Reiss Kruger

This thesis brings together the works of Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MacIntyre in an attempt to overcome what I have identified as problems in the normative sociological project of the former. Critiques levied against the is-ought problem implicit in the normative aspects of Habermas' theory of communicative action, and the role that the concepts of lifeworld plays in Habermas' overall theory, are overcome through a dialogue with the works of MacIntyre. In proposing MacIntyre's idea of 'traditions of inquiry' as a sociologically valuable tool of investigation and understanding, the author also seeks to access some of the normatively driving ideas about human goods, communities, and flourishing from MacIntyre and bring them into dialogue with Habermas' normative project. To do this however, certain disagreements, especially about modernity, must be either overcome or shown to be not significant enough to questions at hand. In facilitating this dialogue between Habermas and MacIntyre, the MacIntyrean concept of 'translatability' is employed to judge the similarities and differences between the two theorists' ideas, and judge how debilitating the differences that exist are. All this is aimed reconceptualizing sociology as a normative exercise, not merely restricted to the description of the social world, but fruitfully engaging with questions of 'what ought we to do.'

Beginning with Margaret Somers and Christopher Roberts’ review of the sociology of human rights and Bryan Turner and Malcolm Waters’ debate therein, the author presents some of the questions which have been so far been the focus of this sociological sub-discipline. This review raises the question of ‘rights’ as a subject of study, and the normative consequences therein. From here, the author introduces recognition theory as a potential participant in these discussions around human rights. The author traces recognition theory from its Hegelian origins to the work of Axel Honneth, and the critiques of Nancy Fraser, Frantz Fanon, and Glen Sean Coulthard. Despite Fanon and Coulthard’s critical accounts, they reinforce the value of recognition within any sociology of human rights. Lastly, the author briefly engages with Alasdair MacIntyre as both a dialogical participant, and a means towards dialogue in the first place between recognition theory and human rights. Concluding, the author argues that the normative and descriptive nature of recognition theory offers a useful tool to aid in sociological theorizations of human nature and rights, while addressing some of the problems raised by early theorists of the sub-discipline and preventing siloing of the sub-discipline within a universalist or particularist vein.