Rastko Jevtic

In this paper, I examine the critiques of the Archimedean point of knowledge in Descartes’ philosophy – cogito, (ergo) sum – as presented by Moritz Schlick and Alfred Ayer. Both prominent philosophers of the positivist tradition believe that there is something problematic about the “first truth” of Descartes’ system, though they identify different sources of the issue. Schlick believes that Descartes arrives at the cogito on the basis of the faculty of intuition; thus, he presents an interesting critique of the possibility of such a faculty. Although not without merit, Schlick’s intuitionist interpretation is, unfortunately, inconsistent with Descartes’ text. In other words, Schlick uses a concept of intuition that differs from the one used by Descartes. This equivocation significantly weakens the immediacy of his critique, as it automatically renders it external to Descartes’ philosophy. On the other hand, Ayer’s linguistic-logical interpretation attributes Descartes’ justification of the cogito to the relationship between statements and logical concepts such as self-contradiction, implication, and negation. Not only is Ayer’s interpretation clearly external and anachronistic — since it relies on the concepts of 20th-century philosophy of language and logic — but it is also limited by the substantive aspect of Descartes’ method. The culmination of the methodical doubt — the possibility of the existence of an all-powerful Demon — prevents the cogito and sum from being justified through high-theoretical means such as Ayer’s linguistic-logical conceptual apparatus. Although both critiques are insufficiently informed by the primary text, they nevertheless “strike” at the core of two seemingly opposing tendencies in the justification of the first truths of Descartes’ philosophy, thereby raising the question: is the cogito the result of intuition or of logical processes? I address this question in the final chapter of the paper by drawing on a somewhat neglected Descartes’ work, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in order to better understand Descartes’ concepts of intuition and reasoning. Once these are understood, it becomes clear that the faculties of intuition and reasoning are not mutually exclusive but that faculty of reasoning depends on intuition; consequently, it is revealed that the dilemma posed by the above question is a false one.

My conversation with Professor Cottingham – one of the foremost living authorities on Descartes – aimed to illuminate often-overlooked aspects of Descartes’ system and to explore unconventional interpretative perspectives. As a result, themes such as Descartes’ metaethics, philosophy of emotions, and the ontology and teleology of human beings and animals take center stage. Naturally, discussing a Janusian figure like Descartes necessitates examining influences that penetrate deep into the past, present, and future, Our conversation, therefore, extends to his Ancient and Medieval predecessors, his contemporaries, and his successors. The depth of his influence also invites Professor Cottingham’s reflections on contemporary themes, including issues of (mental) representation, problems of inverted spectrum, qualia problems etc. Ultimately, it might be easier to list the topics we didn’t discuss than those we covered. Serbian – and all other – readers are fortunate to have such an intellectual delight before them.

In contemporary scholarship, Descartes' Demon has been often treated as a thought experiment with no connection to the world and the views of the 17th century. This rather anachronistic take has been challenged, with some attempting to interpret it within a broader historical Christian context (e.g., Scarre 1990). The most recent challenge has come from scholars focusing on Teresa de Ávila's work (Mercer 2016; Forsman 2023), notably her Inner Castle, as it likely had a profound influence on Descartes. Our goal is to show how radically new Descartes' idea of a demon was despite its historical continuity and the apparent influences of monastic literature. We first outline the ontological status of demons and their ways of deception from late Antiquity to Teresa de Ávila and Descartes. Then, we turn to Descartes' Demon and the differences between Descartes' account and traditional ones. While traditional accounts point towards the moral domain (e.g., the ways demons influence humans and the ways we can negate the influence), Descartes' Demon has the purpose of endangering all knowledge. Therefore, Descartes, unlike Teresa de Ávila and other traditional authors, needs a deceiver far more powerful than any demon in the Christian tradition. The attribution of omnipotence to a demon, if only for theoretical purposes, represents a huge break with traditional Christian demonology. Finally, by comparing the Descartes' Demon with the brain-in-a-vat skeptical scenario, we establish two conclusions: (1) the possibility of such a demon represents the most radical form of skepticism, whereas the brain-in-a-vat scenario is less extreme; and (2) these thought experiments demonstrate how underlying metaphysical and theological frameworks shape the formulation of these scenarios and how far they can reach.