Raymond Belliotti

The question of the morality ofin vitro fertilization is examined. One of the central questions to be answered is whether the zygote loss that seems inseparable from the process is morally justified. Even when embryo transfer occurs, many zygotes which have been intentionally created are intentionally destroyed; they are used as means to the alleged benefits that others will attain (the benefit to the infertile couple, to the child produced by the process, and to those who might benefit from the increase of genetic knowledge that allegedly will occur fromin vitro research).The justifications advanced in defense of early abortion are discussed, and it is shown that these justifications must be totally distinct from those advanced in support ofin vitro fertilization.A theory of values is proposed which shows why a set of reasons may justify early abortion, but not an abortion late in the pregnancy. This theory states that the value characteristics of an entity are notidentical to the characteristics which make the entityhuman.It is concluded that if certain key empirical assumptions are correct, then in vitro fertilization is a morally permissible process; however, the falsity of these assumptions, or the unsoundness of the theory of value, might well result in a reversal of this judgment.

I provide a framework for honor, descriptions and conditions of the form that honor codes take, and the typical directions that they assume: the nature of an honor code; its relationship to identity and self-worth; the emotional reactions fulfilling and violating an honor code produce; the phenomena of losing and regaining honor; the ways honor codes may be infringed; and how members of honor groups may react when one of their peers transgresses against an imperative of their shared code. The content of a system of honor is provided by the specific values, principles, and norms that a particular honor code embraces and celebrates.I then distinguish self-respect from pride and from arrogance, claiming that merited pride or enhanced self-respect is a reward for fulfilling the imperatives, principles, and norms of an honor code. I consider the question whether honor codes are obsolete, the remnants of patriarchal oppression and toxic masculinity that reflect a world properly transcended. Sketching a case in favor of honor, I invoke the individual-community continuum and advance philosophical analyses of achieving meaning in human life and exercising will to power. I argue that commitment to honor can soften the tension between our need to connect with others and our uneasiness that doing so will suffocate our identity, while facilitating meaning and purpose in our lives, as well as offering an outlet for exerting will to power. Finally, I conjure a dialogue between Spada, a representative of honor, and Cicogna, a representative of piety, that calls into question and critically examines some of my earlier assertions.

The Godfather describes the existential conflict between two sets of values partially constituting competing prescriptive and descriptive visions of the world: a nineteenth-century Sicilian perspective grounded in honor and the accumulation of power within a culturally specific family order, and a twentieth-century American perspective celebrating individualism and commercial success. The two sets of values coalesce uneasily in the same cultural setting and their conflict is irresolvable. Ultimately, the Sicilian perspective must wither away in the United States because, unlike the old country, the new world lacks its sustaining cultural conditions. This reading interprets The Godfather as, among other things, a commentary on the transformation of personal identity within the Sicilian and Italian immigrant experience.As such, this chapter provides the foundation for understanding The Godfather as showcasing the existential incompatibility of nineteenth-century Sicilian patriarchal values and twentieth-century American culture. An honor code discordant with its cultural context is highly vulnerable.

In this chapter, I introduce and evaluate versions of existential authenticity, advanced by Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Soren Kierkegaard, Jean Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus.I conclude that the varieties of existential authenticity, taken collectively, evince numerous insights: They deny the existence of an antecedently given true self that might provide guidance to human choice and action; they insist on recognizing freedom and responsibility, and minimizing resorting to excuses when evaluating actions; they distance the individual from the false necessities of dominant ideas and fixed social conventions; they advocate that we create our identities through our deliberations, choices, and actions under conditions of radical uncertainty; and they concede that a measure of faith is required for vibrant living.Nevertheless, we should be cautious about wholesale enthusiasm. I sketch criticisms of the ideal of authenticity that demonstrate the ideal’s fragility. Then I add my own suspicions. Still, if authenticity is not everything, to conclude that it is nothing is unwarranted.

In this chapter, I state and briefly explain the military canon of conduct that constitutes its honor code. I then document some prominent cases of military honor and dishonor. Finally, I explain under what circumstances the military honor code is most likely to resonate and support military rectitude and under what circumstances the military honor code is most likely to fail. Pivotal to this understanding will be conflicts between (a) loyalty to peers and to unit, and the internalized imperative to preserve their reputations, and (b) the principle of holding dishonorable peers and dishonorable conduct to account.

In this chapter, I argue for an understanding of authentic living that builds on the strengths of the previously examined versions of existential authenticity, while editing or amending their more extravagant claims. I conclude by offering a revised rendering of authenticity, one requiring a person to reject the existence of an essential fixed self; to be suspicious of, but not automatically dismissive of dominant societal values; to deny that hedonistic comfort and personal security are the highest values; to respect both the value and limitations of reason; to recognize the need for faith; to act as if the person is free; to take responsibility for actions and avoid excuses; to confront the reality of the human condition, avoiding self-deception, spurning false necessity, and directly confronting mortality; to constitute the self through commitments, convictions, choices, and actions in social contexts; to affirm life through intense living; to be true to the self being constructed and to exude a measure of uniqueness; and to confront mortality as an ever-present possibility.

In this chapter, I explain core Roman aristocratic values and the context from which they emerged. I continue by sketching the Roman veneration of the traditions of mos maiorum and the importance of seeing oneself as a link in a generational chain, which confers special obligations and prescribes specific values. Then, I unpack the Roman aristocratic code of honor and the seven dimensions that served as its ballast: a competition for dignitas, emphasis on willful action promoting the common good; the primacy of military valor; the principles of cruelty and clemency; the importance of oratory in the courtroom; maintaining poise in the face of insults; and an imperative of reciprocity. I then conduct character studies of Marcus Tullius Cicero and Gaius Julius Caesar, historical exemplars of the struggle for dignitas in political, military, legal, and literary settings. Finally, I assess the distinctions and limitations of the Roman quest for honor and what the Roman code can teach us about the celebration of honor.

This is the introduction to the book. In the introduction, I describe the fears and hopes of the individual-community continuum, describe what I will do in the six main chapters of the book, provide preliminary observations about the concepts of honor and authenticity, and herald how my revised understanding of authenticity, once joined to a sense of honor, can ease some of the tensions arising from the individual-community continuum. In so doing, I suggest that my recommendations can contribute to leading more meaningful human lives.

This book is a philosophical investigation of the concepts of honor and authenticity, informed by the paradoxes of the individual-community continuum. To achieve this difficult balancing act, the author refines our concepts of both honor and authenticity. Raymond Angelo Belliotti begins by investigating honor as a moral and social framework, analyzing its historical significance, particularly within the Roman aristocracy, and its portrayal in The Godfather. He then turns to military honor codes, exploring their ethical implications and challenges. From there, the discussion transitions to existentialist notions of authenticity as articulated by Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus, assessing both their insights and limitations. Ultimately, the work argues for a revised understanding of authenticity. Marrying the notions of authenticity and honor, the reader is offered a path toward living a more meaningful and purposeful life.

The failure of medical codes to provide adequate guidance for physicians' moral dilemmas points to the fact that some rules of analysis, informed by moral theory, are needed to assist in resolving perplexing ethical problems occurring with increasing frequency as medical technology advances. Initially, deontological and teleological theories appear more helpful, but critcisms can be lodged against both, and neither proves to be sufficient in itself. This paper suggests that to elude the limitations of previous approaches, a method of moral decision making must be developed incorporating both coherence methodology and some independently supported theoretical foundations. Wide Reflective Equilibrium is offered, and its process described along with a theory of the person which is used to animate the process. Steps are outlined to be used in the process, leading to the application of the method to an actual case.

The Godfather describes the existential conflict between two sets of values partially constituting competing prescriptive and descriptive visions of the world: a nineteenth-century Sicilian perspective grounded in honor and the accumulation of power within a fixed family order and a twentieth-century American perspective celebrating individualism and commercial success. Neither the film nor the book upon which it is based concludes that one of these sets of values is inherently superior.However, the two sets of values coalesce uneasily in the same cultural setting, and their conflict is irresolvable. Ultimately, the Sicilian perspective must wither away in the United States because, unlike the old country, the new world lacks its sustaining cultural conditions. This reading interprets The Godfather as, among other things, a commentary on the transformation of personal identity within the Sicilian immigrant experience.