R. Kathleen Harbin

Although Joseph Addison’s discussion of sublimity is widely acknowledged as historically influential, there has been little philosophical engagement with his account in the recent flowering of interest in the sublime in philosophy and psychology. But the core of his account is persuasive. He holds that sublime experience is pleasurable because it involves being presented with an astonishing, overwhelming volume of content that seems perfectly suited to our faculty for representation. This view is a convincing alternative to the common view, accepted as early as Burke and Kant and up to the present, that sublimity is a “mixed valence” experience involving both positive and negative effects. It also accords well with contemporary philosophical approaches and empirical psychological research on sublimity. These theories often subscribe to the “mixed valence” view, but their central contention is that the sublime is an aesthetic variant of awe. I show that Addison’s understanding of sublimity allows us to retain this plausible idea while resolving apparent problems facing views defending a mixed valence approach, including skeptical attacks on the very notion of sublimity. Addison plausibly suggests that the “vastness and immensity” of sublimity can be a pure joy.

Prevailing interpretations of Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language outside the Organon hold that he offers a single, comprehensive theory of the practical syllogism spanning his ethical and biological works. These comprehensive theories of the practical syllogism are plausible neither philosophically nor as interpretations of Aristotle. I argue for a multivocal account of the practical syllogism that distinguishes (1) Aristotle’s use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of animal motion in MA from (2) his use of syllogistic language to explain aspects of his account of the distinctive practical cognition of the phronimos in EN. I offer a novel account of the role of syllogistic language in ethics, arguing that it elucidates a nuanced account of universals and particulars in ethics according to which acting virtuously requires an understanding of underlying universal values and a capacity to relate them to concrete, particular features of our circumstances.

RÉSUMÉKant affirme que nous exigeons l'accord des autres quand nous rendons des jugements de goût. Je soutiens que cette affirmation fait partie d'une explication de la façon dont la phénoménologie des jugements esthétiques familiers appuie son affirmation selon laquelle les jugements de goût sont universels. La théorie esthétique de Kant n'est plausible que si nous rejetons l'affirmation répandue selon laquelle cette exigence est normative. Je propose une lecture non normative des jugements de goût kantiens basée sur une étude des textes, puis je conteste les trois interprétations normatives importantes, qui nous obligent à attribuer à Kant une position qu'il n'acceptait pas.

RÉSUMÉJe réponds à l'affirmation de Dunn selon laquelle les jugements esthétiques doivent être normatifs pour Kant. Pour ce faire, je clarifie ma position : je ne soutiens nullement que la force du sentiment de plaisir implique que les autres doivent être d'accord avec mon jugement; c'est plutôt la nature désintéressée du sentiment qui est la base de l'accord; je m'oppose à la proposition selon laquelle le système kantien, dans son ensemble, nécessite les jugements normatifs de goût; et je m'oppose à l'affirmation selon laquelle toute opération d'une faculté en accord avec un principe est normative.