Raimund Pils

We argue that the societal consequences of the scientific realism debate, in the context of science-to-public communication are often overlooked and careful theorizing about it needs further empirical groundwork. As such, we conducted a survey experiment with 130 academics (from physics, chemistry, and biology) and 137 science communicators. We provided them with an 11-item questionnaire probing their views of scientific realism and related concepts. Contra theoretical expectations, we find that (a) science communicators are generally more inclined towards scientific antirealism when compared to scientists in the same academic fields, though both groups show an inclination towards realism and (b) academics who engage in more theoretical work are not less (or more) realist than experimentalists. Lastly, (c), we fail to find differences with respect to selective realism but find that science communicators are significantly less epistemically voluntarist compared to their academic counterparts. Overall, our results provide first empirical evidence on the views of scientists and science communicators on scientific realism, with some results running contra to the theoretical expectations, opening up new empirical and theoretical research directions.

It is often claimed that the later Quine became a form of structuralist, especially because of his thesis of ontological relativity, despite the apparent tension with his realism. I argue that rejecting the received structural realist readings of Quine resolves the tension. Only new naturalized forms of ontological structural realism might be compatible with Quine’s philosophy. The interpretation I offer results in a conservative, non-revisionary role for regimentation. I argue that my approach is the most promising one for developing a Quinean philosophy that successfully integrates empiricism, naturalism, and realism, offering an underappreciated pathway in current philosophy of science towards a naturalized empiricist framework.

This article examines the meta-stance choice in the scientific realism debate. I propose that the epistemological aspect of this debate be reframed within an epistemological framework that views our cognitive activities as a trade-off between believing truths and minimizing errors. I identify two main alternatives to this meta-epistemological framework: firstly, the view that the realism debate involves a voluntary choice between incommensurable stances, such as an empirical and a metaphysical stance; secondly, the notion that stance selection is a result of negotiating between explanatory power and error avoidance. My proposal and the two alternatives have in common that they imply a form of epistemic voluntarism and explain the recurring stalemate in the debate. However, I argue that the presented proposal outclasses the competing perspectives due to its enhanced generality, impartiality, a more comprehensive explanation of the anti-realist sentiment, and its potential to mitigate the recurring stalemate.

This article shows, through both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence, that there is an absence of consensus among philosophers of science, scientists, and science communicators regarding the correctness of realist versus anti-realist interpretations of scientific theories. It is argued that integrating this finding within the current prevalent norm of consensus reporting necessitates a reconsideration of how results from the natural sciences are reported. As such, the article advances a model for science reporting that more accurately represents the complexity of scientific expert opinions, thereby aligning more closely with the actual epistemic conditions within the scientific community.

In this paper, we draw attention to the epistemological assumptions of market liberalism and standpoint theory and argue that they have more in common than previously thought. We show that both traditions draw on a similar epistemological bedrock, specifically relating to the fragmentation of knowledge in society and the fact that some of this knowledge cannot easily be shared between agents. We go on to investigate how market liberals and standpoint theorists argue with recourse to these similar foundations, and sometimes diverge, primarily because of normative pre-commitments. One conclusion we draw from this is that these similarities suggest that market liberals ought to, by their own epistemological lights, be more attentive towards various problems raised by feminist standpoint theorists, and feminist standpoint theorists ought to be more open to various claims made by market liberals.

We argue that the societal consequences of the scientific realism debate, in the context of science-to-public communication are often overlooked and careful theorizing about it needs further empirical groundwork. As such, we conducted a survey experiment with 130 academics (from physics, chemistry, and biology) and 137 science communicators. We provided them with an 11-item questionnaire probing their views of scientific realism and related concepts. Contra theoretical expectations, we find that (a) science communicators are generally more inclined towards scientific antirealism when compared to scientists in the same academic fields, though both groups show an inclination towards realism and (b) academics who engage in more theoretical work are not less (or more) realist than experimentalists. Lastly, (c), we fail to find differences with respect to selective realism but find that science communicators are significantly less epistemically voluntarist compared to their academic counterparts. Overall, our results provide first empirical evidence on the views of scientists and science communicators on scientific realism, with some results running contra to the theoretical expectations, opening up new empirical and theoretical research directions.

This paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE, with the epistemological dimension of the scientific realism debate. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. I argue that van Fraassen’s epistemology is not suited to give a justification for a crucial presupposition of his Bad Lot objection to inference to the best explanation (IBE), the presupposition that believing that p is linked to p being more likely to be true. This makes him vulnerable to a counterargument, tailored after Musgrave’s defense of IBE, which would result in a stalemate between them about presuppositions of rationality. I will, however, show that switching to VTE can justify van Fraassen’s presupposition. This leads to a dismissal of common IBE arguments for realism as presented by Boyd and Musgrave, but I also argue that a more cautious version of realism can be rescued from the Bad Lot objection. Finally, I raise some worries about epistemic risk-attitude consistency for constructive empiricists and develop an alternative anti-realist position.1.

The social sciences are facing numerous crises including those related to replication, theory, and applicability. We highlight that these crises imply epistemic malfunctions and affect science communication negatively. Several potential solutions have already been proposed, ranging from statistical improvements to changes in norms of scientific conduct. In this paper, we propose a structural solution: the elimination of the discussion section from social science research papers. We point out that discussion sections allow for an inappropriate narrativization of research that disguises actual results and enables the misstatement of true limitations. We go on to claim that removing this section and outsourcing it to other publications provides several epistemic advantages such as a division of academic labour, adversarial modes of progress, and a better alignment of the personal aims of scientists with the aims of science. After responding to several objections, we conclude that the potential benefits of moving away from the traditional model of academic papers outweigh the costs and have the potential to play a part in addressing the crises in the social sciences alongside other reforms. As such, we take our paper as proffering a further potential solution that should be applied complimentarily with other reform movements such as Open Science and hope that our paper can start a debate on this or similar proposals.

There is now a significant body of literature on consequentialist ethics that propose satisficing instead of maximizing accounts. Even though epistemology recently witnessed a widespread discussion of teleological and consequentialist theories, a satisficing account is surprisingly not developed yet. The aim of this paper is to do just that. The rough idea is that epistemic rules are justified if and only if they satisfice the epistemic good, i.e., reach some threshold of epistemic value (which varies with practical context), and believing is justified if and only if it follows said rules.I argue that this alternative to the implicitly established way of thinking in maximizing terms has significant advantages. First, maximizing epistemic value can be unreasonably demanding; second, a satisficing theory can make finding reasonable rules for belief formation and sustenance much more accessible; and third, a satisficing approach is a better alternative to both general subjectivist and maximizing objectivist attempts to spell out epistemic blame.

My target is the epistemological dimension of the realism debate. After establishing a stance voluntarist framework with a Jamesian background, drawing mostly on Wylie, Chakravarty, and van Fraassen, I argue that current voluntarists are too permissive. I show that especially various anti-realist stances but also some realist and selective realist stances block themselves from refutation by the history of science. I argue that such stances should be rejected. Finally, I propose that any disagreement that cannot be resolved by this strategy frequently boils down to an epistemic value disagreement about balancing the truth-goal.

In this paper, we draw attention to the epistemological assumptions of market liberalism and standpoint theory and argue that they have more in common than previously thought. We show that both traditions draw on a similar epistemological bedrock, specifically relating to the fragmentation of knowledge in society and the fact that some of this knowledge cannot easily be shared between agents. We go on to investigate how market liberals and standpoint theorists argue with recourse to these similar foundations, and sometimes diverge, primarily because of normative pre-commitments. One conclusion we draw from this is that these similarities suggest that market liberals ought to, by their own epistemological lights, be more attentive towards various problems raised by feminist standpoint theorists, and feminist standpoint theorists ought to be more open to various claims made by market liberals.

In order to reconnect Quine's views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine's scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical, and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine's scientific realism from the late 1940s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames's view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist and an anti‐realist conceptual scheme instead. I also argue that Quine's early views on regimentation are incompatible with a strong formulation of semantic realism. I proceed in reconstructing how he becomes a metaphysical and epistemological realist in the mid‐1950s and argue against the view of Keskinen and Fogelin that interprets Quine as being a metaphysical anti‐realist. Contrary to Davidson, I defend the view that he never gave up normative epistemology and really is a proper epistemological realist. Finally, I discuss how he tries to reconcile his realism with his thesis of ontological relativity and how this necessitates the switch to a stronger form of semantic realism.