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11Nonresistant NonbeliefAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1): 1-23. 2024.The argument from divine hiddenness (ADH) requires accepting that nonresistant nonbelief has existed or does exist. Yet some reasons for accepting nonresistant nonbelief are also reasons for accepting theistic-supporting and naturalism-falsifying evidentially compelling religious experiences (ECREs). Additionally, any reasons for rejecting ECREs can be used to reject nonresistant nonbelief, thus creating parity (at the very least) of epistemic warrant between the two claims. Consequently, accept…Read more
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46Deny the Kalam’s Causal Principle, Embrace AbsurdityPhilosophia Christi 22 (2): 239-255. 2020.One objection against the kalam is that while the standard arguments for its causal premise apply to things in the universe, they do not apply to the universe itself. Thus, universes could come into existence uncaused from nothing. This objection, however, creates a situation where an absurd universe is as likely to come into existence uncaused as a normal universe is. This then generates serious skepticism about the reliability of our cognitive faculties, the truth of our sensory inputs, and ou…Read more
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31Defeating the Problem of Evil with EvilTheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 9 (1). 2024.I argue that the creation and freely chosen salvation and everlasting bliss of even just one person is a greater good than any finite amount of evil and suffering. Since it is extremely likely (if not certain) that, out of all possible individuals that could exist, some (or at least one) would only be freely saved through the contemplation and experience of evil and suffering, then God would be justified in creating a world with evil and suffering to allow for the salvation of such individuals, …Read more
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15Correction to: Maximal possessiveness: A serious flaw in the evil God challengeInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 92 (2): 89-89. 2022.
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26From Aesthetic Virtues to GodTheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 7 (2). 2022.I argue that the aesthetic theoretical virtues of beauty, simplicity, and unification, as well as the evidential virtue of explanatory depth, can transform theistic-friendly personal cause (PC) arguments—like the kalām cosmological argument (KCA) and the fine-tuning argument—into stand-alone arguments for monotheism. The aesthetic virtues allow this by providing us with the grounds to rationally accept a perfect personal cause (i.e., God) as the best PC to believe in given the success of some PC…Read more
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59Maximal possessiveness: A serious flaw in the evil God challengeInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 92 (2): 73-88. 2022.The Evil God (EG) challenge alleges that because arguments used to support belief in a Good God (GG) can be mirrored by the EG hypothesis, then belief in the former is no more reasonable than belief in the latter. Thus, there is an epistemic symmetry between both hypotheses. This paper argues that one of the EG’s secondary traits, specifically his maximal possessiveness, would render it very likely, if not certain, that the EG would _not_ create anything at all. By contrast, the GG would very li…Read more
Rad Miksa
Independent Researcher
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Independent ResearcherOther (Part-time)
Ottawa, ON, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Religion |