Rachel Higginbotham

The existence and coherence of self-directed duties (that is, duties one owes to oneself) has been the topic of much debate lately. However, beyond defending their existence, not much work has been done to compare self-directed duties to their other-directed counterparts. In this paper, I examine three ways that self-directed duties might be thought to differ from self-directed duties: compensatory obligations, liability to defensive force, and respective weightiness. For each of these, I will provide some reason to think an asymmetry is not so obvious. In doing so, I will identify what one would need to show in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine asymmetry between self-directed duties and their other-directed counterparts and argue that such a standard has not yet been met. I conclude that self-directed duties are not so obviously different and carry many of the same consequences as their other-directed counterparts.