Ramesh Sharma

In this paper, I attempt a further elucidation and defense of some of the things I said in my article “Critical Reflections on Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī” and a response to Professor Claus Oetke’s criticisms :371–394, 2012) of “a number of views which have been propagated” by me in my article. Although some additional issues have been raised, broadly, the themes addressed here are the same three as were the object of my investigation in that paper: namely, Nāgārjuna’s emptiness doctrine; his denial that he has any thesis to advance or buttress; and his onslaught on the pramāṇa theory. Toward the end I argue that if I understand Nāgārjuna correctly, then what that thinker ends up providing is a criterion, not of reality, but of unreality, and that this stance, speaking philosophically, is tantamount to nihilism.

Scholarly disquisitions on Nyāya(-Vaiśeṣika) philosophy in the English language generally agree in calling it “metaphysical realism” or simply “realism.” Metaphysical realism or realism as understood in the West is the doctrine that (1) substances (particulars)/things and events exist independently of the knowing/thinking mind, and that (2) they exemplify properties/qualities and enter into relations—in short, universals—independently of the concepts by which we know them and, Nyāya would add, even of the language with which we describe them. This mind-independent world is supposed to be something correspondence with which renders our particular beliefs/cognitions determinately true or false. Thus, realism, in all ..

I think, from the standpoint of present experience, one can fairly start by saying that all experience is lived embodied experience, though it is clear that such a statement, if wholly unqualified, would mean a commitment of extensive implications. 1 Some of these implications I will briefly try to spell out toward the end of this essay. I don’t say our body sets limits to how far our imagination can really go, for clearly, if our imagination were wholly controlled by our body as presented to us, dreams, for example, would not be possible. 2 But dreams are not only possible, they are a matter of everyday experience. Nay, even the limits of imagination do not determine the limits of possibility. ..

The phenomenon of dreamless sleep and its philosophical consequences, particularly deep sleep's relevance to such issues as Self, Consciousness, Personal Identity, Unity of Subject, and Disembodied Life, are explored through a discussion, in varying detail, of certain noted doctrines and views--for example of Advaita Vedānta, Hegel, and H. D. Lewis. Finally, with a cue from Leibniz and McTaggart, the suggestion is made that at no stage during sleep is the self without some perceptions, however indeterminate. Support for this hypothesis is claimed from the current psychoanalytic opinion that mental activity does not cease during any part of sleep and that human beings continue to dream even in the so-called dreamless state

: Classical Sāmkhya, as represented by Īśvarakrsna's Sāmkhya-kārikā, is well known for its attempt to prove not only the reality but the plurality of selves (purusa-bahutva). The Sāmkhya argument, since it proceeds from the reality of the manyness of the bodies as its basic premise, approximates, even if not in every detail, the 'argument from analogy' in its traditional form (which the essay tries to explicate). One distinguished modern interpreter, K. C. Bhattacharyya, however, not satisfied with this account, attempts to interpret and expound Sāmkhya pluralism in terms of a radically different strategy consisting of showing that the self is known in buddhi in its pure asmita function as an infinite I and so as necessarily involving all Is or selves. This solution, which in the process offers reflections on such issues as infinity, universals, the role of 'I', the individuality (of self ), et cetera, is examined and criticized at length with respect to some of its basic assumptions, with a brief focus on the idea of 'self-consciousness', which according to some (Western) philosophers presupposes 'other'-consciousness and which in certain respects seems to inform Bhattacharyya's thoughts on the main issue