Raman Sachdev

This chapter explores the comparative philosophies of Stoicism and Buddhism through the lens of their paradigmatic figures: the Stoic sage and the Awakened One (the Buddha). Despite their divergent cultural and historical contexts, both traditions present the sage as an exemplar of emotional mastery and tranquility, achieved through disciplined engagement with the mind and emotions. This essay argues that the Stoic and Buddhist sages, while differing in their metaphysical underpinnings, share a common practical goal: inner freedom from suffering through the cultivation of wisdom, mindfulness, and ethical integrity. The chapter begins by drawing on Diogenes Laertius’s Lives of the Eminent Philosophers to outline the Stoic sage as an ideal, supplementing this with reflections from Seneca (On the Tranquillity of the Mind, On Anger), Epictetus (Discourses, Enchiridion), and Marcus Aurelius (Meditations). These works illuminate the sage’s ability to live in harmony with nature, transcend emotional disturbances, and maintain rational self-governance. In parallel, the essay examines the Awakened One as depicted in Buddhist texts such as the Dhammapada and analyzed in Walpola Rahula’s What the Buddha Taught, focusing on the Buddha’s teachings on taming the mind, overcoming craving, and achieving enlightenment. Central to the chapter’s thesis is the claim that the sage and the Awakened One, though grounded in different metaphysical frameworks, embody the transformative power of philosophy as a way of life. This shared vision—philosophy not as abstract theory but as a practical discipline—offers complementary paths to tranquility through self-mastery and ethical living. By integrating Pierre Hadot’s insights from What Is Ancient Philosophy? on spiritual exercises, the chapter emphasizes the lived practices that define the sage and the Awakened One as models for resilience and well-being.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a critique of the idea that skepticism was the driving force in the development of early modern thought. Historian of philosophy Richard Popkin introduced this thesis in the 1950s and elaborated on it over the next five decades, and recent scholarship shows that it has become an increasingly accepted interpretation. I begin with a study of the relevant historical antecedents—the ancient skeptical traditions of which early modern thinkers were aware—Pyrrhonism and Academicism. Then I discuss the influence of skepticism on three pre-Cartesians: Francisco Sanches, Michel de Montaigne, and Pierre Charron. Basing my arguments on an informed understanding of both ancient Greek skepticism and some of the writings of these philosophers, I contend that it is inaccurate to predominantly characterize Sanches, Montaigne, and Charron as skeptics. To support his thesis about the singular influence of skepticism on early modern thought, Popkin says that René Descartes’ metaphysical philosophy was formed as a response to a skeptical threat and that Descartes ultimately conceded to the force of skepticism. He also argues that David Hume was a Pyrrhonist par excellence. I disagree with Popkin’s claims. I argue that Descartes was not as deeply affected by skepticism as Popkin suggests and that it is inaccurate to characterize Hume as a Pyrrhonist. By offering this critique, I hope to make clear to the readers two things: first, that Popkin’s thesis, though it is both enticing and generally accepted by many scholars, is questionable with regard to its plausibility; second, that the arguments I present in this dissertation reveal that further research into the role of skepticism in early modern philosophy is in order.

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Descartes that deemphasizes his skepticism. I analyze a selection of remarks from Descartes’ correspondence in which he makes judgments about the skeptics. I argue that such remarks display Descartes’ attitude of contempt for skeptical philosophy. Since Descartes associates the skeptics with the activity of constant and total doubting and yet presents scenarios that seemingly arise from extreme doubt—like the malicious demon hypothesis—I look at what Descartes says in the correspondence about his own use of doubt in his published works. Descartes distances himself from the skeptics because he claims that whereas they doubt everything and, in so doing, act heretically, he uses doubt for a noble purpose. I suggest that although Descartes is influenced by skeptical ideas and considers skeptical argumentation to be useful, his strategic use of such argumentation should not lead us to believe that he condones skepticism. Quite the contrary, most of his remarks on the subject show that Descartes is highly critical or dismissive of skeptical ideas. Therefore, I argue that it is more accurate to characterize Descartes as a philosopher generally opposed to skepticism.