Rahul Kumar

This chapter discusses Scanlon’s contractualist account of moral responsibility. The first half of this chapter argues for the significance of the distinction between responsibility as attributability and substantive responsibility that is central to this account. This section traces the respects in which these two notions have their roots in distinct aspects of the contractualist ideal of moral community, a difference that illuminates important differences in the subject matter with which each notion is concerned. The second part of the chapter examines contractualist thinking about substantive responsibility, especially the Value of Choice account. It is argued that critics have misunderstood this account because they do not recognize the extent to which it presupposes the general contractualist view of reasoning about what it is morally permissible to do.

Scanlon’s contractualism clearly places itself in opposition to all forms of consequentialism in rejecting the to reasoning about what we owe to one another of any considerations having to do with aggregate value. The implications of doing so in some cases is very plausible, but in other cases it seems very implausible to deny the relevance of the numbers of persons who stand be burdened or benefitted. This has led some to argue that contractualism should be revised so as to relax its anti-aggregative strictures and allow that aggregative considerations can sometimes be relevant. In this paper, I argue that such a revision amounts to abandoning one of the animating ideas of the contractualist account, that what is central to morality is the maintenance of relationships based on mutual recognition with all others. Though this conclusion may seem in one way to damage contractualism, I argue, in the second part of the paper, that the account is in fact better able to make sense of the intuitive relevance in certain cases of the numbers than has been generally recognized.

Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) in healthcare has sparked innovation but exposed vulnerabilities in regulatory oversight. Unregulated “shadow” AI systems, operating outside formal frameworks, pose risks such as algorithmic drift, bias, and disparities. The Comprehensive Algorithmic Oversight and Stewardship (CAOS) Framework addresses these challenges, combining risk assessments, data protection, and equity-focused methodologies to ensure responsible AI implementation. This framework offers a solution to bridge oversight gaps while supporting responsible healthcare innovation. CAOS functions as both a normative governance model and a practical system design, offering a scalable framework for ethical oversight, policy development, and operational implementation of AI systems in healthcare.

This is a review essay of Jeff McMahan's recent book The Ethics of Killing : Problems at the Margins of Life. In the first part, I lay out the central features of McMahan's account of the wrongness of killing and its implications for when it is permissible to kill. In the second part of the essay, I argue that we ought not to accept McMahan's rejection of species membership as having any bearing on whether it is permissible to kill a particular individual, as there are ways of understanding its relevance that are more plausible than McMahan allows

Many of the policy choices we face that have implications for the lives of future generations involve creating a risk that they will live lives that are significantly compromised. I argue that we can fruitfully make use of the resources of Scanlon’s contractualist account of moral reasoning to make sense of the intuitive idea that, in many cases, the objection to adopting a policy that puts the interest of future generations at risk is that doing so wrongs those who will live in the further future.

Reparations is an idea whose time has come. From civilian victims of war in Iraq and South America to descendents of slaves in the US to citizens of colonized nations in Africa and south Asia to indigenous peoples around the world--these groups and their advocates are increasingly arguing for the importance of addressing historical injustices that have long been either ignored or denied. This volume contributes to these debates by focusing the attention of a group of highly distinguished international experts on the ways that reparations claims figure in contemporary political and social justice movements. Four broad types of reparations claims are examined, those involving indigenous peoples, the legacy of slavery in the United States, victims of war and conflict, and colonialism. In each instance, scholars and activists argue about the character of the injustice for which reparations are owed, why it is important to take these demands seriously, and what form redress should take. The aim is not consensus but to exhibit better the complexity of the issues involved--a goal which the interdisciplinary nature of the volume furthers--as well as the importance of taking seriously both conceptual issues and the actual politics of reparations

Philosophical discussions of the phenomenon that has come to be known as ‘moral luck’ have either dismissed it as illusory or touted it as the evidence for doubting the probative value of our commitment to certain widely avowed views concerning interpersonal assessments of responsibility. In this discussion, we present a third, distinctive interpretation of the moral luck phenomenon. Drawing upon empirically robust results from psychological studies of judgment bias, we argue that the phenomenon of moral luck is demonstrably not illusory. What we suggest, however, is that the phenomenon ought not to be taken to countenance doubts about the standards generally taken to be regulative of assessments of interpersonal responsibility. Rather, its significance lies in foregrounding certain generally unacknowledged obstacles we face in the process of conclusively applying general valid moral standards in making specific judgments of responsibility and desert.1.

The discussion of obligations to future generations often assumes that though the global poor can be wronged because there are obligations the affluent owe to them, those who will live in the further future can't. They can't be wronged, the thought goes, because though we have obligations with regard to future generations, they aren't obligations _owed_ to them. This chapter argues that the assumption is mistaken. Adopting a Scanlonian contractualist account of what it is for one person to wrong another, it turns out that there is no good reason to think that those who will live in the further future can't be wronged by the choices we make now. This conclusion, it is suggested, has importance for how we understand the normative basis of claims to reparations for past injustice.

For close to forty years now T.M. Scanlon has been one of the most important contributors to moral and political philosophy in the Anglo-American world. Through both his writing and his teaching, he has played a central role in shaping the questions with which research in moral and political philosophy now grapples. Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, each of which develops a distinctive and independent position while critically engaging with central themes from Scanlon's own work in the area. Contributors include well-known senior figures in moral and political philosophy as well as important younger scholars whose work is just beginning to gain wider recognition. Taken together, these papers make evident the scope and lasting interest of Scanlon's contributions to moral and political philosophy while contributing to a deeper understanding of the issues addressed in his work.