses lack personhood. I argue ‘The Impairment Argument’ fails. It is not adequately defended from objections, and abortion is, in fact, a counterexample to the impairment principle. Furthermore, it explains neither what the wrong-making features of abortion are nor what …Read more
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263Considering Dispositional Moral RealismIn Francis Fallon (ed.), Insights Into Ethical Theory and Practice: Principia Eclectica, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 32-49. 2022.An updated reprint of Singh, Prabhpal. 2018. "Considering Dispositional Moral Realism". Perspectives: An International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 8(1): 14-22.
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612Considering Dispositional Moral RealismPerspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 8 (1): 14-22. 2018.My aim in this paper is to consider a series of arguments against Dispositional Moral Realism and argue that these objections are unsuccessful. I will consider arguments that try to either establish a dis-analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities or try to show that a dispositional account of moral properties fails to account for what a defensible species of moral realism must account for. I also consider criticisms from Simon Blackburn, who argues that there could not be a corres…Read more
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1117Fetuses, Newborns, and Parental ResponsibilityJournal of Medical Ethics 46 (3): 188-193. 2020.I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analyzing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that …Read more
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603Defending the Distinction Between Pregnancy and ParenthoodJournal of Medical Ethics 47 (3): 189-191. 2021.In this paper, I respond to criticisms toward my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent-child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative support, they do not pose a problem for my account. I conclu…Read more
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Reproductive Ethics |
Philosophy of Race |