Quanhua Liu

Sękowski attempts to defend the Method of Cases against the negative experimental philosophy challenge by distinguishing general conceptual judgments (intuitions of intension) from case-application judgments (intuitions of extension). By conceding that case-application judgments are unreliable, Sękowski argues that thought experiments can survive if their grounding premises rely exclusively on general conceptual judgments. Using Sękowski as a primary case study to evaluate the broader family of “mischaracterization” defenses, I contend that this strategy is incomplete. I demonstrate that case-application judgments inescapably appear in the evaluative setup of thought experiments – notably in the justification premise of Gettier’s ten-coins vignette. Plausible attempts to replace these case-sensitive setup premises with general epistemological principles (such as standard evidentialism, process reliabilism, and their revised forms) either leave the case-dependency intact, render the necessary bridging premises false, or beg the question. Furthermore, recent appeals to conceptual engineering and methodological infinitism cannot bypass this dependency, as concept-revision logically supervenes on concept-application. Hence, case-application judgments remain inescapable, and mischaracterization style defenses cannot fully neutralize the Xphi challenge. I close by outlining several implications for epistemological practice, given this dependency in Gettier-style cases.