Pureum Chae

This thesis focuses on moral philosophical arguments overlooked in Adorno's philosophy. The main focus of Adorno's criticism of Kants moral philosophy is the Third Antinomy, which deals with the conflict between freedom and causality. If this Antinomy is not resolved, the moral realm cannot be opened in the first place. In other words, the Third Antinomy is morality's most fundamental problematic issue. Adorno criticizes the process of dealing with and resolving this Antinomy, as well as Kant's concepts of causality and freedom. This paper aims to reconstruct and present these criticisms of Adorno and to emphasize the persuasiveness and effectiveness of Adorno's criticism by responding to the criticisms. In chapter 2, the thesis will first examine the development and resolution process of the Third Antinomy and then look at Adorno's criticism that Kant treats the Antinomy as a pseudo-problem by trying to solve it. It will then examine the argument that Kant's concept of causality, one axis of the Third Antinomy, extends from original meaning to regularity and the category of thinking because the concept of causality is regarded as an example of identity thinking and a tool of domination of nature. Afterward, Chapter 3 critically examines the concept of freedom, another axis of the Third Antinomy, and Kant's moral philosophy centered on this concept. In Kant, Adorno points out that the concept of freedom also has a limitation that it is imagined and defined as a kind of law from the Third Antinomy, and from that, he also criticizes the fundamental limitations of the Third Antinomy. In addition, Kant's freedom as autonomy through self-legislation is based on self-domination but results in self-submission. Such self-domination is achieved by abstracting impulses indispensable for the practice of moral behavior from rationalistic autonomy by irrational mechanisms. Chapters 4 and 5 will examine the critical discussions raised about Adorno's claims that have been examined so far and respond to them. Chapter 4 will examine the criticism that Adorno confuses distinguished concepts of causality and necessity in Kant and explain that it is not merely a confusion from Adorno's point of view but a valid criticism based on affinity between the concepts. Next, chapter 5 will examine the criticism that Adorno's interpretation of Kant's freedom and its antinomy is based on misreading and that there is genuine Kantian freedom and its antinomy. In response, this thesis argues that Adorno's interpretation of Kant already encompasses its alternative interpretation and provides a better understanding of Kant's freedom and Kant's moral philosophy than the alternative.