Raphael Anderson

The nature of the self is contested within Nietzsche scholarship. Many texts suggest skeptical eliminativism or reduction of the self to sub-personal drives. But core Nietzschean doctrines (self-overcoming, perspectivist objectivity) seem to require substantial _self-management_, and Kantians insist that only a separate, transcendental self could play this role. This chapter resists both naturalistic reductionism and transcendentalism. Through analysis of the nature of drives and affects, and then of their interactions, it shows how the Nietzschean self emerges as a numerically distinct psychological object, over and above its constituent drives and affects. But this minimal self lacks the strong features of a transcendental ‘I’; it is complex, not simple, and its boundaries do not coincide with those of consciousness. Nevertheless, the resulting conception of the self affords an adequate basis for understanding Nietzsche's valuation of autonomy (_self_-governance).

This paper has two goals, one narrower and one wider. The limited goal is to address an interpretive dispute over the Genealogy’s description of the “sovereign individual,” a character type whose features bear on Nietzsche’s distinctive conceptions of conscience, promising, and what it is to take responsibility for oneself. The wider goal is to characterize Nietzschean autonomy. The basic idea is that the meaning of the sovereign individual emerges clearly in light of a distinction from Bernard Williams between two senses of responsibility—one tied to voluntary action, the other to an ambitious conception of responsible agency. What we learn from Williams about responsibility then illuminates Nietzschean autonomy, which is understood as a matter of overcoming psychological weakness by unifying the self.

Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is “contained in” the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: genera are contained in the species formed from them. Kant's thesis then amounts to the claim that no concept hierarchy conforming to division rules can express truths like ‘7 + 5=12.’ Kant is correct. Operation concepts (> 7+5 >) bear two relations to number concepts: >7 5 12> is output. To capture both relations, hierarchies must posit overlaps between concepts that violate the exclusion rule. Thus, such truths are synthetic.

ABSTRACT Nietzsche’s perspectivism can fruitfully be understood as a claim that all our representations are perspectival and absolute representations are impossible. But that treatment leaves unclear another key aspect of Nietzschean perspectivism—the idea that our representations are perspectival because they are ultimately rooted in some way in our values. I motivate this latter aspect of Nietzsche’s account through an argument that relies on the contrast between Bernard Williams’s rejection of “external reasons statements” in the case of practical reasoning, and his reliance on an “absolute conception of the world” in theoretical reasoning. Nietzsche holds, by contrast, that theoretical reasoning, too, can offer only “internal,” and hence perspectival, reasons.

Nietzsche's perspectivism claims that every view is only one view. This claim raises serious self-referential difficulties: if Nietzsche's view is not to refute itself, then any argument offered on its behalf must be merely perspectival, but no such reasons would be convincing to Nietzsche's dogmatic opponents. This dissertation takes a historical approach, arguing that Nietzsche's perspectivism is a development and transformation of Kant's transcendental idealism. Our perspectival notions, like the Kantian categories, are conceptual resources that we bring to experience to organize it. Nietzsche does not accept Kant's transcendental interpretation of our conceptual scheme, however. He offers arguments against the claims to necessary knowledge on which Kant's transcendental approach is based, and also against the coherence of the notion of the thing in itself, which Kant shares with traditional metaphysical realism. These arguments have the force of "internal reasons" against Kant and the realist; they are given from within Nietzsche's own perspective, but they appeal to cognitive standards which Nietzsche shares in common with his dogmatic opponents. They therefore count as reasons in favor of perspectivism, even within the terms of the alternative perspectives, despite the fact that they make no claim to universal, aperspectival validity. Nietzsche can thereby avoid the self-referential difficulties facing his argument. This interpretation also allows Nietzsche to develop "theory-internal" conceptions of truth and objectivity. These conceptions are found to provide a better account of our cognitive practices than the traditional, externalist alternatives.

This article explores various conceptions of Nietzsche’s thoughts on autonomy. It distinguishes six main interpretive approaches, each with its own conception of autonomy: autonomy as spontaneous self-determination, in the sense of traditional free will; a “standard model” interpretation counting actions as autonomous when they are caused by rationalizing beliefs and desires; a view that traces autonomy to a Kantian transcendental subject; constitutivist theories that seek to explain the source of normativity by “deriving ethics from action”; “hierarchical model” interpretations arguing that complex, higher-order attitudes “speak for the agent,” and thereby constitute her autonomy; and conceptions of autonomy as an ethical ideal.

Robert Pippin has recently raised what he calls ‘the Montaigne problem’ for Nietzsche's philosophy: although Nietzsche advocates a ‘cheerful’ mode of philosophizing for which Montaigne is an exemplar, he signally fails to write with the obvious cheerfulness attained by Montaigne. We explore the moral psychological structure of the cheerfulness Nietzsche values, revealing unexpected complexity in his conception of the attitude. For him, the right kind of cheerfulness is radically non-naïve; it expresses the overcoming of justified revulsion at calamitous aspects of life through a reflective, higher-order affirmative attitude. This complex notion of cheerfulness turns out to have roots in Montaigne himself, and it must be thought of as a kind of second nature cultivated through practice, as a kind of second nature. Understanding the meaning of cheerfulness thereby sheds light on the conception of philosophy as a way of life in both Nietzsche and Montaigne.

Nietzsche’s perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of ‘perspectives’ to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore’s treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche’s pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition.

ABSTRACT Pippin treats Nietzsche's moral psychology as the key to his philosophy. Three aspects of the psychology are meant to bear this weight: (1) a critical and deflationary, but irreducibly hermeneutic, conception of the nature of moral psychology itself; (2) a thesis that eros is central to Nietzsche's theory of valuing; and (3) an expressivist theory of action, which replaces the causal role of intention with an interpretive notion of expression in explaining action. Pippin's handling of all three, but especially the third, places Nietzsche's philosophy in a Hegelian light, as does his view that genuine action arises from a deep-going self-dissatisfaction. I raise doubts about whether the expressivist theory of action can be adequate to all actions and suggest that the centrality of self-dissatisfaction for Pippin stands in tension with Nietzsche's own construal of the demand for affirmation of life.

Lucy Allais’s Manifest Reality offers an attractive new interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kantian appearances are known through essentially manifest properties, but those properties are construed as belonging ultimately to things in themselves with intrinsic natures. This position can offer a nice account of the sense in which appearances and things in themselves are identical and a metaphysically plausible way to construe appearances as strictly partially mind-dependent. The position is less convincing when it comes to explaining the sense in which appearances and things in themselves remain non-identical. I argue that such a non-identity thesis was in fact crucial to Kant’s use of idealism to explain the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, to his account of the apriority of the representation of space, and to his anti-Leibnizian point that our mathematical and scientific cognition provides not confused representation of underlying things in themselves, but perfectly exact and strictly true cognition of something else. In closing, I suggest that the hylomorphic nature of Kant’s idealism points toward an alternative conception of the partial mind-dependence of appearances.

My title question has something of the feel of a book club discussion starter, but it has further-reaching implications for understanding Mrs. Dalloway than might first appear. Consider two more mainstream interpretive questions. First, Virginia Woolf's novel places extensive cognitive and aesthetic demands on its readers and thereby participates in the famous "difficulty" of much high-modernist literature. Any interpretation should explain why Woolf thought such a challenge to the capacities and expectations of the reader was necessary or conducive to her purposes. Second, it is an obvious, perhaps the most obvious, feature of the work that it takes the name of a character for its title. That puts Clarissa...

I defend Kant’s definition of analyticity in terms of concept “containment”, which has engendered widespread scepticism. Kant deployed a clear, technical notion of containment based on ideas standard within traditional logic, notably genus/species hierarchies formed via logical division. Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction thereby undermines the logico-metaphysical system of Christian Wolff, showing that the Wolffian paradigm lacks the expressive power even to represent essential knowledge, including elementary mathematics, and so cannot provide an adequate system of philosophy. The results clarify the extent to which analyticity sensu Kant can illuminate the problem of a priori knowledge generally.

This essay is one of ten contributions to a special editorial feature in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 49.2 (Autumn 2018), in which authors were invited to address the following questions: What is the future of Nietzsche studies? What are the most pressing questions its scholars should address? What texts and issues demand our urgent attention? And as we turn to these issues, what methodological and interpretive principles should guide us? The editorship hopes this collection will provide a starting point for discussions about the most fruitful directions for Nietzsche scholarship to take and the most promising avenues for building on the best recent work.

I investigate the consequences of Nietzsche's perspectivism for notions of truth and objectivity, and show how the metaphor of visual perspective motivates an epistemology that avoids self-referential difficulties. Perspectivism's claim that every view is only one view, applied to itself, is often supposed to preclude the perspectivist's ability to offer reasons for her epistemology. Nietzsche's arguments for perspectivism depend on “internal reasons”, which have force not only in their own perspective, but also within the standards of alternative perspectives. Internal reasons allow a perspectivist argument against dogmatism without presupposing aperspectival criteria for theory choice. Nietzsche also offers “internal” conceptions of truth and objectivity which reduce them to a matter of meeting our epistemic standards. This view has pluralistic implications, which conflict with common sense, but it is nevertheless consistent and plausible. Nietzsche's position is similar to Putnam's recent internalism, and this is due to their common Kantian heritage.

Martin offers an intriguing account of nineteenth century challenges to the traditional theory of judgment as a synthesis of subject and predicate (the synthesis theory)--criticisms motivated largely by the problem posed by existential judgments, which need not have two terms at all. Such judgments led to a theory of "thetic" judgments, whose essential feature is to "posit" something, rather than to combine terms (as in synthetic judgment). I argue, however, that Kant's official definition of judgment already implicitly recognizes the importance of positing, and that its (otherwise confusing) abstract generality actually affords Kant's own logic an adequate way to accommodate existential judgments within the traditional synthesis theory. Preservation of a synthetic account of judgment is also found to be independently important for Kant's larger aims in the theory of cognition.