In this paper, I argue that we can get surprisingly far in vindicating common intuitions about population ethics without assuming that the well-being of those we could create gives us moral reasons for or against creating them. According to the account I sketch, rather than generating procreative reasons, facts about our potential offspring’s well-being serve as normative background conditions—they enable, disable, or modify the strength of independent reasons we might have to procreate. It is u…
Read moreIn this paper, I argue that we can get surprisingly far in vindicating common intuitions about population ethics without assuming that the well-being of those we could create gives us moral reasons for or against creating them. According to the account I sketch, rather than generating procreative reasons, facts about our potential offspring’s well-being serve as normative background conditions—they enable, disable, or modify the strength of independent reasons we might have to procreate. It is unclear whether the account can capture everything many of us want to say about population ethics. But whatever the answer, the point remains that background conditions are a powerful and underappreciated tool in population ethics.
