Ravi Thakral

Indefinite singular (IS) noun phrases are a familiar but under-theorized feature of moral discourse (such as in "A virtuous person prioritizes self-improvement"). While widely used in definitions and generalizations about character, their semantic and normative significance has gone largely unexamined. This paper argues that IS moral generalizations serve a dual function in moral thought: a definitional role in articulating principles (e.g., "An act is right iff it maximizes happiness") and a metalinguistic role in negotiating moral concepts (e.g., "A good person is generous"). We propose that many IS moral generalizations operate not merely as descriptive statements, but as normative proposals that shape how moral terms should be used. We distinguish these uses from standard characterizing generalizations and show that IS constructions allow for moral concepts---such as virtue, goodness, and rightness---to be dynamically defined, contested, and taught. This reveals a novel perspective on how language contributes to the evolution and application of moral norms.

A prevailing thought is that generics have a covert modal operator at logical form. I claim that if this is right, the covert generic modality is a weak necessity modal. In this paper, I provide evidence for this claim and I sketch a theory. In particular, I will show that there are some important distributional parallels between generics and sentences with overt weak necessity modals: both sorts of sentences share behavior in nonmonotonic reasoning environments and also lack genuine epistemic readings. Acknowledging these parallels and the connection here is in the service of both our understanding of genericity and of weak necessity. Finally, I propose an understanding of generics as involving a covert weak necessity modal and argue that this is a promising path to pursue in relation to different issues related to the interpretation of generics.

I argue that moral principles involve the same sort of generalization as ordinary yet elusive generic generalizations in natural language such as ‘Tigers are striped’ or ‘Peppers are spicy’. A notable advantage of the generic view is that it simultaneously allows for pessimism and optimism about the role and status of moral principles in our lives. It provides a new perspective on the nature of moral principles on which principles are not apt for determining the moral status of particular actions while they may be apt, and even fundamental, to our acquisition of moral knowledge. A natural consequence of the view is variation among moral principles, with some regularly warranting exceptions and some appearing arguably exceptionless. I will also argue that this generic conception of moral principles has significant advantages, as a normative model of moral reasoning, over the view of moral principles as defaults advanced in recent years.