Ramón García Moya

A series of recent experimental studies have cast doubt on the existence of a traditional tension that aestheticians have noted in our aesthetic judgments and practices, viz. the problem of taste. The existence of the problem has been acknowledged since Hume and Kant, though not enough has been done to analyse it in depth. In this paper, we remedy this by proposing six possible conceptualizations of it. Drawing on our analysis of the problem of taste, we argue that the experimental results in question are not a real challenge to its existence. By contrast, they provide empirical evidence in its support.

RESUMEN: En este trabajo el autor presenta, en un primer momento, las principales características del modelo constitucional mexicano emergente como detonante de importantes cambios a nivel del ordenamiento jurídico, los mismos que demandan una concepción del derecho diferente a las anteriores para dar cuenta de la nueva realidad normativa del país. El autor describe, después, los elementos más destacables de ese virtual enfoque filosófico y sostiene, al final, que éste mantiene mayor cercanía con el llamado constitucionalismo pospositivista o pospositivismo jurídico de autores como Atienza, Alexy, Nino y otros, que con el constitucionalismo iuspositivista de Ferrajoli. ABSTRACT: The author of this paper presents, in the first place, the main features of the new constitutional model that has been rising in the last few years in Mexico and the way it has changed the Mexican legal system. The author claims these changes are in need for a new legal conception different from others in the past and describes its core elements. Then he argues about the connection between this new philosophy and the non-legal positivism approach of modern constitutionalists such as Atienza, Alexy and Nino.

The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive the case as a puzzle. Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other researchers from different countries have undertaken that task. We argue that their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship of Theseus story.