Paul Bloom has famously argued against the need for empathy in clinicians, while Sally Dalton-Brown has argued that AI need not be capable of empathy in order to be a good carer. In this paper, the capacity for AI to substitute for human clinicians is assessed from a bioethical perspective, primarily through the evaluation of the arguments put forth by Dalton-Brown and Bloom concerning empathy in healthcare. In opposition to both Bloom and Dalton-Brown, this paper argues that (1) empathy is esse…
Read morePaul Bloom has famously argued against the need for empathy in clinicians, while Sally Dalton-Brown has argued that AI need not be capable of empathy in order to be a good carer. In this paper, the capacity for AI to substitute for human clinicians is assessed from a bioethical perspective, primarily through the evaluation of the arguments put forth by Dalton-Brown and Bloom concerning empathy in healthcare. In opposition to both Bloom and Dalton-Brown, this paper argues that (1) empathy is essential to providing good care or deep care (that is, care that goes beyond the mere fulfillment of medical tasks), (2) deep care is a significant aspect of healthcare and yields important benefits, and (3) AI’s lack of capacity for empathy and mutual recognition prevents it from being able to provide deep care for patients, and for this reason, we ought to be extremely cautious about considering allowing AI to ultimately replace human health care providers.
