Raquel Bouso

Arguably, emotions figure prominently in contemporary philosophy, not only in the fields of aesthetics and philosophy of religion, but also in the study of morality and cognition. Expressions like “emotional intelligence” are now commonly used and there is even talk of an affective turn in the cognitive sciences. Twentieth-century philosophers paved the way with conceptual creations like “poietic thinking” (dichtende Denken), “sentient intelligence” (inteligencia sentiente) or “poetic reason” (razón poética). It is also widely acknowledged that our apparently rational thoughts, calculations and decisions are inextricably intertwined with our emotions, which even alter our mental judgement without making us aware of it. Thus, the clear contrast between reason and feelings―as separate and mutually exclusive―that runs through much of Western philosophical thought seems to be fading away. We could ask ourselves whether this has been the case in other philosophical traditions, or whether, far from it, this contrast has led them to privilege the rational over the affective. Moreover, in valuing these other traditions as philosophical, it is also worth considering the extent to which this opposition remains valid, perhaps behind the scenes.

Dans la philosophie japonaise, le temps, traditionnellement, n’a jamais été pensé comme séparé de l’espace. Plutôt que de concevoir l’espace-temps de manière abstraite, elle a toujours eu tendance à penser l’expérience d’une temporalité indissociable de la spatialité, une « temporalité spatiale ». À partir de deux créations conceptuelles japonaises, l’une médiévale et l’autre contemporaine, l’une ontologico-existentielle et l’autre esthétique, uji et kire respectivement, nous explorerons deux façons d’exprimer la nature vivante du temps à partir du flux du devenir, celles de Dōgen Kigen et Ōhashi Ryōsuke. Elles ne traitent pas le temps comme une succession d’instants ou comme le récipient neutre du flux des événements, mais comme le cours de la vie appréhendé à partir d’une situation et d’un moment spécifiques.

This paper discusses the notion of disimagination a translation of the German word Entbildung, which was devised by Meister Eckhart as a reinterpretation of the Neoplatonic categories of abstraction (aphairesis) and negation (apophasis)in connection with Nishitani Keiji's standpoint of emptiness. Nishitani proposes a nonsubjective, nonrepresentational, and nonconceptual type of knowledge to avoid the problem of representation implied in the modern subjective self-consciousness that prevents our access to the reality of things. It is argued that what he calls a knowing of non-knowing can be understood as a transposition of the problematics of aphairesis to a new context, that of the formless form. The ontology of images in the creative process, both cosmic and artistic, is examined from Nishitani's identification of likeness and suchness on the field of emptiness. It is suggested that the resulting denial of the traditional distinction between being and appearance approaches a critique closer to postfoundational metaphysics and, like disimagination, aims at an ascetic movement of self-negation and detachment from words and images that leads, in turn, to a creative and playful use of language free of representation.

David Johnson’s book introduces the enormous explanatory potential of Watsuji’s view of nature and one of his most original conceptual creations, fūdo, into the current philosophical discussion. Within the framework of phenomenology and hermeneutics, Johnson brings the idea that nature is part of the very structure of human existence into the limelight. In contrast to the value-free world of nature described by science, at least in a conventional and positivist sense, Watsuji’s nature is a meaningful setting in which subjective and objective elements form a unity. This study shows how conceptual resources from different cultural traditions can enrich our view of the self and nature and, at the same time, pave the way to a reenchantment of nature.

Concerned with the issue of the I-thou encounter and the question of how to overcome the problem of the confrontation that occurs in the worldly existence among individuals, the Japanese philosopher Ueda Shizuteru (1926-), a leading member of the Kyoto School, addressed this issue in his phenomenology of the self. Ueda develops his ideas as a hermeneutical practice in the reading of the well-known Zen classic parable Ten Ox-Herding pictures, given that Zen Buddhism is the main tradition upon which he critically and creatively draws. In accordance with Zen, Ueda argues that the emptied self is a non-self self boundlessly open and compassionate. As a result, the selfless self is open to the other in such a way that a genuine encounter with the other can take place. In the encounter, the closed ego realizes that its self-identity includes also its self-negation, such that, for the selfless self the other’s concerns are one’s concerns. The main aim of this contribution is to look at Ueda’s understanding of the interpersonal relations in what he conceives as a twofold world, that is, the worldly existence and the infinite openness that imbues this existence. In the infinite openness, the fundamental difference between self and other disappears into the state where the individual becomes emptiness while maintaining their “otherness” as separate and distinct. It means that the nullified self still preserves its identity, the other is accepted as different, and at the same time both share this common selfless ground. Thus, a particular conception of identity arises in which we can trace its roots back to Nishida Kitarō’s notion of “self-contradictory identity” (矛盾的自己同一 mujunteki jikodōitsu) and Nishitani Keiji’s “non-duality of self and other” (自他不二 jitafuni). According to the first, each of us, as individual bodies, also contains absolute negation within. The latter refers to a mode of being where self and other are one and simultaneously each one remains what it is in itself, probably inspired in Mahāyāna Buddhist logic whereby two different things are neither one nor two and yet both one and two. Given that the identification of the subject with its context and the emphasis on the sameness can entail the risk of suppressing other’s alterity and subordinating the individual to the whole, these views have been regarded as ambivalent. Therefore, the criticism and implications of this standpoint of “contradictory identity” are also examined. However, the assumption here is that due to the ethical import of this standpoint, it could certainly be of interest if applied to social and intercultural relations.

El maestro zen Hakuin Ekaku enseñaba a sus seguidores que para lograr la liberación del sufrimiento debían poner en tela de juicio su propia capacidad de comprensión y al mismo tiempo dotarse de una gran confianza en la posibilidad del despertar a la verdad que persigue el budismo. Su método consistía en practicar una serie de kōan, una técnica meditativa basada en la resolución de unos casos aparentemente paradójicos o ilógicos, hasta que el practicante llegara a convertirse en una «gran masa de duda». Dos siglos más tarde, el filósofo japonés Nishitani Keiji, ampliamente reconocido como uno de los miembros más destacados de la llamada Escuela de Kioto, se propuso como tarea pensar el problema del nihilismo, como fenómeno filosófico pero también histórico y existencial. Este artículo examina el modo en que Nishitani aborda el problema del nihilismo y su propuesta de resolución a partir de la influencia ejercida por el maestro Hakuin en él y, más concretamente, el papel que desempeña en su argumentación la noción zen de «gran duda». Sugerimos que el pensamiento de Nishitani se puede situar en la línea de una tradición espiritual que se halla representada en el zen de Hakuin, en la medida en que ve en la duda radical una forma de hallar la certeza, o en la negación de la negación, una afirmación absoluta.

Our starting point is a remark made by an art historian, Charles Carman, to the theorist of art Norman Bryson regarding his interpretation of the Japanese philosopher Nishitani Keiji's standpoint of emptiness. Bryson claims that Nishitani's standpoint supports his contrast between Western and non-Western gaze. On the contrary, Carman sees Nishitani's standpoint closer to the Renaissance theory of vision as found in Alberti and Nicholas von Cues and so not as opposite to Western tradition as a whole but to a major trend of it. Our suggestion here is that while Nishitani's standpoint illustrates an Asian way of thinking, at the same time it sheds light upon Western assumptions. Therefore, it constitutes a demonstration of how much it can be significant to integrate non-European cultures into the philosophical and art theory discussions in order to broaden our understanding of the discipline of aesthetics.

A palavra japonesa geidō 芸道 é formada por dois caracteres: o primeiro remete à “habilidade” ou “capacidade” de executar algo e o segundo a uma “via” ou “caminho”, de maneira que poderia ser traduzida por “via da arte”. Como observou Hisamatsu Shin’ichi em um diálogo com Martin Heidegger, “via”, aqui, não significa simplesmente “método”, mas mantém uma profunda relação com a vida. No entanto, para nomear a “arte” no sentido moderno “ocidental estético”,emprega-se, em japonês, o neologismo geijutsu 芸術. O segundo caráter, neste caso, contém mais claramente o significado de “método” ou “técnica”, além de “êxito/realização” e “destreza”. Partindo das distintas conotações que os dois termos evocam, propomo-nos a examinar a concepção tradicional e moderna da arte, no Japão, à luz das reflexões dos filósofos da Escola de Kioto sobre o “lugar do nada” (mu no basho 無の場所) como “campo expressivo”(hyōgenteki sekai表現的世界). Com isso, tentaremos mostrar a correspondência existente entre a concepção de arte como poiesis, ou autoexpressão criativa, de alguns desses filósofos e a compreensão tradicional japonesa da arte como via.

This paper discusses the notion of disimagination a translation of the German word Entbildung, which was devised by Meister Eckhart as a reinterpretation of the Neoplatonic categories of abstraction (aphairesis) and negation (apophasis) in connection with Nishitani Keiji's standpoint of emptiness. Nishitani proposes a nonsubjective, nonrepresentational, and nonconceptual type of knowledge to avoid the problem of representation implied in the modern subjective self-consciousness that prevents our access to the reality of things. It is argued that what he calls a knowing of non-knowing can be understood as a transposition of the problematics of aphairesis to a new context, that of the formless form. The ontology of images in the creative process, both cosmic and artistic, is examined from Nishitani's identification of likeness and suchness on the field of emptiness. It is suggested that the resulting denial of the traditional distinction between being and appearance approaches a critique closer to postfoundational metaphysics and, like disimagination, aims at an ascetic movement of self-negation and detachment from words and images that leads, in turn, to a creative and playful use of language free of representation.

With the expression apophatic aesthetics, Amador Vega names different cases of twentieth-century hermeneutics of negativity that show a spiritual debt to negative theology and in particular to the major mystical trends of Medieval Europe. Our aim here is to explore how this category applies to the artistic work created by the contemporary artists Arakawa and Gins. However, our focus is not on the debt of these artists to apophatism in the Christian tradition but in Buddhism, especially in Zen. Through an analysis of various artworks, the article intends to determine the reminiscences of the evocation of emptiness in Zen-related arts. By so doing, despite the lack of continuity with tradition, it seems possible to uncover certain links with Japanese classic aesthetics. At the same time, since emptiness is a notion revisited in modern Japanese thought, the paper raises the question of its role as an ascetic way of thought, capable of avoiding conceptual limitations and thus opening new paths to philosophy. In this sense, insofar as thinkers well known as critics of modernity, such as Lyotard, Danto, or Taylor, have dialogued with Arakawa and Gins's artistic proposal, a connection between certain aspects of Japanese philosophy and so-called postmodern thought is suggested.

Abe Masao 阿部正雄 is accepted by many as a member of the Kyoto School of philosophy, known primarily for its role in drawing together distinct traditions of Western and Asian thought.1 Abe was a key figure in this respect, dedicating much of his career to dialogue with Western philosophers and theologians.2 Through his many essays, translations, lectures, and conversations, Abe brought Zen Buddhism to audiences in Europe and the United States. In particular, he introduced his own interpretation of the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 and his followers, to Western audiences. Through his work in Japanese, especially his final essays, Abe also developed a more personal perspective and...

This book presents the first collection of essays on the philosophy of Ueda Shizuteru in a Western language. Ueda, the last living member of the Kyoto school, has fostered the East-West dialogue in all his works and has helped to open up the Western image of philosophy by engaging the Zen tradition. The book reflects this particular trait of Ueda’s philosophy, but it also covers all thematic fields of his writings. Contributions from both young and established scholars and experts from Japan, Europe and the U.S. make this a unique introduction to and reception of Ueda’s philosophy. Readers will discover discussions of mysticism in the East and West, and consideration of modern philosophy topics including self-awareness, nature and poetic language. The book also presents a focussed look at language and nothingness, considering silence and nihilism. Chapters allow the reader to understand the timeliness of a thinking that mediates and transcends the dichotomy of East and West. This volume will appeal not only to scholars of Nishida, Japanese philosophy, mysticism and religious experience in Japan, but also to scholars of Western philosophy, especially those interested in Meister Eckhart, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber. It makes an ideal introduction to Zen philosophy and presents important contributions to scholarship on language and experience.