Raymond Turner

© 2015 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Examining the function of individual human hippocampal subfields remains challenging because of their small sizes and convoluted structures. Previous human fMRI studies at 3 T have successfully detected differences in activation between hippo-campal cornu ammonis field CA1, combined CA2, CA3, and dentate gyrus region, and the subiculum during associative memory tasks. In this study, we investigated hippocampal subfield activity in healthy participants using an associative memory paradigm during high-resolution fMRI scanning at 7 T. We were able to localize fMRI activity to anterior CA2 and CA3 during learning and to the posterior CA2 field, the CA1, and the posterior subiculum during retrieval of novel associations. These results provide insight into more specific human hippocampal subfield functions underlying learning and memory and a unique opportunity for future investigations of hippocampal subfield function in healthy individuals as well as those suffering from neurodegenerative diseases.

We may wonder about the status of logical accounts of the meaning of language. When does a particular proposal count as a theory? How do we judge a theory to be correct? What criteria can we use to decide whether one theory is “better” than another? Implicitly, many accounts attribute a foundational status to set theory, and set-theoretic characterisations of possible worlds in particular. The goal of a semantic theory is then to find a translation of the phenomena of interest into a set-theoretic model. Such theories may be deemed to have “explanatory” or “predictive” power if a mapping can found into expressions of set-theory that have the appropriate behaviour by virtue of the rules of set-theory (for example Montague 1973; Montague1974). This can be contrasted with an approach in which we can help ourselves to “new” primitives and ontological categories, and devise logical rules and axioms that capture the appropriate inferential behaviour (as in Turner 1992). In general, this alternative approach can be criticised as being mere “descriptivism”, lacking predictive or explanatory power. Here we will seek to defend the axiomatic approach. Any formal account must assume some normative interpretation, but there is a sense in which such theories can provide a more honest characterisation (cf. Dummett 199). In contrast, the set-theoretic approach tends to conflate distinct ontological notions. Mapping a pattern of semantic behaviour into some pre-existing set-theoretic behaviour may lead to certain aspects of that behaviour being overlooked, or ignored (Chierchia & Turner 1988; Bealer 1982). Arguments about the explanatory and predictive power of set-theoretic interpretations can also be questioned (see Benacerraf 1965, for example). We aim to provide alternative notions for evaluating the quality of a formalisation, and the role of formal theory. Ultimately, claims about the methodological and conceptual inadequacies of axiomatic accounts compared to set-theoretic reductions must rely on criteria and assumptions that lie outside the domain of formal semantics as such.