Rafael De Clercq

We provide an argument for the thesis that there could not have been nothing, given that there is something. Only one non-logical assumption goes into our argument. The assumption in question is supported by intuitive considerations as well as by three currently popular views about metaphysical modality. Moreover, our argument can be proven to be valid in the weak modal system K. If a posteriori assumptions are permitted, then the argument can be extended into an argument for why there could not have been nothing, period. The extended argument avoids the controversial assumptions made by previous attempts to establish the same thesis

Modern buildings do not easily harmonize with other buildings, regardless of whether the latter are also modern. This often-observed fact has not received a satisfactory explanation. To improve on existing explanations, this article generalizes one of Ortega y Gasset's observations concerning modern fine art and then develops a metaphysics of styles that is inspired by work in the philosophy of biology. The resulting explanation is that modern architecture is incapable of developing patterns that facilitate harmonizing because such patterns would humanize buildings, and modern architecture is a homeostatic property cluster with a dehumanizing motive at its core.

This essay argues for two conclusions about functional beauty as the notion has been understood by Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson in a recent book by the same name. First of all, it is argued that functional beauty either is not a distinct kind of beauty or that the members of this kind are not all and only instances of the property of looking fit. Second, it is argued that functional beauty is relative only to categories corresponding to essential functions. The second conclusion contradicts what Parsons and Carlson write about functional beauty, but the first conclusion does not, since they agree that looking fit is not necessary for functional beauty. However, their agreement on this point is based on reasons that can be shown to be mistaken. Moreover, contrary to what Parsons and Carlson claim, looking fit can also be shown to be insufficient for functional beauty.

Purist approaches to restoration have in common a certain understanding of the goal of restoration. This understanding suits an institutional framework that favours natural-scientific methods but also encourages risky interventions. To illustrate this point, a critical look is taken at the recent restoration of Hubert and Jan Van Eyck’s Adoration of the Mystic Lamb, also known as the Ghent Altarpiece. An alternative, “impurist” understanding of the goal of restoration is then proposed to help conservators avoid faulty interventions.

Several of the most prominent theories of actual causation make use of a minimality condition to prevent irrelevant elements from being tacked onto a cause so that the conjunction or sum passes for a cause. Focusing on one theory in particular—the influential Halpern-Pearl definition of actual causation—we argue that either the minimality condition or its rationale ought to be revised. We produce proposals showing that both are live options and demonstrate their potential usefulness within the larger family of counterfactual approaches to causation.

If possible worlds are conjunctions of states of affairs, as in David Armstrong’s combinatorial theory, then is the empty world to be thought of as the null conjunction of states of affairs? The proposal seems plausible, and has received support from David Efird, Tom Stoneham, and Armstrong himself. However, in this paper, it is argued that the proposal faces a trilemma: either it leads to the absurd conclusion that the actual world is empty; or it reduces to a familiar representation of the empty world in which the concept of a null conjunction plays no role; or it needs to make room for the null individual of certain non-classical mereologies.

For centuries, it has been recognized that beauty can move. My aim in this paper is to understand how beauty moves. One suggestion is that beauty moves in a causal way, for example, by causing us to have certain feelings. Four objections to this suggestion are considered, but none is found to be convincing in the light of how causation tends to be understood. Moreover, it turns out that there is a positive reason for thinking that beauty is causally efficacious, not just once it has been experienced, as John Hyman has suggested, but even in bringing about the experience on which all other effects of beauty depend.

Modern buildings do not easily harmonize with other buildings, regardless of whether the latter are also modern. This often-observed fact has not received a satisfactory explanation. To improve on existing explanations, this article first generalizes one of Ortega y Gasset’s observations concerning modern fine art, and then develops a metaphysics of styles that is inspired by work in the philosophy of biology. The resulting explanation is that modern architecture is incapable of developing patterns that facilitate harmonizing, because such patterns would humanize buildings and modern architecture is a homeostatic property cluster with a dehumanizing motive at its core.

In this article, I argue that our ontology of art has undergone a major change in the course of modern history. While we currently think of artworks as parts arranged in a certain way, there was a time when artworks were thought of as metaphysically more akin to ordinary artefacts such as tables and chairs; that is, as wholes having replaceable parts. This change in our ontology of art is reflected in our approach to art restoration. But what explains the change? I will suggest that the change took place because of a change in our conception of the function of art. More specifically, I will suggest that we have started to think of artworks as parts arranged in a certain way, because we have started to think of artworks as having, primarily, an aesthetic function.

One of the oldest platitudes about beauty is that it is pleasant to perceive or experience. In this article, I take this platitude at face value and try to explain why experiences of beauty are seemingly always accompanied by pleasure. Unlike explanations that have been offered in the past, the explanation proposed is designed to suit a “realist” view on which beauty is an irreducibly evaluative property, that is, a value. In a nutshell, the explanation is that experiences of beauty are experiences in which it appears that something is beautiful, and that such experiences are identical to experiences of aesthetic pleasure.

The aim of this chapter is to understand how sortals determine what aesthetic properties an object has. It is argued that Frank Sibley’s notion of an ideal of beauty does not help us to achieve that aim. Instead, it is argued, the special aesthetic relevance of sortals is better understood by reference to the (non-aesthetic) ideas of normality and functionality associated with sortals. In passing, the paper also argues that there must be a maximum degree of beauty if non-comparative judgments of beauty are possible, as they seem to be.

According to Roy Sorensen [Philosophical Studies 100 (2000) 175–191] an object cannot differ aesthetically from its mirror image. On his view, mirror-reversing an object – changing its left/right orientation – cannot bring about any aesthetic change. However, in arguing for this thesis Sorensen assumes that aesthetic properties supervene on intrinsic properties alone. This is a highly controversial assumption and nothing is offered in its support. Moreover, a plausible weakening of the assumption does not improve the argument. Finally, Sorensen’s second argument is shown to be formally flawed. As a result, the case for the aesthetic irrelevancy of orientation seems still open.

In this paper, we take another look at the reasons for which the causal criterion of event identity has been abandoned. We argue that the reasons are not strong. First of all, there is a criterion in the neighborhood of the causal criterion—the counterfactual criterion—that is not vulnerable to any of the putative counterexamples brought up in the literature. Secondly, neither the causal criterion nor the counterfactual criterion suffers from any form of vicious circularity. Nonetheless, we do not recommend adopting either the causal or the counterfactual criterion because, given a sufficiently lax principle of event composition, neither criterion can be applied to complex events. This we regard as a (prima facie) undesirable restriction on their applicability.

Libertarian philosopher Michael Huemer has argued recently that there is a prima facie right to immigrate, and, moreover, that concerns people have about the effects of immigration are not strong enough to neutralize or override this prima facie right. In this paper, I focus on one particular concern that Huemer deems insufficiently strong to neutralize or override the prima facie right to immigrate, namely, the concern that unrestricted immigration poses a threat to one’s culture. I argue that Huemer fails to show that the concern is insufficiently strong.

Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.