Raimundo Henriques

Macbeth is not the ultimate source of his actions (the Three Witches are) and he could not have done otherwise (the witches would not allow it). Yet, he is guilty of his heinous crimes. This puzzling combination of intuitions can only be accommodated if human action is understood along the lines proposed by authors such as Harry Frankfurt. Thus, without ever bringing determinism into the discussion, William Shakespeare’s Macbeth provides an argument for compatibilism. This argument is relevantly similar to a thought experiment, but the conclusion is left for us to draw.

Between 1926 and 1928, Wittgenstein designed a house for his sister in Vienna. This book concerns the relation between that house (the Kundmanngasse) and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). In this introductory chapter, I describe the aims and structure of the book and provide information about the history and reception of the house. I also present a review of the relevant literature, divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the place of the house in the history of architecture. The second—and, given the aims of the book, most important—focuses on the relation between the house and Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

Based on the conclusion of Chap. 3, I propose a new understanding of the analogy from Diktat für Schlick (c. 1933; see Chap. 2). I start by showing that Wittgenstein’s remarks on nonsense in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) face two problems analogous to those faced by Loos’s remarks on ornament: the lack of a robust definition of ‘nonsense’ and the lack of explanatory power. I argue that the three strategies available to deal with these difficulties correspond to three existing readings of the Tractatus and that one of them is supported by the analogy: the so-called resolute reading. I then provide an interpretation of the Tractatus, within the framework of the resolute reading, according to which Wittgenstein’s remarks on nonsense were means to the end of showing his readers that they were wrong about the activity in which they were engaging. Thus, I propose that both Loos and Wittgenstein should be understood in light of their shared goal of promoting self-understanding.

In this chapter, I offer a reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks on architecture that will allow me to formulate (in Chap. 6) what I take to be the relation between the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the house Wittgenstein designed for his sister (the Kundmanngasse). I start by arguing that Wittgenstein uses ‘architecture’ to refer to two different activities, depending on whether they are pursued in “good” or “bad” cultural periods. For that end, I address also Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein. I then argue that, according to Wittgenstein, whereas architecture in good periods can produce works of art, architecture in bad periods can only produce functional buildings. Since Wittgenstein perceived the period of his lifetime to be bad, it should follow that he intended the Kundmanngasse to be a functional building and not a work of art. I argue that his remarks on the subject and the design of the Kundmanngasse corroborate this perspective.

In a remark from Diktat für Schlick (c. 1933), Wittgenstein proposes an analogy between ornaments and “inarticulate sounds.” This analogy has not been sufficiently discussed in the literature on the relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his architecture. In this chapter, I argue that there is a thematic continuity between this remark and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). I further argue that what Wittgenstein calls ‘inarticulate sounds’ here corresponds to what he calls ‘nonsense’ in the Tractatus, licensing the conclusion that the proposed analogy concerns ornaments and nonsense. Toward the end of the chapter, I characterize the four main aspects of the analogy and briefly discuss a perspective that it seems to support. One issue with this perspective is the absence of motivation for Wittgenstein’s (alleged) rejection of ornaments. The search for it will lead to the writings of Adolf Loos.

In this concluding chapter, I articulate what I take to be the relation between the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the house Wittgenstein designed for his sister (the Kundmanngasse). In order to get there, I argue that, despite relevant differences in their perspectives on culture, Loos and Wittgenstein shared a conception of architecture. I characterize this conception as a qualified form of functionalism, marked by an emphasis on self-reflection. Based on that characterization, I conclude that both the Kundmanngasse and the Tractatus result from Wittgenstein’s efforts to resist temptations that lead one to impose oneself on others. In resisting them, Wittgenstein was not only striving for self-understanding and self-improvement, but also acknowledging his—and our—humanity. By way of conclusion, I sketch an account of the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought, centered on this Cavellian theme.

Between 1926 and 1928, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein designed a house for his sister in Vienna (the Kundmanngasse). This book aims to clarify the relation between that house and Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. The starting point of its main argument is a remark from Diktat für Schlick (c. 1932-33) in which Wittgenstein proposes an analogy between ornaments and nonsensical sentences. The attempt to extract from it an account of the relation between the Kundmanngasse and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) leads to the writings of Adolf Loos (whose influence Wittgenstein recognized). The discussion of Loos’s writings suggests that the analogy should be understood, not as one between actual ornaments and nonsensical sentences, but as one between Loos’s and Wittgenstein’s uses of these notions. So understood, it favors the (so-called) resolute reading of the Tractatus and reveals that both Wittgenstein’s use of ‘nonsense’ and Loos’s use of ‘ornaments’ are means to the end of promoting self‐understanding. The book concludes that both the Kundmanngasse and the Tractatus are results of Wittgenstein’s efforts at this kind of self‐understanding. These can be construed as ways of acknowledging our humanity, which in turn can be seen as a unifying element of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

This dissertation aims at a systemic presentation of Neurath’s thinking as a coherent and sui generis whole. In order to satisfy this desideratum, the main idea put forth in this dissertation is that a specific two-way relation holds between two of Neurath’s main philosophical theses: Semantic Coherentism: a sentence is true if, and only if, it belongs to, or can be deduced from, a coherent set of sentences. Sociological Relativism: the value of a social change depends on how it influences the living conditions of a certain group of individuals. The two-way relation is the following: from the reconstructive point of view, Neurathian semantic coherentism entails his sociological relativism; but, from the point of view of the conceptual structure underlying Neurath’s thinking, it is his sociological relativism that entails his semantic coherentism. We thus arrive at a virtuous circle. On the one hand, the appeal to sociological relativism (together with Neurath’s first order sociological commitments) allows us to explain his view of science; on the other hand, only once we have acquired a justification for sociological relativism, via his theory of truth, are we entitled to explain his view of science in this way. The exposition will be guided by the attempt to find an answer to the three following questions: (i) Does Neurath accept the standard threefold definition of knowledge? (ii) What kind of coherentism is endorsed by Neurath? (iii) Is Neurath’s coherentism compatible with empiricism? The answer to the first question will be negative. It will be argued that radical physicalism (i.e. the conjunction between physicalism and epistemic naturalism) entails the rejection of this definition. The answer to the second question will amount to showing that Neurath’s endorsement of semantic coherentism does not entail, as it is sometimes stated, the endorsement of epistemic coherentism. Finally, the third question will be answered negatively by showing that, given Neurath’s theory of protocol sentences, his coherentism and his empiricism are compatible. The exegetical work prompted by the need to answer these questions will provide us with the elements we need in order to substantiate the main idea mentioned above.