Raja Halwani

Existing philosophical concepts of sexual orientation understand it in terms of sex/gender: one’s sexual orientation is one’s sexual attraction to members of the same or different sex/gender. I argue that this understanding of sexual orientation is narrow and lacks proper justification by providing and rejecting seven reasons given in its support. I instead offer and defend a broader concept—the General Concept—which understands sexual orientation as consisting of those sexual attractions that are stable (or enduring) and that are important to one’s—what I call—psychosexual identity. I explain these two conditions, especially the identity condition, and distinguish it from self-ascribed sexual identities. I then provide seven reasons in support of the General Concept. I conclude the paper by imagining a possible world in which our concept of sexual orientation is age-based instead of sex/gender-based in order to bring home the point that our current concepts of sexual orientation are a product of our contingent history.

To investigate the metaphysics of gender categories—categories like “woman,” “genderqueer,” and “man”—is to ask questions about what gender categories are and how they exist. This chapter offers a pluralist account of the metaphysics of gender categories, according to which there are several different varieties of gender categories. I begin by giving a brief overview of some feminist accounts of the metaphysics of gender categories and illustrating how certain moral and political considerations have been in play in these discussions as constraints on acceptable accounts of gender categories. I then present my pluralist account of gender categories and highlight some of its virtues. Finally, I assess how my pluralist account fares relative to the moral and political considerations identified earlier in the chapter. I argue that although the account does not fare well, we should in fact revise our understanding of what those considerations are and how they should constrain our accounts of gender categories. I then show that, on this revised understanding, my pluralist account emerges as a viable position.

To investigate the metaphysics of gender categories—categories like “woman,” “genderqueer,” and “man”—is to ask questions about what gender categories are and how they exist. This chapter offers a pluralist account of the metaphysics of gender categories, according to which there are several different varieties of gender categories. I begin by giving a brief overview of some feminist accounts of the metaphysics of gender categories and illustrating how certain moral and political considerations have been in play in these discussions as constraints on acceptable accounts of gender categories. I then present my pluralist account of gender categories and highlight some of its virtues. Finally, I assess how my pluralist account fares relative to the moral and political considerations identified earlier in the chapter. I argue that although the account does not fare well, we should in fact revise our understanding of what those considerations are and how they should constrain our accounts of gender categories. I then show that, on this revised understanding, my pluralist account emerges as a viable position.

With twenty-five essays, seven of which are new to the eighth edition, this best-selling volume examines the nature, morality, and social meanings of contemporary sexual phenomena. Topics include: sexual desire and activity, masturbation, Sexual orientation, asexuality, transgender issues, Zoophilia, rape, casual sex and promiscuity, love and sex, polyamory, sexual consent, sexual, perversion, sexual ethics, objectification, BDSM, sex and technology, sex and race, and sex work. Updated and new discussion questions offer students starting points for debate in both the classroom and the bedroom.

Recent discussions of misanthropy consider misanthropy to be cognitive at its core, consisting of the judgment that humanity is a failure. If this judgment is justified, then one question is whether one can be both a misanthrope and virtuous. This article argues that cognitive misanthropes can adopt a sympathetic outlook on humanity which is a necessary step for being virtuous. This is because the sympathetic outlook requires the virtue of practical wisdom, a special virtue in being either necessary or necessary and sufficient for other virtues. The article then argues that virtue is open to even some misanthropes whose misanthropy is also affective. Given that dislike is a common affective state among misanthropes, the article focuses on misanthropes who dislike humanity (as opposed to those who, say, hate it or view it with contempt) and argues that dislike is compatible with virtue. Misanthropes are thus not condemned to non-virtuous lives.

With twenty-five essays, fourteen of which are new to this edition, this best-selling volume examines the nature, morality, and social meanings of contemporary sexual phenomena. Topics include sexual desire, masturbation, sex on the Internet, homosexuality, transgender and transsexual issues, rape, and promiscuity. New chapters discuss polyamory, transgender issues, queer issues, paraphilia, drugs and sex, objectification, BDSM, cybersex, and sex and race. Updated and new discussion questions offer students starting points for debate in both the classroom and the bedroom.

How is love different from lust or infatuation? Do love and marriage really go together "like a horse and carriage"? Does sex have any necessary connection to either? And how important are love, sex, and marriage to a well-lived life? In the Second Edition of this lively, lucid, and comprehensive book, Raja Halwani explores and elucidates the nature, uses, and ethics of romantic love, sexuality, and marriage. It is structured in three parts: Love examines the nature of romantic love and how it differs from other types of love, such as friendship and parental love. It also investigates the relationship of love to morality and asks what limits morality puts on romantic love and even whether romantic love is inherently moral. Sex demonstrates the difficulty in defining sex and the sexual, and examines what constitutes good and bad sex in terms of pleasure, "naturalness," and moral permissibility. It discusses the nature of sexual desire and its connection to objectification and virtue, all the while looking at specific sexual engagements such as pornography, BDSM, and raced desires. Marriage traces the history of the institution and describes the various forms in which marriage exists and the reasons why people marry. It also investigates the necessity of marriage and ways in which it requires reform. Updates and Revisions in the Second Edition Expands the coverage of love and morality from one to two chapters, incorporating much of the recent literature on love as a moral emotion. Includes a new chapter on sex and virtue ethics. Ends each of the chapters on sex with an "applied" topic, such as pornography, BDSM, prostitution, racial sexual desires, and adultery. Increases coverage of the nature and purpose of marriage, including debates surrounding same-sex marriage, but also moving beyond these debates to include issues on minimal marriage, temporary marriage, polygamy, and other forms of marriage. Updates the Further Reading and Study Questions sections at the end of each chapter and provides an up-to-date comprehensive bibliography at the back of the book. Includes new discussions of topics on the nature of love; love and reasons; distinctions between two types of romantic love; love and its connections to moral theories; definitions of crucial sexual concepts; objectification; virtue and sex; racial sexual desires; and the definition of marriage and whether it is important as an institution.

Recent discussions of misanthropy consider misanthropy to be at core cognitive, consisting of the judgment that humanity is a failure. If this judgment is justified, one question is whether one can be both a misanthrope and virtuous. This paper argues that cognitive misanthropes can adopt a sympathetic outlook on humanity which is a necessary step for being virtuous. This is because the sympathetic misanthrope requires the virtue of practical wisdom, a special virtue in being either necessary or necessary and sufficient for other virtues. The paper then argues that virtue is open to even some misanthropes whose misanthropy is also affective. Given that dislike is a common affective state among misanthropes, the paper focuses on misanthropes who dislike humanity (as opposed to those who, say, hate it or view it with contempt) and argues that dislike is compatible with virtue. Misanthropes are thus not condemned to non-virtuous lives.

There have been two dominant views regarding the relationship between truth and the interpretation of works of art. The first, which I call "compatibilism", claims that interpretations do not have the value 'true' attached to them. In addition to the value 'false', they hold truth-values such as 'plausible', 'apt', and 'interesting'. The second view, "incompatibilism", states that interpretations do have the value 'true', and that for any work of art, there is one, and only one, true interpretation, while the rest are false. ;In this dissertation, I argue that compatibilism, in its many diverse forms, is a mistaken view, and that incompatibilism is true. Furthermore, I give a model in which I attempt to reconcile the richness of artworks, which is the motivation behind compatibilism, and the claim that incompatibilism is a correct view. I also argue that the true interpretation of an artwork is the one intended by its artist, and I try to establish this conclusion by arguing that artworks are conversational entities. ;The above claims are found in Chapters 1 through 5. In Chapter 6 I demarcate the logical connections between the concepts of description, interpretation, and evaluation, concepts central to the understanding of art. Chapter 7 explores the connections between literature--a specific form of art--and ethics. I argue that under a theory of virtue ethics, broadly conceived to include central notions of feminist ethics, literature emerges as an essential vehicle of doing moral philosophy

On what we can call the “folk” conception of sexual orientation, sexual orientation is understood as sex-based attraction, that is, as (partly) attraction on the basis of the perceived sex of the person to whom one is attracted. However, in recent discussions, philosophers have either added gender to sex as the basis of sexual orientation, or have altogether replaced sex with gender. Moreover, this addition or replacement has gone—mostly—unargued for. This paper argues that a sex-based conception of sexual orientation remains plausible because (1) it is compatible with gender-based attraction, which I argue can be understood as a preference; (2) the reasons so far on offer for adding gender to sex (or for replacing sex with gender) are not convincing; (3) we have good evolutionary and non-evolutionary reasons for thinking that sex is the basis of sexual orientation; (4) we have good reasons to not add gender as a basis of sexual orientation; and (5) a sex-based conception of sexual orientation accommodates the various sexual orientations that have recently appeared, orientations in addition to the folk two (or three) of heterosexuality, homosexuality (and bisexuality), such as pansexuality, skoliosexuality, gynsexuality, and androsexuality. What emerges is a conception of sexual orientation based (partly) on the sex of the people to whom we are attracted, but that understands sexual-based attraction in broad enough terms to include surgically altered bodies.

Philosophers have recently expressed interest in the question as to whether there is a right to sex, a right whose justification is motivated by the existence of sexually excluded people – people who suffer from involuntary long-term sexual deprivation (owing, say, to a chronic medical condition). This paper, after offering preliminary remarks about what a right to sex and its objects might be and who might have this right, surveys seven justifications for the right: linkage arguments, need, well-being, a minimally decent life, being a basic good, justice, and relationships. The paper argues that a right to sex does not likely exist because none of the justifications are convincing. The paper then argues that despite the lack of justification, and because sexual exclusion is a problem worthy of attention, people's sexual needs can be addressed through the lens of goals instead of rights. This not only takes sexual exclusion seriously enough but also avoids the crucial problems associated with rights-talk, especially that of sexual coercion.

A common belief is that, among our sexual dispositions, sexual orientations are important and deep features of who someone is. This distinguishes them from other sexual dispositions—“mere” preferences—that are thought to be trivial in comparison. Is there a way to adequately account for this distinction? What is a plausible explanation for the belief that sexual orientation is a deep and important feature of who one is? This paper defends one necessary condition for a sexual disposition to be an orientation, the well-being condition: if a sexual disposition is an orientation, then the inability to act on it lowers one’s well-being by rendering one’s life sexually deprived. The paper argues that the well-being condition better explains than other criteria the belief that orientations are important features of who one is. The paper concludes by tracing the implications of this view to the common understanding of sexual orientation.

This paper is a review essay of the recently published _Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality_, edited by Brian D. Earp, Clare Chambers, and Lori Watson (2022). The anthology consists of an introduction and 40 essays, and it has eight parts: (I) What Is Sex? Is Sex Good?; (II) Sexual Orientations; (III) Sexual Autonomy and Consent; (IV) Regulating Sexual Relationships; (V) Pathologizing Sex and Sexuality; (VI) Contested Desires; (VII) Objectification and Commercialized Sex; and (VIII) Technology and the Future of Sex. The anthology contains essays mostly by philosophers and a few by non-philosophers (which can be a double-edged sword for a philosophy book). Some essays survey a topic, while others defend specific theses. I argue that the quality of the essays varies, but that all are thought-provoking. Although the essays that deal with sexual orientation and race tend to be on the weaker side, those that deal with technology, objectification, incest, pedophilia, sex work, and the regulation of relationships are on the strong side.

This paper focuses on the relationship between love (romantic, friendship) and moral integrity. More specifically, it looks into the conditions that need to be satisfied for the two to conflict with each other. After giving a general characterization of moral integrity and explaining some crucial moral aspects of love, both culled from the literature on integrity and on love, I provide two cases of couples whose love clashes with their integrity, one of a vegan in love with a non-vegan, and another of a pro-choicer in love with a pro-lifer. I then argue that love and integrity conflict when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the lover's integrity tracks real and worthwhile values; (2) these values are important to the lover; (3) these values are contrary to those of the beloved's; (4) the beloved acts on the beloved's values; and (5) the lover cannot justify the beloved's values. I conclude with some remarks about the actual satisfaction of these conditions—on how frequently such conflicts occur.

This papers explains the sexual pleasure view of sexual desire, and argues that the moral evaluation of sexual pleasure depends on the moral evaluation of the sexual activity on which the pleasure supervenes. Thus, ethical talk of sexual pleasure as such, regardless of the type of activity on which it supervenes is misguided. The essay also argues that the ethics of sexual desires also depends on the sexual activities that the desires seek, but that the sexual desires and pleasures can help evaluate the character of the person with those desires. The essay concludes by using this Aristotelian view of pleasure as supervening on its activities to solve a dilemma that David Benatar once raised in sexual ethics.

This essay starts by discussing the definitions, and their attendant difficulties, of "casual sex," "promiscuity," and "objectification" (including whether objectification is only about treatment or can be about mere regard), and then continues to discuss the morality of casual sex and promiscuity, especially as to whether they are objectifying. Assuming a pessimist view of sexual desire and activity, the paper argues that it is nearly impossible to defend these sexual practices against the accusation of objectification, because even though casual sex and promiscuity do not necessarily objectify, they likely almost always do. The essay concludes by arguing that the wrongness of objectification in these two kinds of sexual practices might not be serious, so they might be overall morally permissible. (This is a revised version from that in the 7th edition of The Philosophy of Sex.)

(This is a revised version of the essay for the 8th edition of The Philosophy of Sex.) Halwani address three main arguments as to why someone with sexual racial preferences (sexual preferences for or against people on the basis of their ethnic of racial belonging) might be thought racist, and argues that they all fail. He then explains the steps that need to be taken before we can conclude that someone is racist from the mere fact that he or she has racial preferences. In an appendix to this revised essay, Halwani explains and criticizes all the recent essays that have been published since 2017 on this subject.

This is the 8th edition of the book, with eight new essays to the volume. Table of contents: Are We Having Sex Now or What? (Greta Christina); Sexual Perversion (Thomas Nagel); Plain Sex (Alan Goldman); Sex and Sexual Perversion (Robert Gray); Masturbation and the Continuum of Sexual Activities (Alan Soble); Love: What’s Sex Got to Do with It? (Natasha McKeever); Is “Loving More” Better? The Values of Polyamory (Elizabeth Brake); What Is Sexual Orientation? (Robin Dembroff); Sexual Orientation: What Is It? (Kathleen Stock); Asexuality (Luke Brunning and Natasha McKeever); LGBTQ ... Z? (Kathy Rudy); How to Be a Pluralist About Gender Categories (Katharine Jenkins); The Negotiative Theory of Gender Identity and the Limits of First-Person Authority (Burkay Ozturk); Racial Sexual Desires (Raja Halwani); Sex and Technology: The Ethics of Virtual Connection (Neil McArthur); A Realist Sexual Ethics (Micah Newman); Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person (Thomas Mappes); Sexual Use (Alan Soble); Dark Desires (Seiriol Morgan); The Harms of Consensual Sex (Robin West); Casual Sex, Promiscuity, and Objectification (Raja Halwani); Is Prostitution Harmful? (Ole Martin Moen); BDSM (Shaun Miller); Two Views of Sexual Ethics: Promiscuity, Pedophilia, and Rape (David Benatar); Sexual Gifts and Sexual Duties (Alan Soble); A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Sex

The paper argues that individual Palestinians have a right of return to historic Palestine in virtue of being members of the Palestinian people that continues to have occupancy rights in historic Palestine. More specifically, the paper argues that the Palestinians were, when Israel was founded, a people with occupancy rights to their lands, that they continue to be a people to this day, and that their occupancy right has not been alienated, forfeited, or prescripted. The paper then argues that individual Palestinians have the right of occupancy in virtue of being members of the Palestinian people. Because the right has been blocked by Israel since 1948, the right of return is the right of individual Palestinians to be allowed to return to their homeland and exercise their occupancy rights there.