Rasmus Hansen

This article explores the construction of health data spaces through the lens of border work. It provides insights into the complex attachments and detachments that come to the fore when establishing centralized health data access bodies in the Nordic countries. By comparing Denmark, Norway, and Finland, the study unveils a variety of border work practices. These practices include the complex interplay between national infrastructures, local practices, and regulatory frameworks, the management of continuous attachments through additional loops, and negotiations over public-private borders. The study shows that, despite policy goals envisioning health data access bodies as seamless one-stop shops for ‘detached’ data, the data remains attached to places, institutions, people, and countries. Consequently, new data spaces tend to emerge and co-exist with existing ones. Our analysis of the Nordic experiences offers valuable lessons and critical insights for ongoing efforts to build a European Health Data Space. We further suggest that this stickiness of fragmentation might be a common feature of big data policy efforts.

This article explores the construction of health data spaces through the lens of border work. It provides insights into the complex attachments and detachments that come to the fore when establishing centralized health data access bodies in the Nordic countries. By comparing Denmark, Norway, and Finland, the study unveils a variety of border work practices. These practices include the complex interplay between national infrastructures, local practices, and regulatory frameworks, the management of continuous attachments through additional loops, and negotiations over public-private borders. The study shows that, despite policy goals envisioning health data access bodies as seamless one-stop shops for ‘detached’ data, the data remains attached to places, institutions, people, and countries. Consequently, new data spaces tend to emerge and co-exist with existing ones. Our analysis of the Nordic experiences offers valuable lessons and critical insights for ongoing efforts to build a European Health Data Space. We further suggest that this stickiness of fragmentation might be a common feature of big data policy efforts.

According to the ‘integration approach’, interpretations of political concepts should explain that they stand for rights we ought to respect and be both compatible and mutually supporting. I start by clarifying what this means, and proceed to an examination of Ronald Dworkin’s latest argument for value holism. I argue that his argument fails to provide a convincing case for the integration approach. I go on to argue that we nonetheless should accept that interpretations of political concepts should be compatible, because denying it would be inconsistent with, and the fact that ‘ought implies can’. I then provide reasons for thinking that we also cannot really satisfy for any particular concept without giving reasons in term of what fall under other concepts—that is, interpreting the concepts as mutually supporting. We thus have reasons to accept both parts of. Finally, I defend the integration approach from three important objections: First, that it conflates different values; secondly, that it is inconsistent with ordinary language-usage; and thirdly, that it overlooks important telic values. I conclude that none of these compels us to abandon the integration approach.

G. A. Cohen argues that egalitarians should compensate for expensive tastes or for the fact that they are expensive. Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, regards most expensive tastes as unworthy of compensation — only if a person disidentifies with his own such tastes (i.e. wishes he did not have them) is compensation appropriate. Dworkinians appeal, inter alia, to the so-called ‘first-person’ or ‘continuity’ test. According to the continuity test, an appropriate standard of interpersonal comparison reflects people's own assessment of their relative standing: Person A can only legitimately demand compensation from person B if he regards himself as worse off, all things considered, than B. The typical bearer of expensive tastes does not regard herself as being worse off than others with less expensive tastes. Hence, in the typical case, pace Cohen, compensation for expensive tastes is inappropriate. The article scrutinizes this rationale for not compensating for expensive tastes. Especially, we try to bolster the continuity test by relating it to Dworkin's distinction between integrated and detached values, pointing out that an argument for the continuity test can be built on the assumption that equality has integrated value. In brief, the point is that a metric of equality should be assessed, partly, in virtue of its consequences for related ideals. One of these is the kind of justificatory community promoted by the continuity test. We defend this view against an objection to the effect that equality is a detached value. We conclude that the continuity test constitutes a strong foothold for the resourcist egalitarian reluctance to compensate people for their expensive tastes

Liberal egalitarianism is commonly criticized for being insufficiently sensitive to status inequalities and the effects of misrecognition. I examine this criticism as it applies to Ronald Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’ and argue that, in fact, liberal egalitarians possess the resources to deal effectively with recognition-type issues. More precisely, while conceding that the distributive principles required to realize equality of resources must apply against a particular institutional background, I point out, following Dworkin, that among the principles guiding this background is a ‘principle of independence,’ and that this principle, properly interpreted, requires government to protect people against the disadvantageous effects of wrongful prejudicial discrimination. Moreover, I give an account of wrongful prejudice which is grounded in a particular interpretation of the abstract egalitarian principle Dworkin requires for a government to be legitimate and which goes a long way toward acknowledging status inequalities. Finally, I suggest other resources within the theory for responding to residual problems of recognition not addressed by the principle of independence