Randall R. Curren

This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle's Politics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato's Laws.Part II: Sections IV–VII examine the arguments for the first of the two conclusions which Aristotle advances in VIII. 1, namely that education is important enough to merit the legislator's attention. It is shown, through a development of links between Politics V and the arguments of VIII. 1, that Aristotle's two arguments for this conclusion are calculated to appeal to two distinct subgroups within his intended audience, those who would be moved by a desire to promote the common good, and those who could only be counted on to desire the preservation of their own rule.

This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle'sPolitics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato'sLaws.Part III: Sections VIII-XI examine the two arguments which Aristotle adduces in support of the claim that education should be provided through a public system. The first of these arguments concerns the need to unify society through education for friendship and the sharing of a common end. Several versions of his second argument are considered, and the most promising of them is elaborated in connection with an examination of the links between instruction and legislation in theLaws. This yields what is probably the most compelling argument there is for the claim that public supervision of education is anecessary condition for a just society.

This paper develops an interpretation and analysis of the arguments for public education which open Book VIII of Aristotle's Politics, drawing on both the wider Aristotelian corpus and on examination of continuities with Plato's Laws.Part I: The paper opens with the question of why Aristotle would say that no one will doubt that education should be the concern of the legislator, and Sections I–III identify the nature of his enterprise in the Politics, the audience he wishes to address, the conclusions he seeks to establish in VIII. 1, and what public education would amount to for him. An important conclusion reached is that the first of Aristotle's two conclusions in VIII.1 has been routinely misidentified.

The rise of the phenomenon of virtue ethics in recent years has increased at a rapid pace. Such an explosion carries with it a number of great possibilities, as well as risks. This volume has been written to contribute a multi-faceted perspective to the current conversation about virtue. Among many other thought-provoking questions, the collection addresses the following: What are the virtues, and how are they enumerated? What are the internal problems among ethicists, and what are the objections and replies to contemporary virtue ethics? Additionally, the practical implications following from the answers to these questions are discussed in new and fascinating research. Fundamental concepts such as teleology and eudaimonism are addressed from both a historical and dialectical approach. This tome will contribute not only to providing further clarity to the current horizons in virtue ethics, but also to the practical conclusion following from the study: to challenge the reader toward a greater pursuit of the virtuous life.

__A Companion to the Philosophy of Education_ is a comprehensive guide to philosophical thinking about education._ Offers a state-of-the-art account of current and controversial issues in education, including issues pertaining to multiculturalism, special education, sex education, and academic freedom. Written by an international team of leading experts, who are directly engaged with these profound and complex educational problems. Serves as an indispensable guide to the field of philosophy of education.

__A Companion to the Philosophy of Education_ is a comprehensive guide to philosophical thinking about education._ Offers a state-of-the-art account of current and controversial issues in education, including issues pertaining to multiculturalism, special education, sex education, and academic freedom. Written by an international team of leading experts, who are directly engaged with these profound and complex educational problems. Serves as an indispensable guide to the field of philosophy of education.

ABSTRACT This paper addresses three basic questions about moral motivation. Concerning the nature of moral motivation, it argues that it involves responsiveness to both reasons of morality and the value of persons and everything else of value. Moral motivation is thus identified as reason-responsive appropriate valuing. Regarding whether it is possible for people to be morally motivated, the paper relies on Self-Determination Theory (SDT) to show how moral motivation is a likely product of education that is need-supportive in modeling appropriate valuing and engaging students in the kinds of reasoning that are essential to moral motivation. Virtuous motivation that inclines people to engage in morally motivated acts is equated with being morally self-determining or achieving the right kind of integrated motivation. SDT shows how people come to be morally motivated, and the paper concludes that an identified aspiration to be virtuous may play a significant role.

ABSTRACT Self-Determination Theory (SDT) is an empirically based organismic theory of human motivation, development, and well-being that shares many points of interest with the fields of moral development and moral education. Yet, SDT has been largely disconnected from these fields so far. How can we define and empirically assess autonomous moral motivation? How is moral autonomy achieved in the course of development? And what are the relationships between leading a moral life and happiness? These questions have been occupying moral psychologists and educators for a long time. They are focal for SDT, as well. This special issue highlights various lines of intersection between SDT, morality and education. Contributions either expand SDT into the moral domain or incorporate elements of SDT into moral theory with the ultimate goal of integrating fields that inherently belong together.

This article addresses a puzzle about moral learning concerning its social context and the potential for moral progress: Won’t the social context of moral learning shape moral perceptions, beliefs, and motivation in ways that will inevitably limit moral cognition, motivation, and progress? It addresses the relationships between habituation and moral reasoning in Aristotelian moral education, and assesses Julia Annas’s attempt to defend the possibility of moral progress within a virtue ethical framework. Focusing on the motivational core of the puzzle, the article argues that Self-determination Theory (SDT) provides resources for better understanding how moral progress is possible and how moral education can facilitate such progress.

This article examines some central aspects of Kristján Kristjánsson’s book, Aristotelian Character Education, beginning with the claim that contemporary virtue ethics provides methodological, ontological, epistemological, and moral foundations for Aristotelian character education. It considers three different formulations of what defines virtue ethics, and suggests that virtue ethical moral theory has steered character educators away from important aspects of Aristotle’s views on character education. It goes on to suggest a broadening of attention to psychology beyond personality and the psychological status of virtues, and it concludes with an examination of Kristjánsson’s understanding of phronesis.

This chapter identifies confusion about the normative dimensions of sustainability as an important obstacle to teaching the ethics of sustainability across the curriculum. It aims to overcome this obstacle by presenting a framework of sustainability ethics consisting of principles derived from the most basic commitments of common morality. Four rationales and related models for teaching ethics across the curriculum are identified, and an argument for infusing education at all levels with education in sustainability and sustainability ethics is framed on this basis. The prescribed model involves cross-curricular integration and collaborative public service projects, where possible.

This paper addresses the responsibilities of philosophers. It distinguishes philosophers by profession, philosophers as a type of person playing a social role by doing philosophy, and philosophers without any professional or social role as a philosopher. It criticizes and rejects the internal goods view of philosophers’ responsibilities, according to which a philosopher’s only responsibility as a philosopher is to do ‘good’ philosophy. It examines the responsibilities of philosophy professors and the role of philosophy teaching in liberal education, criticizing the implications of the internal goods view for university missions and commenting on related deficiencies of the Code of Conduct of the American Philosophical Association. The central conclusions are that philosophers should accept responsibilities to do philosophy in the public interest and to adopt a cross-disciplinary and collaborative stance toward their role in educating students in the forms of understanding and judgment that will best equip them for life and citizenship.

This paper argues that rural children’s prospects of achieving civic equality within the wider society are limited by the fact that the education they receive is not inclusive, that this is in some respects unjust, and that some partial remedies are available. The non-inclusiveness of rural education is characterized as a form of rural isolation, defined by physical and cultural distance from pathways of opportunity that are significant for civic equality, and by failures of mutually recognized mutual goodwill. Physical and cultural distance are identified as aspects of an evolving geography of opportunity, in which college graduates are highly favored and high-status opportunities are concentrated in cities.

The Handbook of Philosophy of Education is a comprehensive guide to the most important questions about education that are being addressed by philosophers today. Authored by an international team of distinguished philosophers, its thirty-five chapters address fundamental, timely, and controversial questions about educational aims, justice, policy, and practices. Section I (Fundamental Questions) addresses the aims of education, authority to educate, the roles of values and evidence in guiding educational choices, and fundamental questions about human cognition, learning, well-being, and identity. Section II (Virtues of Mind and Character) is concerned with the educational formation of personal attributes that are often seen as essential to flourishing individuals and societies. This section includes chapters on the cultivation of intellectual and character virtues, the nature and formation of expertise, Stoic virtues, and intellectual vices. Section III (Education and Justice) addresses fundamental and emerging issues of educational justice, from equal educational opportunity, racial domination, and linguistic justice in education, to educational problems of mass migration, global educational justice, the education of working children around the world, and the costs of higher education and upward mobility. Section IV (Educational Practices) addresses controversial aspects of contemporary education - pedagogical, curricular, and managerial practices - that deserve careful examination. These include controversies surrounding free speech and instruction in controversial issues; anti-racist, sustainability, and sex education; and the unfulfilled promises and demoralizing impact of high-stakes accountability schemes. The format and jargon-free writing in this volume ensure that topics are interesting and accessible, helping facilitate the work of advanced students and professionals in Education.