Rei Takahashi

We often talk as if things can benefit or harm groups, such as states and corporations. But do groups have well-being? Despite its potential importance to many areas of practical philosophy, this question has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. I will try to make progress on this underexplored question by offering a partial defense of group well-being. After setting out the wide significance of this topic, I defend the well-being of groups against the objection from the consciousness requirement. It is widely accepted that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is necessary for having well-being. If this consciousness requirement is true and no groups have the capacity for consciousness, then groups cannot have well-being. In response, I argue that we should not accept the consciousness requirement as it is currently formulated, because the requirement is undermotivated and faces a counterexample. I first show that two possible supports for the consciousness requirement are unconvincing. I also make a positive case for the view that groups have well-being in the course of this discussion. I then argue that we should weaken the consciousness requirement because it faces a counterexample. This weakened requirement that I propose will allow groups to have well-being while maintaining the appealing idea that there is some intimate connection between well-being and consciousness. I appeal to metaphysical perdurantism to support my proposal.