Ralph Shain

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Perjury and Pardon, Volume 1 by Jacques DerridaRalph ShainDERRIDA, Jacques. Perjury and Pardon, Volume 1. Translated by David Wills. Edited by Ginette Michaud and Nicholas Cotton. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2022. 368 pp. Cloth, $45.00This is the translation of a volume in the posthumously published series of Derrida's lecture courses. The most important of these are the early Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (1964–65) and Theory and Practice (1975–76), no parts of which were published by Derrida. Substantial portions of the first volume of the lectures on Perjury and Pardon were published as separate essays, so the main question concerning this book is what it adds to the published portions.For those readers who are familiar with Derrida's most famous work and are curious about his deconstructive ethics ("ethics beyond ethics") and have not read any of the essays drawn from this book (such as "To Forgive: the Unforgiveable and the Imprescriptible," "Literature in Secret," and "Typewriter Ribbon"), this is a good place to approach the topic. One will find here many of Derrida's classic moves, such as the deconstruction of texts, concepts, and traditions. One will find conditions of possibility that are also conditions of impossibility, concepts that are contaminated from within by their opposites, and appeals to the experience of the impossible and to the distinction between a general and restricted economy.One will also find here those points that seem to be Derrida's weakest, such as the insistence on the privacy of the mental, a rather wobbly treatment of the separation between intending and causality, and the [End Page 545] claim, important for Derrida's "poetico-performative" theory of truth, that all constatives depend on a prior performative—a promise to tell the truth, always already contaminated by failure and hence a "perjury." (The first and third of these are also found in Derrida's published work.)The topics in this book are helpful in situating Derrida vis-à-vis other thinkers, especially those in the Frankfurt School. Derrida's concept of an impossible, paradoxical pardon might be compared with Adorno's concept of utopian moments. The promise of truth implicit in every constative might be compared with Habermas's quasi-transcendental ideal speech situation.Even if one has read one or more of the published portions, if one is unsure how they fit together, these lectures will allow one to see how they cohere. In the third session Derrida provides an outline of the project, which he qualifies with the comment that "I am aware of the grossly schematic character of this outline." Grossly schematic, yes, but grossly schematic outlines are very helpful. Here's the gist of the outline: "stubbornly tracking down in the Biblio-Koranic tradition a logic of economy, an economy, a sublime ruse which... comes to contradict and undermine a demand for finite-infinite forgiveness, forgiveness without condition, the aneconomic forgiveness that is nevertheless at the heart of this same thinking... showing that on the supposed Greek side, the aneconomic notion of forgiveness comes to organize the aneconomic logic and 'syngnomic' rationality of a so-called Greek culture." In short, the concept of forgiveness that is derived from the monotheistic traditions of forgiveness claims not to be pragmatic or goal oriented, but Derrida shows that it is, whereas the Greek concept that is the closest equivalent, and is supposed to be entirely pragmatic, has moments that exceed any limited economy. (If this still sounds opaque, see Derrida's essay on Bataille and general economy in Writing and Difference.)Even those who are well versed in deconstructive ethics and have read the published parts of this book may still find it quite interesting. Derrida's verbal elucidations of the typescript are transcribed from recordings and placed in footnotes. There are quite a few of these, and some of them are interesting. The editorial apparatus will allow one to confirm that one has indeed read all of the published parts, which one should not take for granted since a couple of them are in relatively obscure venues. The readings of texts are of variable interest, but even in the...

The aim of this project is to dissolve the skeptical "indeterminacy" or "underdetermination" problem by showing that the problem depends essentially on an erroneous conception of time. ;I trace the development of underdetermination skepticism from its origins in the work of Duhem, through its transformation by Quine, to its contemporary use as an anti-realist argument in philosophy of science. The same skeptical problem appears as Quine's indeterminacy of translation. These analyses show that the problem is an improved version of Pyrrhonian skepticism of a completely general nature. Each of the standard responses to the problem is shown to be unpromising. A new approach is needed. ;This new approach is an attempt to dissolve the problem through an analysis of its temporal presuppositions. I show that underdetermination skepticism depends on the traditional philosophical conception of the atemporal . I deploy three argumentative strategies to make this point. First, in a metaphilosophical section, I discuss the importance of the denial of the reality of time in philosophy and of the variety of ways that the atemporal appears in different philosophical views. Then I analyze the indeterminacy argument and argue that, by always reducing the future to the present, the underdetermination skeptic depends on a denial of temporality. In an interpretive section, by analyzing the texts of those who have given the best responses to the indeterminacy argument, I show that without recognizing it, they are discussing time. ;The question of whether the "view from no-when" underlying underdetermination skepticism is in fact a metaphysical mistake is approached through the arguments between tensed and tenseless conceptions of time. I contend that time is tensed and that the arguments for the tenselessness of time are erroneous. In these chapters I consider the standard arguments between these views of time: McTaggart's argument, fatalism, change, our experience of time, and alleged counterexamples to the openness of the future

In the last two decades, a number of political theorists have published a great deal of theory that argues for the centrality of the idea of recognition. In the most prominent of these papers, Charles Taylor makes the claim that “recognition is a human need.”1 The immediate spur for this flurry of interest has been a discussion of multiculturalism and its attendant issues, which are expressed in terms of “group recognition.”2 This work focuses on the importance of group identity or social characteristics, as well as on their relation to individualism and liberalism. These issues are important, and there is…