Ramon Mistral

This article examines Derrida’s concept of hospitality. Unlike friendship, which involves an affective bond and thus cannot found a truly democratic society, hospitality, as defined by Derrida, requires welcoming the stranger without expecting reciprocity. I suggest that Derrida’s focus on hospitality, rather than friendship, aligns with his vision of a truly democratic society. However, Derrida often relies on a domestic model of hospitality. I explore moments where he transcends this framework, emphasizing that hospitality entails bracketing all familial community, including that of the host.

This article aims to reconstruct Jacques Derrida’s relationship to Hegelian philosophy as established prior to the publication of Glas (1974). During the late 1960s, a moment in whi-ch the philosophical context was marked by a strong anti-Hegelianism, Derrida’s deconstru-ction was received as the opposite of Hegel’s speculative idealism. While this opposition became the most accepted version of the French philosopher’s position towards Hegel, there are discernible affinities between the two thinkers. This paper analyzes the texts dedicated to Hegel before 1974: “Le problème de la genèse dans la phénomenologie de Husserl”, “De l’économie restreinte à l’économie générale. Un hégélianisme sans réserve” and “Le Puits et la pyramide. Introduction à la sémiologie de Hegel”. It demonstrates that despite an appa-rent explicit rejection of dialectical thinking, Derrida consistently acknowledged its relevan-ce, declaring a unilateral break as impossible, and, at least during the early stages of his ca-reer, conceived the possibility of a deconstructive interpretation of Hegel’s thought.

This dissertation analyses the evolution of Jacques Derrida's relationship to Hegel's philosophy. During the late 1960s, a moment in which the philosophical context was marked by a strong anti-Hegelianism, Derrida’s deconstruction philosophy was received as the opposite of Hegel’s speculative idealism. While at that time this opposition became the most accepted version of the French philosopher’s position towards Hegel, some scholars, however, have noted the affinities between both philosophers. Building on the criticisms addresses by Foucault and Lyotard to Derrida’s alleged “Hegelianism”, my dissertation studies the evolution of Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel since the French philosopher’s first texts. I argue that, while Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel underwent important changes throughout the years, it reached his definitive formulation with Glas in 1974. This interpretation would also be present in texts that he would publish after his ethico-political turn. By insisting on the familial structure of Hegel’s dialectic, I demonstrate that Derrida approached Kant’s philosophy and analysed politique familialism in order to deepen his own critique of the Hegelian dialectic, and, specially, its political dimension.

This study confronts Sartre and Derrida’s interpretations of Genet. It argues that it is incorrect to assume that Sartre applies Hegelian logic to Genet, while Derrida frees him from it. Both contend that Genet’s writing is antithetical to absolute idealism, albeit in different ways. To elucidate this variation, I examine, in particular, Derrida’s interpretation of Genet’s signature. According to Derrida, Genet does not resist dialectics because he is a pederast, thief or traitor, as Sartre claims, but rather because of the way he places his signature on everything he writes. However, my analysis of Derrida’s attempt to sign Genet’s text indicates that it constitutes a subtle critique of Genet. Drawing on some often-overlooked analyses by Derrida, I suggest that even Genet’s writing may not be able to escape dialectics because no signature is absolutely singular.

In light of some Gilles Deleuze’s texts in which he studies the stupidity and error problems, the conflict between heterodox investigations and traditional methods that The X-Files raises can be studied. One discovers that the reasons why Mulder wants to replace a kind of investigation with another and the process through which he performs this transformation are similar to the ones that work on Deleuze’s Images of Thought. Taking into account the impossibility of solving certain problems, which are usually understood as empirical setbacks or insolvable by right, Mulder and Deleuze defend giving up the police method and the dogmatic image of thought, respectively, and searching for other possible structures that do enable them to face up to these problems. Although this non-detective, non-thinker condition must be crossed in order to solve them, this state that makes any supposedly universal method dubious is by the French thinker called "stupidity."

This article seeks to reconstruct Derrida’s position regarding the phenomenological problem of givenness. Using Jean-Luc Marion’s description of saturated phenomena as a reference point, I argue that Derrida questions the possibility of an excess of intuition. I propose an interpretation of key moments in his thought to demonstrate that the generalization of writing implicitly attributes impure donation to all phenomena. In other words, a donation from which absolute certainty cannot be derived and which necessitates rejecting the supposed singularity of any phenomenon, including aesthetic ones that serve as a paradigm for the saturation trope.