In what sense are we aware of objects behind the head? Do we experience such objects perceptually, or are they merely remembered, imagined, kinesthetically sensed, or cognitively believed? How is the space behind us represented more generally, and which mental capacities underwrite our experience of the world behind the head? This paper argues that standard models of such experience are insufficient. It develops and defends a novel account according to which the world behind the head is represen…
Read moreIn what sense are we aware of objects behind the head? Do we experience such objects perceptually, or are they merely remembered, imagined, kinesthetically sensed, or cognitively believed? How is the space behind us represented more generally, and which mental capacities underwrite our experience of the world behind the head? This paper argues that standard models of such experience are insufficient. It develops and defends a novel account according to which the world behind the head is represented by two semi-independent memory systems: a spatial updating system primarily attuned to transportable objects like keys, cups, phones, and other agents, and a cognitive mapping system primarily attuned to non-transportable objects like buildings, walls, and furniture. Each system has a distinct mechanistic and neural basis, and makes a distinct phenomenal contribution to experience. I show how this account intersects with debates about the relationship between perception, imagination, and memory, and supports a view on which rear space experience is a form of present-tensed, memory-constituted perceptual experience.