Ramy Amin

Anderson and Piccinini’s robust mapping account holds that genuine physical computation requires physical-computational equivalence (PCE), whereby the physical states realizing a computational state must carry exactly the same information about the system’s computational trajectory as that computational state. Though this requirement may be well motivated for digital artifacts, questions remain regarding whether analogous motivations can be made with respect to putatively computing neurobiological systems. In this commentary, I investigate three possible routes for motivating PCE in neurobiological systems: computational models, abstraction over dynamical structures, and Landauer’s Principle. I conclude that each route faces significant underdetermination. Thus, motivating PCE in neurobiological systems remains an open challenge.

This paper examines the asymmetric relationship between epistemic uptake (accepting a scientific explanation as true) and normative uptake (accepting the associated moral demands) through examining Alison Reiheld’s (2010) case of the medicalization of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Utilizing Ashley Harrison et al.’s (2017) Autism Stigma & Knowledge Questionnaire, I showcase how empirical evidence demonstrates that increased knowledge about ASD does not consistently correspond to decreased stigma, or greater normative uptake. I therefore argue that, while medicalization may produce explanatory frameworks that improve public understanding, it does not necessarily shift moral attitudes or reduce marginalization.