Qian Chen

This paper presents a logic of preference and functional dependence (LPFD) and its hybrid extension (HLPFD), both of whose sound and strongly complete axiomatization are provided. The decidability of LPFD is also proved. The application of LPFD and HLPFD to modelling cooperative games in strategic form is explored. The resulted framework provides a unified view on Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Some key connections with other logics are also revealed, for example, the coalition logic, the logic of functional dependence and the logic of ceteris paribus preference.

Digital technological innovation is reshaping the pattern of industrial development. Due to the shortage of digital talents and the frequent mobility of these people, the competition for talents will be very fierce for organizations to realize digital transformation. The digitization transformation of China’s service industry is far ahead of that of industry and agriculture. It is of great significance to study the organizational management and talent management of service enterprises to reduce the negative impact of insufficient talent reserve and meet the needs of digital development. Based on 378 valid questionnaires from China’s service industry, this paper applied polynomial regression and a response surface model to analyze the impact of two kinds of person-environment fit on work engagement and individual creativity. The results show that: under the combination of high morality and high talent, work engagement and individual creativity are the highest; individual creativity is stronger under the condition of high morality and low talent than under low morality and high talent; and work engagement mediates the influence of morality and talent on individual creativity. The research reveals the internal mechanism by which morality and talent cooperatively promote individual creativity, which provides theoretical guidance for management practice of service firms to improve individual creativity in the process of digital transformation.

Managerial myopia occurs when executives value short-term benefits to the extent that firm long-run development will be obstructed. Recent studies have shown that the locality effect plays an important role in managerial myopia—local United States chief executive officers who work near their home states are less likely to behave myopically because of more effective monitoring and greater reputation concern. In an emerging market, government policies play a more important role in the strategic planning enterprises. A local CEO may have better understanding of local government’s policies thus makes less short-term decisions. This article adds to this literature by testing whether local-province CEOs in China, i.e., the CEO’s native place or birthplace is in the same province as her company’s headquarters, are also far-sighted. Using data on 470 publicly listed non-state-owned Chinese firms from 2014 to 2018, supportive evidence has been found that non-local-province CEOs in China tend to cut R&D expenses for beating analyst forecasts, reversing earnings decline, or pursuing higher returns. This article also confirms social capital as one mechanism of Chinese local-province CEOs behaving less myopically. This investigation also adds to the literature by revealing a new mechanism that CEO locality in China has a positive and direct bearing on how governments support corporate innovation.